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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to
use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate
conflict. The end of the Cold War has fostered a new spirit
of enthusiasm for the peacekeeping function of the United
Nations. This enthusiasm encouraged the view that the
deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces can serve as a panacea
for a wide range of conflicts. This includes intrastate
conflicts.
This new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the
belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state
is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the
world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not
to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to
examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this
task.
This thesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter
II surveys the "evolution" of the concept of peacekeeping and
new roles assigned to U.N. forces. This chapter also examines
an emerging trend in conflict in the late twentieth century -
state disintegration. Chapter III investigates the ability of
the United Nations to execute these new missions given its
inherent limitations as a system of highly diverse political
iii
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actors. Chapter IV evaluates the problems intrinsic in this
new class of mission, such as the efficacy of the use of force
and the requirements for the control of large tracts of
territory. Chapter V is a case study of the political process
as it emerged in the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC).
In the final analysis , this thesis contends that the
United Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to
use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate
conflict. The end of the Cold War has fostered a new spirit
of enthusiasm for the peacekeeping function of the United
Nations. This enthusiasm encouraged the view that the
deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces can serve as a panacea
for a wide range of conflicts. This includes intrastate
conflicts.
This new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the
belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state
is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the
world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not
to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to
examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this
task.
The ramifications of this new direction give rise to a
host of questions, such as: one, what are the requirements
for an external actor to be capable of brokering a solution
to intrastate conflicts and forming stable governments in
states that have all but collapsed? Two, is the U.N. capable
of the decisive, effective action required in these operations
viii
given its inherent limitations as an organization of
politically diverse member states? Three, what are the
principal difficulties in the use of external military forces
to solve an intrastate conflict? And finally, can the
"successful" completion of a United Nations peacekeeping
operation ensure the future viability of the state?
In order to address these questions this thesis is
structured around four chapters. Chapter II surveys the
"evolution" of the concept of peacekeeping and new roles
assigned to U.N. forces. This chapter also examines an
emerging trend in conflict in the late twentieth century -
state disintegration. Chapter III investigates the ability of
the United Nations to execute these new missions given its
inherent limitations as a system of highly diverse political
actors. Chapter IV evaluates the problems intrinsic in this
new class of mission, such as the efficacy of the use of force
and the requirements for the control of large tracts of
territory. Chapter V is a case study of the political process
as it emerged in the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC).
Integral to this thesis was a research trip to Cambodia in
April and May 1993, just a few weeks prior to the United
Nations-administered elections. The author was afforded full
access to the UNTAC mission area, ranging from the troop level
to an interview with the second highest ranking civilian
ix
official in UNTAC, the Deputy Special Representative of the
mission. This trip also included visits to front line units
of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces, interviews with the
local population (including ethnic Vietnamese refugees along
the Mekong River as the fled racially motivated violence).
Interviews were also conducted in Washington D.C. and New York
at the U.S. State Department, U.S. Mission to the United
Nations, and United Nations Headquarters. Additionally, the
author has had extensive experience working with the United
Nations as a military observer in the U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO) in Israel and Egypt and was able to
closely examine the functioning of other peacekeeping
operations.
While this thesis is meant to be both descriptive and
prescriptive, its ultimate purpose is to provide an analytical
framework to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of United
Nations intervention to save failing states. The final
product is a result of both personal experience and a careful
review of the positions of both enthusiasts and detractors of
the U.N. 's recent expansion into these new mission areas. In
the final analysis, this thesis contends that the United
Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-
suited to deal with situations as intractable as Cambodia or
Somalia.
I . INTRODUCTION
In a time of renewed enthusiasm for multilateral
operations, the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)
represent a new class of mission for the United Nations. This
new mission type is a move away from traditional
"peacekeeping" operations: the imposition of a neutral force
as a confidence building mechanism between states with an
established truce or cease-fire. This new class of mission,
the placement of military and civilian authorities in the
intrastate conflict of a "failing" state, represents an
increase in mission difficulty that is geometric, not linear.
It is important to clearly define and understand the
limitations of this new category of mission before
policy-makers commit U.S. forces to an expanded U.N. mandate.
In a September 1993 speech at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, stated that
clarifying the U.S. military's role in future U.N. operations
was one of the most important policy challenges of the 1990s.
The purpose of this thesis will be to evaluate the
challenges presented by this new interventionism by examining
both the inherent difficulties in this type of operation and
the United Nations' system in general. This thesis will
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demonstrate that the mission requirements for successful
resolution of these internal conflicts are, by nature,
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the United Nations
to accomplish through military operations.
A. BACKGROUND
The world-wide "call to arms" for this new class of
mission was made by the U.N. Secretary-General in his 1992
report, An Agenda for Peace . In this report to the Security
Council, Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared his intention to
embrace this new class of mission with the statement, "the
time of absolute sovereignty has passed." This new initiative
on the part of the U.N. gives rise to a host of questions,
most of which remain unanswered. Key among them are: first,
what are the requirements for an external actor to be capable
of brokering a solution to intrastate conflicts and forming
stable governments in states that have all but collapsed?
Second, is the U.N. capable of the decisive, effective action
required in these operations given its inherent limitations as
an organization of politically diverse member states? Third,
what are the principal barriers that confront external
military forces when they intervene to solve an intrastate
conflict? And fourth, can the "successful" completion of a
United Nations peacekeeping operation ensure the future
viability of the state?
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B . APPROACH
This thesis is structured around four independent but
closely related chapters: The New Era of Peacekeeping,
Problems of Coalitions, Problems of Intervention and an UNTAC
Case Study. A final chapter discusses the conclusions reached
in each of these chapters.
Chapter II begins with an overview of the evolution of
U.N. peacekeeping concepts and the U.N. system of forming
missions. This comprehensive overview will discern the
differences between traditional operations and the new
missions that fall under the broad rubric of peacekeeping.
Next, this section will clarify the current definitions of
U.N. operations as presented in An Agenda For Peace .
Additionally, Chapter II examines one of the increasingly
common sources of conflict in the post-Cold War era:
persistent violence caused by failing or disintegrating
states. Finally, the Chapter will present the United Nations'
operational intent in deploying military forces to these
failing states.
Chapter III will include an assessment of the United
Nations' ability to fulfill the mission requirements of these
operations given the coalitional nature of all U.N. military
forces. This chapter will evaluate the problems of
effectively carrying out the more difficult mission
requirements of this new class of operation with a
3
multinational force that has no prior operational or training
history. This examination of the problems of coalition-
building is scrutinized on three levels: the strategic level
of interaction between the contributing states; the
operational level of interaction between the conflicting
parties and the United Nations forces; and the tactical level
between the forces themselves. Chapter III will show that the
"force dividers" inherent in combined operations have a
greater impact on these new missions than on standard
peacekeeping operations. Finally, Chapter III will weigh the
prospects for a standing U.N. force.
Chapter IV will examine the obstacles inherent in the
implementation of these operations. This will include:
first, the increased difficulty in changing from
"peacekeeping" to "peace-enforcement" strategies; second, the
problems facing an external actor in establishing authority
over a society to which it has no sovereign claim; third the
efficacy of the use of force; and finally, the paradox facing
a U.N. which hopes to remain above the conflict as a neutral
broker yet wishes to have a mandate for the use of force
beyond self-defense.
Finally, in Chapter V the difficulty of manufacturing a
comprehensive political settlement to an intractable civil war
will be demonstrated by a case study of the political process
in UNTAC. Certain aspects of UNTAC will prove to be mission-
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specific, but many of the lessons learned will have
potentially important implications for peacekeeping attempts
to save other failing states. Chapter V will show that the
choice of goals for this new type of mission rests somewhere
between the short-term stability of an externally imposed
artificial settlement and the long-term solutions to the
internal problems of a failing state. The last section of
Chapter V will examine the problem of defining victory in
operations such as UNTAC. The determination of what this
"end-game" should be in future missions like UNTAC will have
direct bearing on their structures and mandates.
Integral to this thesis was a research trip to Cambodia in
April and May 1993, just a few weeks prior to the United
Nations-administered elections. The author was afforded full
access to the UNTAC mission area, ranging from the troop level
to an interview with the second highest ranking civilian
official in UNTAC, the Deputy Special Representative of the
mission. This trip also included visits to front line units
of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces, interviews with the
local population (including ethnic Vietnamese refugees along
the Mekong River as they fled racially motivated violence).
Interviews were also conducted in Washington D.C. and New York
at the U.S. State Department, U.S. Mission to the United
Nations, and United Nations Headquarters. Additionally, the
author has had extensive experience working with the United
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Nations as a military observer in the U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO) in Israel and Egypt where he was able to
closely examine the functioning of other peacekeeping
operations such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), the United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force
(UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, the United Nations Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the non-U. N. Multinational Force and
Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.
While this thesis is meant to be both descriptive and
prescriptive its ultimate purpose is to provide an analytical
framework to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of United
Nations intervention to save failing states. The final
product is a result of both personal experience and a careful
review of the positions of both enthusiasts and detractors of
the U.N. 's recent expansion into these new mission areas.
II. THE NEW ERA OF PEACEKEEPING
Since its inception in 1945, one of the United Nations'
primary objectives has been the maintenance of international
peace and security. The drafters of the Charter of the United
Nations envisioned an organization where the member states
would band together in alliances of collective security led by
the great powers (the victors of World War II). The purpose
of these alliances was to respond to traditional cases of
interstate aggression (i.e. the use of overt military force
across recognized international boundries). The use of
military forces in the enforcement or compellence of peace was
provided for in Chapter VII, Articles 39-51 of the U.N.
charter. 1
However, the political realities of great power alliance
formation and cooperation doomed the idea of collective
security through the United Nations to failure. This failure
of the United Nations to fulfill its ambitious mandate of
international peace and security maintenance has generally
been blamed on the emergence of the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union. What emerged from the
Gorman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the
Charter of The United Nations , Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951,
p. 88-108.
organization was instead a more modest innovation of
collective security known as "peacekeeping." This innovation
arose out of the Cold War as a method of preventing superpower
involvement in localized conflict.
Peacekeeping operations were never envisioned as a
function of the U.N. in its charter. Peacekeeping evolved as
a method for the United Nations to display at least a minimum
manifestation of authority over the management of
international conflicts and disputes. 2 Peacekeeping missions
in their traditional sense were designed to provide a buffer
or confidence building mechanism between belligerents that
have agreed to a cease-fire or a truce.
The original peacekeeping mission: the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF I), formed in the Sinai after the 1956
Suez Crisis and withdrawn previous to the 1967 war, was
exactly this type of buffer force. Of the fourteen U.N. field
operations, generically defined as peacekeeping missions,
formed between 1945 and 1985 eleven fell under the rubric of
buffer or confidence building force. 3 These traditional
2Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendovitz, ed.,
The United Nations and a Just World Order . Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado, 1991, p. 214.
3The end of the Cold War is roughly defined as the coming-to-
power of Mikhail Gobachev by William J. Durch and Barry M.
Blechman, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in The Emerging
World Order . The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., March
1992, pp. 10-12.
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peacekeeping operations were generally not given enforcement
mandate or power. The one mission which stands out as a
glaring exception to the genre of Cold War era peacekeeping
operations was the U.N. Operation in the Congo (known by its
French initials , ONUC). ONUC, as the one Cold War era
instance of U.N. intervention into a state's internal
politics, has some lessons that are still valid for
interventionalist peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War
era.
The end of the Cold War has fostered the image of a
resurgent United Nations. Between 1985 and 1992 the United
Nations initiated as many peacekeeping operations as it had
during its previous forty years of existence. Obviously, in
the words of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
"peacekeeping is a growth industry." 4 By the end of 1992 the
number of U.N. soldiers around the world exceeded 50,000. 5
However, along with this vertical growth of the number of
operations roughly defined as "peacekeeping, " there was
horizontal growth in the scope of these operations. The
vertical and horizontal growth patterns are functions of the
perception that "peacekeeping operations" can be the panacea
for a wide range of problems.
4Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations,"
Foreign Affairs . Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, p. 89.
5Ibid., p. 90.
Of the fourteen operations initiated during this "new era"
nine were involved in the resolution of "domestic" conflicts. 6
Part of the reason for this increased intervention in the
internal affairs of states has been the blurring of the idea
of state sovereignty. The U.N. Charter is very specific in
prohibiting intervention in the internal matters of one of its
members. Article 2(7) of the Charter states that
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter.
However, in his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace , Boutros
Boutros-Ghali stated that "the time of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched
by reality." 7 This dimming of the concept of sovereignty was
accompanied by a clouding of the definition of peacekeeping.
It has given rise to numerous phrases, such as peacemaking,
peace-enforcement, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict
peace building, which are euphemisms for moving beyond the
United Nations' classic role of an "honest broker" to its
6William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case
Studies and Comparative Analysis . St. Martin's Press, New York,
1993, p. 10.
7Boutros-Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
Diplomacy. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping . Report of the Secretary-
General, 31 January 1992, United Nations, New York, p. 9.
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attempting the imposition of solutions upon warring parties,
regardless of whether the conflict is inter- or intrastate.
In order to analyze the dynamics and efficacy of these new
missions, one must first understand the definitions and goals
of these operations. This chapter will address four subjects:
one, the definitions of various types of operations as set
forth by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 's An Agenda for
Peace will be explained and evaluated; two, these definitions
will be evaluated against established conceptions of the
nature of armed conflict; three, one of the more likely
patterns of conflict in the post-Cold War era (state
disitegration) will be examined; and four the role of the
United Nations intervention in these conflicts will be
appraised.
A. NEK DEFINITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING
The term peacekeeping has recently been used to describe
a wide range of operations that involve the maintenance or
restoration of peace or security by military forces of states
not immediately involved in the conflict. An initial
description should be made of the various missions placed
under the broad rubric of peacekeeping in part by popular
perception of U.N. controlled operations. In An Agenda for
Peace , U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali distinguishes five
broad areas of United Nations involvement in peace and
11
security issues: peacekeeping, peace-building, preventive
diplomacy, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking. 8 If
participation in U.N. missions increases in the future, a
clear comprehension of these definintions is necessary to
understand what is the role of military force and avoid its
misuse.
1 . Peacekeeping
The original and most basic function of a peacekeeping
operation has been to stand between hostile forces which have
reached a truce or cease-fire as a confidence building
measure. However, the definition of peacekeeping has expanded
to include: humanitarian assistance, monitoring of elections,
maintenance of security in a given area, administration of
natural resources such as water, monitoring the withdrawal of
an invading army, disarming an insurgent force and, as the
U.N. plan calls for in Cambodia, the virtual rebuilding of the
state through stabilization, pacification and administration.
The United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),
at its inception, was the most ambitious peacekeeping
operation ever attempted in both size and scope. It has
since, however, been superceded by the U.N. efforts in Somalia
and Yugoslavia. 9
8Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace , p. 11.
9Chuck Sudetic, "U.N. Troops' Role Widens in Bosnia; 2 Towns
Get Aid," The New York Times , November 20, 1992, p. 1.
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Peacekeeping operations, under U.N. guidelines, have
evolved to function with three limitations: first, the
operation is undertaken without prejudice to any of the
parties concerned; second, consent of all concerned parties is
necessary to start the operation; and third, the peacekeeping
forces only use arms in self-defense. 10 These guidlines were
developed by then U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in
his report on the UNEF experience in 1958. 11
2 . Peace-Building
In his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace . Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali used the term post-conflict peace-
building. This term generates some confusion. Peace-building
is defined as:
efforts to identify and support structures which will tend
to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and
well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil
strife, these may include disarming previously warring
parties, restoration of order, custody and possible
destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and
training support for security personnel, monitoring
elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights,
reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and
promoting formal and informal processes of political
participation. 12
10Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New
World Order," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 70.
1:LUnited Nations Document A/3943, 9 October 1958.
12Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace , p. 32, emphasis added.
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Obviously, because of its mandate for functioning in many of
these areas, UNTAC resembled more of a post-conflict peace-
building operation than a peacekeeping operation.
3. Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy is defined as "action to prevent
disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the
spread of the latter when they occur." 13 The arena of
preventive diplomacy can include fact finding missions, the
use of confidence building measures such as "good offices" and
preventive deployments of forces. In an effort to keep the
ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia from spreading
further, a preventive force was deployed in Macedonia as a
sort of strategic tripwire. The purpose of such a force,
which could be easily overwhelmed by the Serbian military, is
to discourage possible aggression through the moral authority
of the U.N. and deterrent value of international troops. The
United States deployed an infantry battalion in the Spring of
1993 as part of this force.
Another type of operation listed under the category
"preventive deployment" in An Agenda for Peace is humanitarian
assistance. The purpose of military forces in humanitarian
assistance operations is to limit or control violence so that
13Ibid., p. 11.
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relief organizations can alleviate conditions such as massive
starvation. This is the type of mission which UNITAF (the
U.S. led United Task Force) and UNOSOM II (Second United
Nations Operation in Somalia) originally embarked upon.
Observer missions are one type of operation which fall
under the rubric of many of these categories. The United
Nations has often provided unarmed observers, usually military
officers, to monitor situations like the ones described above.
These observers are often the advance party for a larger
operation or they may stay behind to monitor the situation
after a peacekeeping force has departed. However, they may
also act as part of a larger force as liaison between the
civilian population and the armed peacekeepers or they may be
deployed in situations where a peacekeeping force is
unsuitable.
4 . Peace-Enforcement
While peacekeeping operations enforce a truce or
cease-fire which has been established, peace-enforcement
operations are designed more to compel or coerce peace.
Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter gives the Security
Council the authority to enforce its will on the state or
states that cause the breakdown of peace or order. The only
examples of the U.N. authorizing the use of military force in
an offensive manner are the conflicts in Korea, the Persian
Gulf, and more recently the Security Council Resolutions
15
mandating UNITAF (the U.S. led coalition in Somalia) and
UNOSOM II (The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia). 14
Unlike peacekeeping forces, peace-enforcement forces
may not have the consent of all, or any, of the belligerent
parties. By its very nature the intervening force may become
a party to the conflict. However, the punishment of one, or
some, of the belligerents is not the original purpose of
peace-enforcement. Therefore, operations such as those
conducted in Korea (1950-1953) or Desert Storm (1990-1991) do
not neatly fit into this category. They can more correctly be
defined as collective security operations with a mandate from
the United Nations. This type of collective security is a
related, but distinct, type of operation and consequently does
not fall under the scope of this thesis.
5 . Peacemaking
The term peacemaking has often been confused with
peace-enforcement. One of the original drafts of Joint Pub 3-
07.3. JTTP (Joint Techniques. Tactics and Procedures) for
Peacekeeping Operations , incorrectly defines peacemaking as "a
type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish
or restore peace and order through the use of force." 15 A
14Security Council Resolutions 794 of 3 December 1992 and 814
of 26 March 1993.
15Joint Pub 3-07.3. JTTP (Joint Tactics Techniques and
Procedures) for Peacekeeping Operations . November 1991, GL-7.
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later draft of this publication defined peacemaking as the
"diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes and
solving the underlying causes." 16 According to the United
Nations' definition, peacemaking is the use of various
mechanisms, possibly including force, for the resolution of
conflicts. 17 These mechanisms, outlined in Chapter VI of the
U.N. Charter, include: use of the World Court, amelioration
through assistance and the imposition of sanctions. Actions
taken in the area termed "peacemaking" range from assistance
to coercion, and attempt to bridge the gap between preventive
diplomacy and peace-enforcement.
Peacemaking efforts can also include gestures defined
as "amelioration through assistance," which are actions to
alleviate circumstances that have contributed to a dispute or
conflict. 18 This can include assistance to segments of
population which have been displaced by the conflict; often
taking the form of refugee assistance. In a post-conflict
phase this may have positive connotations, such as the
repatriation of over 300,000 Cambodian refugees by the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees. However, this refugee
assistance can also take on a negative flavor in ethnic
16Joint Pub 3-07.3 , Final Draft, December 1992.
17See: Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace . 1992, pp. 20-25
18Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace , p. 23.
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conflicts when the U.N. may unwittingly assist agressors in a
form of "migratory genocide" by transporting large segments of
one ethnic group from their homes. If United Nations forces
are unable or unwilling to protect ethnic minorities they may
have no choice but to protect them as they are driven from
their homes. This unforseen consequence of United Nations
operations will be discussed further in Chapter IV under "The
Responsibilitis of Authority."
Descriptions such as the preventive deployment of
forces, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, and peace-
enforcement represent an attempt to categorize the various
means of accomplishing political ends through the use of
military forces. In order to better understand these
different categories it is useful to understand where they fit
along a continuum of conflict from peace to war.
B. PEACEKEEPING AND THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT
Views of war and peace have generally characterized the
two as diametric states rather than parts of a unified
continuum. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army
defines three distinct environments: peacetime, conflict and
war. 19 However, in reality, war and peace do not exist either
singularly or in totality apart from this third category of
19Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and
War," Military Review . April 1992, p. 35.
18
conflict. Nineteenth Century Prussian military strategist
Karl von Clausewitz's thesis of the dual nature of war argued
that all acts of organized violence can vary in intensity from
armed demonstrations to wars of annihilation. 20
This continuum of conflict, displayed as the level of
violence across time, is shown graphically in Figure 1.
Underneath the bell curve, which describes the level of
violence, is the corresponding function of an intervening
military operation required to lower the level of violence at
that point in the conflict. 21 The traditional method of
tracking the level or intensity of violence is a determination
of the amount of conventional military equipment involved,
i.e. the use of artillery or airpower by the belligerents is
of higher intensity than a guerrilla warfare fought with
irregular forces. By contrast, in the definition used here,
the level of violence is a function of the amount of the
population involved in the conflict combined with their goals,
i.e. defense, offense or annihilation.
20Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and
the History of Military Power . Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1992, p. 109.
21The idea of using a bell curve as a description of the level
of violence was taken from Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for
Peace, Crisis and War: The Continuum of Military Operations"
Military Review , April 1992, p. 28.
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Just as Clausewitz recognized the diverse nature of war, 22
operations grouped under the nebulous heading of peacekeeping
exist along a continuum. Theoretically, the level of military
force used in the spectrum of U.N. operations, undertaken to
sustain or restore peace, can range from zero to quite
considerable. The function of any "neutral" United Nations
operation along the continuum of conflict is to supress or
contain the level of violence.
Continuum of Conflict
Level of Violence Over Time
Peace- En f o r c erne n t
TIME - - ->
F l o u r e 1 .
22Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Edited by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
1976, p. 87.
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As the level of violence increases the use of intervening
military force or forces changes from influence to deterrence
to suasion to coercion. Peacekeeping, and other "peace-
support operations," attempt to re-equilibrate a conflictual
situation. Figure 1. shows where the different types of
peacekeeping missions are engaged to this end. 23 The two
phrases coined by Clausewitz most often used or misused by
modern military strategists are: "War is nothing but the
continuation of politics with other means," 24 and "The first,
the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that
test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither
mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that
is alien to its nature." 25 However, the United Nations by the
very purpose of its charter cannot declare war on any of the
factions involved in internal conflicts. So it seems
appropriate to paraphrase Clausewitz and declare that
"Peacekeeping is nothing but the continuation of politics with
other means," and especially "... the kind of peacekeeping on
23Interposing the descriptions of peacekeeping missions on the
continuum of conflict was originally suggested by Prof. Dana Eyre,




which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying
to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."
Peacekeeping operations, viewed in a wartime context,
exist in the U.S. Army's continuum as an "operation short of
war." The categorization of all U.N. operations as "short of
war" is analagous to the somewhat misleading term, low-
intensity conflict, coined during the 1980s in reference to
guerrilla or intrastate conflicts. This term belies the zero-
sum nature of most intrastate conflicts. Rarely are internal
wars settled by compromise or conciliation. In intrastate
wars losing usually means extinction. 26 In his study on war
termination, Negotiating Peace , Paul R. Pillar demonstrates
that interstate wars are twice as likely to be settled by
negotiation as intrastate conflicts. 27 According to
Clausewitz, a conflict that is "freely operating and obedient
to no law but their own" will eventually escalate toward
absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one side
by the other." 28 Clearly a peacekeeping operation such as
UNTAC could only be deployed once the various factions had
26Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End: Preliminary Results
from a Comparative Project," An International Law of Guerrilla
Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making , St. Martin's Press,
New York, 1984, p. 221.
27Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a
Bargaining Process . Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1983, p. 25.
28Paret, Understanding War , p. 109.
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moved beyond the peak of violence. Regardless of the changes
in the international system enabling the United Nations to
more easily deploy military operations, an attempt at peace-
enforcement intervention at the peak of the violence level in
any conflict is impossible without overwhelming coercive
force.
The function of intervention during the incipient stages
of a conflict, defined as preventive diplomacy, is to
influence or possibly deter the various parties from further
belligerency while the level of violence is low. This might
include the use of fact-finding or observer missions. If the
level of violence continues to rise, preventive diplomacy may
give way to the preventive deployment of armed forces as a
peacemaking option.
Peacemaking includes some of the most difficult operations
for military forces on the ground. As the level of violence
increases, peacemaking attempts to use these intervening
forces to assuage the factors contributing to the conflict.
This may include enforcing sanctions, containing the
conflict's spread to bordering areas, or preventing outside
forces from intervening in a conflict.
If the level of violence has already risen to a point
where the preventive deployment of forces cannot prevent an
escalation of the violence, troops may be used to protect the
delivery of humanitarian aid or the evacuation of non-
23
belligerents. This is the function of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzigovina where the




The use of force to compel beligerents in humanitarian aid
missions may have several unwanted consequences: the
perceived loss of neutrality and targeting of U.N. forces or
the withdrawl of troop-contributing countries who volunteered
their soldiers only for the original mission.
At the peak of the level of violence, the option of using
a military presence to coerce belligerents toward lowering the
violence level is peace-enforcement. It should be stressed
that in this discussion the use of coercion in peace-
enforcement operations is distinguished from pure coercion
used in collective security situations such as in Korea or the
Persian Gulf. The use of coercive force in peace-enforcement
operations is closer to coercive diplomacy. Coercive
diplomacy seeks to persuade an opponent to cease aggression
through the threat or limited use of force while coercion is
the use of force as a bludgeon against a foe. 30
29Paul Lewis, "U.N. Sides Say Use of Force Will Endanger
Bosnian Relief," The New York Times . 21 April 1993, p. A6.
30Gordon A. Craig & Alexander L. George, Force And Statecraft:
Diplomatic Problems of Our Time . Oxford University Press, New York,
1990, p. 197.
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The use of military forces in a confidence building role
after the peak of violence has passed is peacekeeping in the
purest sense of the term. Peacekeeping operations must
presuppose the existence of a peace, or at least a robust
cease-fire, to keep. Because of their limited mandates and
firepower, peacekeeping forces cannot be effective in
situations where the belligerents are not willing to come to
the terms of a truce or ceasefire. Some of the most
successful operations of this kind are not well known because
they have been so successful: i.e. The United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights or
The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai
Peninsula. A clear example of a peacekeeping force which has
been unable to fulfill its mandate because of the lack of
acquiescence, or at least acceptance, of the belligerents in
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
It is apparent that in situations of internal war and/or
ethnic conflict where the level of violence is extremely high,
traditional peacekeeping is bound to fail in supressing
violence. A deterent strategy will not guarantee success due
to the highly decentralized and zero-sum nature of these types
of conflict. Inherent in a strategy of deterrence, and
peacekeeping in this continuum, is the assumption of rational
25
opponents for whom compromise is an option. 31 However, in
intrastate conflicts "outcomes intermediate between victory
and defeat are difficult to construct . . . one side has to get
all, or nearly so ... since the passions aroused and the
political cleavages opened render a sharing of power
unworkable." 32 Certainly at the height of Khmer Rouge power,
coterminous with the peak in the level of violence in the
Cambodian conflict, the Khmer Rouge would not have been open
to compromise and could not have been influenced, deterred or
suaded.
The process of post-conflict peace-building can only be
accomplished once the intensity of violence has either
subsided or been suppressed to a level where diplomatic and/or
military action can identify and support structures which will
strengthen and solidify peace and prevent a relapse of
violence. In terms of an interstate conflict this might
include a remaining observer mission or border patrol force as
confidence building measures.
In cases of intrastate peace-building operations, one of
the primary foci is the attempt to redress the underlying
causes of the conflict through the establishment, and possibly
protection, of political mechanisms. UNTAC, because of its
31Craig & George, p. 188.
32Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End . Columbia University
Press, New York, 1991, p. 95.
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broad range of tasks in re-establishing a state structure of
Cambodia and low suasion capability, fits more accurately into
the category of peace-building.
The term peacekeeping is generally used to refer to any
one of these tasks involving the United Nations. Obviously
peacekeeping, in the truest sense of the term, is only one
part of the scope of these operations. In order to minimize
confusion, the group of operations, as an entirety, will here
after be referred to as peace-support operations.
C. POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT: STATE DISINTEGRATION
A trend in the conflicts of the late twentieth century has
been the disintegration of sovereign states which were held
together by the freeze of the Cold War. As the international
system "warms up," the bonds holding these states together are
disolved in the thaw. The standard method of state
disintegration appears to take the form of successionist
movements or the division of a larger state into constituent
ethnic "nations." The prototype example of this type of
disintegration is the former Yugoslavia which fractionated
along roughly ethnic lines. However, two of the largest U.N.
peace-support efforts in this new era (UNTAC in Cambodia and
UNOSOM II in Somalia) have been deployed to help states that
can be described as being on the verge of collapsing under the
weight of numerous crises.
27
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the
accelerating rate of state entropy and failure world-wide will
be a phenomenon linked to severely atrophied states which for
years have possessed sovereignty only in terms of legal
statehood. Throughout the Cold War, legal statehood provided
these states with a "negative sovereignty" derived from the
right of self-determination, but they did not possess the
capacity for effective government (positive sovereignty).
Negative sovereignty has been defined as the formal-legal
condition of freedom from outside interference. 33 While the
end of the Cold War has revealed the deficiencies of the most
glaring examples of negative sovereignty, many of these
"nascent," "quasi," or "pseudo" states continue to exist
because "once juridical statehood is acquired . . . diplomatic
civilities are set in motion which support it, exaggerate it,
and conceal its lack of real substance and value." 34
Negative sovereignty and non-intervention have been
described as two sides of the same coin. The principle of
non-intervention has been the central principle of the
classical law of nations: the sphere of exclusive legal
33Robert H. Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereignty. International
Relations Theory, and The Third World , Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1990, p. 27.
34Robert H. Jackson, quoted in Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W.
Mansbach, The State. Conceptual Chaos. and the Future of
International Relations Theory . Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder
& London, 1989, p. 61.
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jurisdiction of states or international laissez faire. 35 As
states, which have never possessed positive sovereignty, lose
their ability to maintain negative sovereignty the principle
of non-interference has started to wane.
This trend of catastrophic deterioration where the state
is "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the
international community" was described by Gerald B. Helman
(former ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva) and Steven
R. Ratner in their essay, "Saving Failed States." 36 Through
a variety of factors (different combinations of civil strife,
government breakdown, natural disaster) these states do not
have the means to fulfill the social contract of providing for
the protection of their citizens. The internal situation
denegrates into a Hobbesian universe where "men live without
a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every
man against every man." 37
Sociologist Max Weber's theory of what defines a state
declares that it is a human community that claims the
"monopoly of legitimate use of physical force" within a
35Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and The Third World , p. 27.
36Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States,"
Foreign Policy . No. 89, Winter 1992-93, pp. 3-20.
37Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , ed. Michael Oakeshott, Collier
MacMillan Publishers, London, 1962, Chap. 13, p. 100.
29
society. 38 The trend in these disintegrating states is that
the state intitutions no longer maintain this monopoly over
the legitimate use of violence. In the early stages of
disintegration, the state's role in the maintenance of order
for the protection of life and property within its borders and
abroad is challenged by other mechanisms of society. In later
stages, the state's authority is no longer simply challenged
but completely absent.
In Cambodia, the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge and
over a guarter of a century of conflict has left the country
far behind even most of the developing world. In Somalia,
government ceased to exist as fourteen different armed clans
controlled fractions of the countryside. In the former
Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzigovina never achieved even ostensible
sovereignty as this multinational entity unraveled within a
larger disintegrating multinational state.
This self-destructive pathology of social systems is not,
however, unique to the late twentieth century. Since humans
have been organizing themselves into political entities,
states, of one form or another, have gone through cycles of
integration and disintegration. The example of the ancient
Greek polis of Athens, arguably one of the most intimate and
38Max Weber, Max Weber: Essays in Sociology . H.H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills, tras. (New York, 1958), p. 78.
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integrated of all political entities in history, 39 bears
remarkable resemblence to the failed states of the post-Cold
War era. In The Peloponnesian War . Thucydides describes a
situation of war between two great powers, Athens and Sparta,
which impoverished each beyond what anyone could have
foretold. Just as in modern conflicts, the citizens of Athens
took refuge in the urban centers for protection. Once crowded
inside the city walls an outbreak of the plague produced a
condition of panic and the citizens began to commit atrocities
they would have once found unthinkable. Soon society became
so polarized that revenge became more important than self-
preservation. 40
Just as in ancient Athens, the combination of war, disease
and crime have rendered some states, which would be considered
"low achievers" 41 in the best of times, in a state of complete
anarchy. These "low achievers" begin to look less like a
sovereign state and more like the state of nature described by
Hobbes. However, the existence of instant world-wide
telecommunications and "supranational" organizations such as
39Ferguson & Mansbach, p. 29.
40Sissela Bok, A Strategy For Peace: Human Values and the
Threat of War . Pantheon Books, New York, 1989, pp. 7-8.
41The United Nations' Human Development Report classifies 38
states as low achievers on the basis of changes in their human
development index. Ronald K. McMullen & Augustus Richard Norton,
"Somalia and Other Adventures for the 1990s," Current History .
April 1993, p. 174.
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the U.N. means that social systems can no longer disolve
without the effects being felt around the globe. The
converging trends of these states no longer being able to
sustain themselves and the globalization of information have
prompted the United Nations to forsake its founding principle
of non-intervention in domestic affairs.
D. FAILED STATES, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS, AND PEACE-SUPPORT
INTERVENTION
Military historian Martin van Creveld has identified three
principal characteristics of low-intensity conflicts: one,
they tend to take place in the less developed parts of the
world; two, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both
sides; and three, they do not rely primarily on high-
technology collective weapons. 42 Van Creveld points out that
besides being numerically predominant since 1945, these "low-
intensity conflicts" have been far more violent than
conventional wars. As the United Nations becomes involved
more in intrastate conflicts, especially where states are
approaching catastrophic failure, it is necessary to
understand the dynamics of insurgent warfare, or low-intensity
conflict, to properly choose and successfully prosecute peace-
support operations.
42Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War . The Free
Press, New York, 1991, p. 20.
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Intrastate war may occur for a variety of reasons.
However, the overriding trait of these conflicts is the loss
of a state's legitimacy. Political legitimacy entails the
acceptance by a society that the state has the
institutionalized authority to both invoke obligations and use
force to ensure compliance. 43 In general, there are two
mutual obligations that link the ruler (i.e. the state) to the
ruled (society): first, an implicit social contract subjects
each of the parties to a moral obligation to carry out certain
tasks; second, reciprocity demands that either party has
grounds to refuse the execution of its portion of the social
contract if the other fails to perform its obligations. 44 The
state's portion of the social contract can be broken down into
three distinguishable though related sectors: first, and
perhaps most essential, is protection; second, maintenance of
peace and order; and third is behavior which contributes to
the material security of the ruled. In short the state's
social contract "comes down to security: security against
foreign and domestic depredation, supernatural, natural, and
43Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change , Stanford University
Press, Stanford, California, 1982, p. 31.
44Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of
Obedience and Revolt . M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 1978, p. 20.
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human threats to the food supply and other material supports







The failing state's inability to fulfill its basic
obligations of the social contract will lead to moral anger
and the rise of political opposition. The rise to political
opponents who cannot or do not want to vie for power through
legal means creates a new societal force called the counter-
state. 46 The dynamic of an insurgent conflict, as shown in
Figure 2, results from the interaction between the state,
counter-state and the general population of society. Both the
state and counter-state attempt to gain support from society
while targeting one another for destruction.
45Moore, pp. 21-22
46This model of the dynamics of insurgent conflicts was
developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Department of National
Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School.
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In some cases, like Afghanistan, Peru, or Mozambique,
counter-states have reached a position near parity with the
states and control wide areas of territory. In extreme cases
the state, for all intents and purposes, has ceased to
function and authority is fragmented among various collective
actors (collectivities) that effectively become miniature
counter-states. These collectivities may consist of the
failed previous government which still possesses some of the
trappings of power; a nation, clan or tribe; various guerrilla
organizations; or any combination of these. This challenge to
the authority of the state and redirection of legitimacy
toward these collectivities is the beginning of erosion of
state sovereignty. 47 In a failed state, the state can no
longer assert authority. However, none of the quasi counter-
states is able to gain enough power to fill the vacuum.
The United Nations has attempted to fill this vacuum in a
peace-support operation where it moves beyond the separation
of belligerents and attempts to administer sovereign authority
over the territory of the state. In short, in the absence of
a state apparatus capable of maintaining at least negative
sovereignty, the U.N. attempts to assume the role of the state
in many respects, especially the authority over legitimate use
of force. One of the initial goals envisioned by the United
47James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World ,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1992, p. 19.
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Nations for both UNTAC and UNITAF was to deny the various
state and counter-state collectivities the means of physical
force through disarmament; either voluntarily in Cambodia or
by force in Somalia. 48 However, in both cases the United
Nations designed mechanisms that allowed the elites of the
various factions to maintain nominal control of the states
'
sovereignty. In Cambodia this mechanism was the Supreme
National Council (SNC) formed out of the leaders of the four
factions and headed by Prince Nordom Sihanouk. 49 In Somalia,
after the authorization of UNOSOM II, the fourteen factions
met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to set up a U.N. -monitored
interim government for two years. 50
In using peace-support operations to quell the violent
fragmentation of failing states, the United Nations has
developed a new class of mission which is inherently more
difficult than standard peacekeeping. Additionally this new
class of mission is qualitatively more difficult than a
48United Nations Security Council Document S/23613, "Report of
the Secretary-General on Cambodia," 19 February 1992 and Document
S/24992, "Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia," 19 December
1992.
49Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee & Sorpong Peou, Cambodia - The
1989 Paris Peace Conference; Background Analysis and Documents ,
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Kraus International
Publications, Millwood, New York, 1991, p. 493.
50Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian
Intervention in Somalia . Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder &
London, 1993, p. 12.
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sovereign state fighting an insurgent war. In order to be
successful, not only must the United Nations effectively
assume the monopoly over the legitimate use of force (at least
temporarily), but it must do so while remaining ostensibly
neutral and denying itself some of the tools available to a
sovereign state. For example, an effective intelligence and
information capability is central to nearly all aspects of an
insurgent conflict. 51 However, the United Nations does not
have an capability even remotely resembling an intelligence
organization. In United Nations operations the branch which
nominally fills this position is the Military Information
Cell. This problem will be addressed further in Chapter IV.
The dynamics of this new class of mission, shown
diagramatically by Figure 3, involve the United Nations
targeting the fragmented collectivities of society for control
or neutralization. In an insurgent conflict the state targets
the counter-state for destruction. However, in a peace-
support operation the U.N. will seek to either weaken or
bolster these collectivities' relationships with society.
This may take the form of active disarmament of factions (as
in Somalia) or reforming the law enforcement capabilities of
the government (attempted by UNTAC's Civilian Police component
51Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and
Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts , The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February 1970, p. 156.
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in Cambodia). In both Cambodia and Somalia the United Nations
has used the intervention of military forces to create
mechanisms for re-establishing state authority through interim
governments. 52
Dynamics of U.N. Intervention
United Nations
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One of the key handicaps of peace-support operations used in
situations of higher levels of violence is that the United
Nations is hesitant to identify clear-cut aggressors. In
order to prevent the various collectivities from successfully
imposing their will upon the situation while persuading them
that they have no viable alternative but to negotiate a
52See: Paul Lewis, "U.N. Gives Timetable for Somalia
Democracy," The New York Times . 17 September 1993, p. A5. and
United Nations Document S/23613, Report of the Secretary-General on
Cambodia, 19 February 1992, p. 1.
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settlement the United Nations' political objective is suasion.
Unfortunately, as has been demonstrated in many insurgent
conflicts, the contest between the legitimate authority and
the counter-state is often a contest in the effective
management of coercion. 53 However, U.N. forces attempt to
lower the level of violence of all of the belligerents by
simply presenting a credible military threat. Force is used
to neutralize, but not defeat, the belligerents. 54
In order to be successful in peace-support operations
designed to save a dysfunctional state from anarchy, the
United Nations, or any other organization, would need to
develop and demonstrate capabilities akin to those of a
successful counter-insurgency: the capacity to act with
speed, consistency, and discrimination. 55 To this end,
operations in these environments may have to preclude the
three traditional limitation of U.N. missions: one,
undertaking operations without prejudice to any of the parties
concerned; two, consent of all concerned parties; and three,
the use of force only in self-defense. In addition to simply
protecting the population, the surrogate state must be able
identify aggressors and institute mechanisms to neutralize
53Leites & Wolf, p. 155.
54John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void," Foreign
Affairs . November/December 1993, Vol. 72, No. 5, p. 29.
55Leites & Wolf, p. 154.
39
them. However, the characteristics of the United Nations
specifically, and coalition operations generally, make this
task extremely difficult.
40
III. U.N. OPERATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION
With the end of the Cold War many felt that there was a
possibility that the United Nations could attain the power
early enthusiasts envisioned in its Charter to mediate
conflicts. At its inception, many such idealists, like long
time U.N. Undersecretary General Brian Urquhart, felt that the
United Nations would be able to act on the international level
in the same way that governments act on national levels. 1 The
conventional wisdow is that the gridlock on international
action has been caused by a bipolar world order, rather than
the realities of alliance politics. The repeated calls for
strengthening the United Nations' enforcement capabilities in
the post-Cold War system ignores the reality that the U.N. "is
not and cannot be an autonomous political actor in a world of
sovereign states." 2 Rather, the United Nations is an
instrument that states find useful when it serves parallel
interests and easily ignored when interests are contrary.
What is clear is that the United Nations, under the best
of circumstances, does not act as a cohesive unit. The
1Gordon A. Craig & Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft:
Diplomatic Problems of Our Time , Oxford University Press, New York,
1990, p. 110.
2Ernest W. Lefever, "Reining in the U.N.," Foreign Affairs .
Summer 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 17.
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paralysis suffered by the United Nations in security matters,
furthermore, will not disappear as readily as the Cold War.
Because the Cold War was not the sole cause of this paralysis,
the United Nations, in its present form, will find it
difficult if not impossible to effectively prosecute the new
class of mission described in the first chapter:
specifically, peace-support operations to rebuild
dysfunctional states through the use of multilateral military
intervention. The key factor in its present inability to
successfully execute these missions is that it does not have
the cohesive decision-making power of a sovereign actor. The
effectiveness of any association of independent, sovereign
states depends upon the capacity of its members to agree and
cooperate. 3 To the degree that this capacity is limited, the
association's effectiveness will suffer. As the U.N. takes on
more complex missions, moving from conflict containment to
conflict resolution, lack of cohesion will no longer simply
inhibit operations; it may sow the seeds of their failure.
A defining question when examining these operations is do
these "alliances without an enemy" take on the characteristics
of other alliances? Germane to this question is the lack of
an accepted definition of what constitutes an alliance. Some
scholars use the terms alliance, coalition, pact and bloc
JCraig & George, p. 110.
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interchangeably; others distinguish them based on various
criteria. 4
Stephen M. Walt in The Origins of Alliances defines an
alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security
cooperation between two or more sovereign states." 5 However,
according to other definitions, alliances are limited only to
security arrangements and exclude formal agreements with broad
ranges covering trade, cultural affairs and the like. 6
Obviously situations of collective security such as the Korean
conflict or Desert Storm, are cases of alliances acting within
a United Nations mandate. While "peacekeeping" operations are
significantly different than these alliances for collective
security they do qualify as an alliances, according to Walt's
definition, because they are concerned with "threats to the
peace and security." At the very least the characteristics of
alliance politics will be evident in any military force that
is a coalition of different states' troops, regardless of the
mission.
4For example, twenty-three centuries ago, Indian statesman-
philosopher, Kautilya writing about inter-state politics in
Arthasatra . stated that in an alliance the burdens and rewards are
shared equally, whereas in a pact they are not. See: Ole R.
Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann & John D. Sullivan, Unity and
Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies .
John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973, p. 43, n. 2.
5Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances . Cornell University
Press, Ithaca & London, 1987, p. 1.
6Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan, p. 3.
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As the United Nations moves into this "new era," the
surprisingly familiar realities of alliance politics and
coalition building will come into play regardless of the
operation. Member states will still attempt to influence the
outcome of disputes to their advantage. If they have no
agenda within the dispute, they will tend to abstain or look
for an advantage in participation within a larger context,
such as credibility or power within the Security Council.
With a few notable exceptions, such as Canada or the
Scandinavian countries, most states do not contribute to U.N.
missions without some sort of "national interest" in the
conflict. During the Cold War years this meant forces from
the superpowers were excluded because competition between the
two was considered zero-sum by either side.
Additionally, historic trends will continue to have
effects even in this era of a "new world order." For example,
China has historically abstained from or opposed sanction
resolutions that impinged on the sovereignty of states'
internal politics. Since China is sensitive to "internal"
issues, such as human rights, in regard to its own policies,
they will continue to be disinclined to support U.N. proposals
44
which impose sanctions against states because of their
internal politics. 7
Operations using multinational forces have always faced
problems of cohesion. By definition, a coalition functions
through divided counsel and variable commitment. 8 The problem
of determining the degree of force which can be used in a
strategy of suasion or coercion is compounded by the problem
of interpretation by different actors within a coalition.
Coalition partners bring particular national agendas to the
coalition which other members choose to tolerate. Unless
there is a major shift in the perception of state sovereignty
and the willingness of states to subordinate absolute control
of their forces to the United Nations, U.N. field operations
cannot overcome the problems associated with coalition action.
Because the coalition happens to be under the umbrella of a
United Nations operation does not make this assertion less
valid. Although peacekeeping forces are under the command of
the U.N. , it is well recognized that most national contingents
will clear orders with their national command authority before
7Interview with Mr. David Wallace, Advisor to the Ambassador
for Asian Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, 25
February 1993.
8Colin S. Gray, War. Peace, and Victory; Strategy and
Statecraft for the Next Century . Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 245.
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acting. This is particularly true in situations of higher
intensity. 9
Multilateral action sanctioned by the U.N. comes with
associated costs and benefits. While a United Nations mandate
provides a certain legitimacy to the application of military
force, the associated multilateral nature of the operation
will impose certain "force dividers." These force dividers
mean that any force operating under United Nations control
cannot operate at maximum efficiency. As a general rule,
military commanders attempt to maximize the forces available
to them through the use of various "force multipliers." By
enhancing a forces intelligence, command and control or
supporting arms capabilities a military commander attempts to
make his force greater than the sum of its parts. By the vary
nature of coalition operations the whole of United Nations
operations will never be equal to the sum of its parts.
These force dividers exist on three broad levels: the
strategic level of interaction between the contributing states
and the United Nations; the operational level of interaction
between the conflicting parties and the United Nations forces;
and the tactical level between the forces themselves.
9Durch, pp. 64-65.
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A. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Former U.S. permanent representative to the United
Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, has described the U.N. as a
political system rather than a political institution. 10 This
system has been described as analogous to a government
consisting of "executive, legislative, administrative, and
judicial agencies at its center and numerous specialized
agencies in the field that are relatively autonomous of its
central organs." 11 However, while this U.N. system is a
representative institution, it does not represent the world
population the way that state representative bodies represent
their populations. The U.N. system represents governments and
rulers. And these governments do not necessarily represent
their own people. According to Kirkpatrick:
Inside the United Nations, nations do not behave as
dispassionate, disinterested single members seeking only to
use their influence in ways that will advance justice and
peace. What happened in the United Nations is that a
political system developed which features all the elements
of power-seeking on behalf of some version of the public
good common to more mundane political systems. 12
Furthermore, what has developed within the United Nations
systems is a division of the states into blocs, functioning
10Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force: Volume One.
Political and Moral Dimensions . Transaction Books, New Brunswick &




much in the same way as political parties in legislative
politics. The relationship between these blocs, which are
often political, cultural, or geographical, is the key to the
function, or sometimes disfunction, of the General Assembly
and to a lesser degree the Security Council. Obviously, the
two most important blocs during the Cold War were those built
around the superpowers (even if former Representative
Kirkpatrick would have us believe that the U.S. had no
bloc 13 ). One of the most important blocs to emerge because of
the bipolar world was the non-aligned bloc or the G-77 (named
for the 77 original members of the non-aligned movement). 14
In the future actions by a more interventionalist United
Nations may be opposed by a stronger bloc of the non-aligned
states because of their particular sensitivity to
infringements upon states' sovereignty. 15
It is plausible that, with the end of the Cold War, the
power of regional blocs will become increasingly important in
the arena of security. It is not hard to imagine blocs being
formed around a European and Asian leaders in the future,




'Interview with COL. T.K. Kearney, Military Advisor to the
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, 25
February 1993.
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Security Council. 16 The relationship between powerful new
blocs may not necessarily be as adversarial as that between
the Cold War blocs. However, it is clear that the
transitional period of great cooperation within the Security
Council is already beginning to show signs of weakness. As
power, or perceived power, is realigned, long time allies in
the Security Council may well become adversaries for power.
For example French President, Francois Mitterand, recently
proposed re-instituting the Military Staff Committee,
envisioned by the U.N. Charter. This proposal was advanced
apparently to break the United States' perceived hold on U.N.
actions. Along these lines French foreign minister, Roland
Dumas, stated that Europe and the United Nations should help
counter U.S. power because "American might reigns without
balancing weight." 17
Regardless of how power is realigned in the future,
deployments of military force under the mandate of the United
Nations will always require the leadership and funding of
"linchpin" actors: the great and near-great powers of the
day. Any state which is a permanent member of the Security
Council is automatically in this category because of their
16
"Step Out Japan," The Economist , 17 July 1993, pp. 15-16,
and "Japan: No Council Bid," Far Eastern Economic Review . 14
October 1993, p. 15.
17Doug Bandow, "Making Peace," Foreign Policy . No. 89, Winter
1992-93, pp. 162 & 171.
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possession of veto power. Great power support will always be
necessary for the deployment of forces because lesser powers,
while they may be able to contribute, troops, generally do not
have the ability to rapidly transport or sustain them. This
problem will be further addressed in the section on tactical
level problems. Additionally, the contributions of "linchpin"
states may be necessary to encourage the participation of
other troop contributors. For example, Britain and France
made their participation in UNITAF and UNOSOM II conditional
upon the presence of U.S. combat forces. 18
Certain states may be considered a linchpin actor in one
operation and not another if they have a vital regional
interest in containing or suppressing the conflict or if their
presence is necessary to hold the operation together. In the
case of UNTAC, Japan and Australia moved into this category
along with the French, Chinese and the United States. UNTAC
proved to be a testing of the waters for Japan as it deployed
troops outside its own borders for the first time since World
War Two. Japan, like the United States, has a financial stake
in the success of UNTAC because it is the second largest
contributor to peacekeeping funding at 12.45%. Japan
indicated that it might be willing to pay for more than its
18Interview with Brigadier General J.W. Kinzer, Deputy Chief
of Staff - Office of the Department of the Army Operations Center,
Washington D.C., 23 February 1993.
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current assessment calls for, perhaps as high as 30%, with the
provision that it is given as much of a decision making role
as the five permanent members of the Security Council. 19 The
U.N. acknowledged Japan's contibution by appointing a Japanese
diplomat, Yasuchi Akashi, as the civilian head of UNTAC.
It is not uncommon for "linchpin" actors to demand a
larger role in operations in order to protect their
investments of of personnel, money, or prestige. This is
especially true when combat troops are involved or the mission
is considered more dangerous. Another example of this is the
United States' insistence that retired U.S. Navy Admiral
Jonathan Howe be appointed as the Secretary-General's Special
Representative in Somalia. 20 While the force commander was
Turkish general, Cevik Bir, the real authority within any
United Nations operation rests with the Secretary-General's
Special Representative. The problems associated with this
arrangement will be discussed in the final section of this
chapter. Because there has been misgivings about the
prospects of U.S. troops serving under foreign commanders21
the U.S. obviously wanted to be able to exert greater control
19Nate Thayer, "Budget Blues," Far Eastern Economic Review , 27
February 1992, p. 23.
20John Barry, "The Making of a Fiasco," Newsweek , 18 October
1993, p. 36.
21Steven A. Holmes, "Clinton May Let U.S. Troops Serve Under
U.N. Chiefs," The New York Times . 18 August 1993, p. 1.
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over the operation. The United Nations had little choice but
to defer to the concerns of U.S. leaders becuase their support
was necessary to keep the opertion in Somalia intact.
Japan's motivation for enhanced involvement in UNTAC is
twofold. UNTAC has provided the Japanese government with a
vehicle to become more active in Southeast Asia, and was an
opportunity to further its cause to attain a permanent seat on
the Security Council. Japan's security interests in Southeast
Asia are considerable because of investments in the region.
The Japanese foreign ministry's announcement that it was
providing a $4 million aid package to the provisional
Cambodian government to keep its administration, including the
police force, operating22 was an indication of Japan's
intention of playing a continuing important role in Southeast
Asia beyond the end of UNTAC 's mandate.
The deployment of troops as part of UNTAC is the first
tenuous step in Japan taking more of a military role in the
region. 23 Both of these goals were viewed warily by Asia's
other regional power, China, and by Japan's citizens. 24 Japan
has countered China's protestations that involvement in
22Associated Press Wire Service, "Japan Donates $4 Million,"
Phnom Penh Post , 13-26 August 1993.
23Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Security Policy and Southeast
Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia , vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 186-197.
24Sasaki Yoshitaka, "Japan's Undue International
Contribution," Japan Quarterly . July-Septermber 1993, pp. 259-261.
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Cambodia is a sign of increasing Japanese militarism with the
belief that "Beijing is trying to force it to remain an
abnormal state so it would be denied a permanent seat on the
U.N. security council." 25
China also made its first tenuous steps in the peace-
support operations arena through UNTAC. The 400-man engineer
battalion deployed to Cambodia represented China's most
significant contribution to an international force to date.
Its purpose has raised some questions in the international
community, pointing out China's close ties with the Khmer
Rouge and its engineering operations in other parts of
Southeast Asia. 26 Despite the apparent conflict of interest
that this situation presents, the United Nations finds it
difficult to refuse an offer of participation from any
country. This is especially true as the scope of the United
Nations' peacekeeping mission has increased by an order of
magnitude in the past two years and resources to fulfill all
of the new operations are scarce.
Additionally, an offer of help is particularly hard to
refuse when the country possesses veto power within the
Security Council and has the ability to block the entire
25Gerald Segal, "Confrontation Between China and Japan?" World
Policy Journal , Summer 1993, Vol. X, No. 2, p. 29.
26Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle,
Making Some Neighbors Nervous, Filling a Perceived Power Gap in
Southeast Asia," The New York Times . 11 January 1993, p. 1.
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operation before it is even started. Attempts to implement
effective actions are difficult when one of the belligerent
parties has a linchpin power patron. For example, in the
UNTAC operation, attempts by the Security Council to impose
economic sanctions to punish the recalcitrant Khmer Rouge
faction for not complying with Phase II of the Paris Peace
Plan (cantonment and disarmament) were consistantly weakened
by the Chinese representative. 27
China's former rival in the Cambodian conflict, now reborn
as Russia, has also deployed forces as part of UNTAC. The
Russian military has provided the air support group and
operates the helicopters for UNTAC. Russia's motivation for
involvement may no longer be tied to any ideology other than
money. Russia has been unable to pay its annually assessed
11.4% share of the peacekeeping budget or the debt that it
inherited from the Soviet Union. The United Nations pays hard
cash to the soldiers while they are deployed under U.N.
auspices and operating costs are written off against a
country's peacekeeping assessment or arrearages. Because of
this, the Russian Air Force has become one of the primary
contractors for airlift of U.N. forces and eguipment world-
27 Interview with Mr. David Wallace.
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wide. 28 While the Russian military may still possess the
hardware to act as a "linchpin" state, the reality of relying
upon a military facing uncertainties of its own has costs on
the operational and tactical levels, which will be discussed
in the following sections.
France, significantly more active in United Nations peace-
support efforts than other permanent members of the Security
Council, appears to be the only linchpin actor who manipulates
the U.N. system with unabashed transparency. The French have
demonstrated the willingness to operate within the U.N. system
as a major power. In 1993, with approximately 6,000 soldiers
deployed world-wide in places such as southern Lebanon,
Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, France was the
largest troop contributor to U.N. operations. 29 This is a
departure from the traditional practice of permanent member
states only deploying supporting units to peacekeeping
missions. Predictably their participation, as a linchpin
actor, was not without demands. For example, France wanted a
French general officer to be designated as the UNTAC Force
Commander. However, since Australian Lieutenant General
Sanderson was already chosen, the French government pushed
28Interview with CAPT. Robert Thomas, United States Air Force,
Airlift Coordinator, Office of the Military Adviser to the
Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, 26 February 1993.
29Ian Kemp, "Peacekeeping: Between the Battle Lines," Jane's
Defense Weekly . 13 March 1993, p. 26.
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hard for the Deputy Force Commander position, which they
received. 30
Additionally, the French Battalion deployed to UNTAC was
originally to be assigned a sector in the northeast of the
country that was of less importance economically and
politically, because of the low population level. The French
Battalion was chosen because it was more capable of self-
sustainment and could operate more effectively than others in
areas farther away from the logistical support of U.N
Headquarters in Phnom Penh. However, the French government
insisted that the battalion be deployed in Kampot Provence
which, aside from Phnom Penh, is economically the most
important area of Cambodia. 31 Because this province was
easily resupplied and supported because of its proximity to
Phnom Penh and the seaport of Kampong Saom the sector
logically should have been given to a contingent that did not
have the French's level of logistical self-sufficiency.
Another major drawback to "linchpin" actors, aside from
their insistence on exerting more control over an operation,
is that while their leadership is necessary in putting
together U.N. operations, their withdrawal or faltering
30Interview with LCOL Rich Rice, Southeast Asia Desk Officer,
Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Intelligence Estimates Division, February 24, 1993.
31Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, Malaysian Army, UNTAC Chief
of Operations, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
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leadership can bring about critical weakening or even
catastrophic failure of the operation. For example, in late
April 1993, the UNTAC election effort appeared to be on the
verge of collapse as the Khmer Rouge attempted to disrupt the
process by targeting the United Nations directly. The death
of a Japanese election official in Cambodia in early April
1993 prompted the Japanese Government to request special
assurances from the United Nations that their nationals would
only be deployed in "safe" areas. 32
Similarly in UNOSOM II, following the disastrous October
3rd, 1993 raid to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid, the Clinton
Administration announced that it would withdraw all U.S.
forces participating in the U.N. from Somalia within a six
month time period. It was acknowledged that the withdrawal
date of 31 March 1994 was arbitrarily chosen. 33 UNOSOM II 's
mandate to complete an UNTAC-like plan, and create a
democratic government, was estimated to take 12 months
longer. 34 United Nations Under Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, described the effects of
the United States' withdrawal from the Somalia mission as
32David E. Sanger, "Seeking Stature, Japan Steps in Cambodia
Bind," The New York Times . 13 May 1993, p. A7.
33Michael Duffy, J.F.O. McAllister & Bruce van Voorst,
"Anatomy of a Disaster," Time . 18 October 1993, p. 49.
34Paul Lewis, "U.N. Gives Timetable for Somalia Democracy,"
The New York Times . 17 September 1993, p. A3.
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frantic. Following the U.S. announcement, the French, German
and Belgian governments decided to withdraw their troops also.
And the Italian Government, with the second largest contingent
in UNOSOM II, decided to "re-evaluate" their continued
presence in Somalia. 35
B. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: OPERATIONAL LEVEL
While the United Nations is a system of blocs and
alliances on the strategic level, peace-support operations are
more accurately described as ad hoc coalitions. Joint
Publication 0-1, JTTP For Combined Operations, defines an
alliance as "a result of formal agreements between two or more
nations for broad, long-term objectives," while a coalition is
"an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a
common action." 36 A coalition is a system through which the
participants reap mutual benefits and advantages, however, a
coalitional relationship is one where the autonomy of each
individual is still the greatest concern. 37 The result is
35Marguerite Michaels, "Blue-Helmet Blues," Time , 15 November
1993, p. 67.
36Waldo D. Freeman, Randall J. Hess & Manuel Faria, "The
Challenges of Combined Operations," Military Review . November 1992,
p. 11, n. 3.
37Amos Perlmutter & William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in
Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist
Political Systems," The American Political Science Review , Vol. 76,
1982, p. 782.
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that the cohesion of a U.N. operation is adversely affected by
the reality of contributing states placing their national
agendas above the agenda of the mission/ to one degree or
another.
Therefore, one of the key problems facing multilateral
operations, especially those intervening into intrastate
conflicts, is the varying relationships that the different
national contingents will have with the belligerents. While
one of the overriding principles of U.N. operations has always
been the strict neutrality of forces, different national
contingents will more often than not establish decidedly
non-neutral relationships with the belligerents. As the types
of missions shift upward along the continuum of conflict this
reality will have a compounded negative effect on the
operation's ability to act cohesively. Especially as the
force, as a whole, is perceived as non-neutral by the parties
to the conflict.
A clear example of this problem, in a non-United Nations
peace-support operation, is the ill-fated Multinational Force
(MNF and MNF II) in Lebanon in the early 1980s. While this
endeavor was not under a mandate from the United Nations, it
provides some useful lessons for any form of peace-support
operations in the future, especially those approaching peace-
enforcement and in circumstances of high-intensity violence.
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Paramount among these lessons is the stipulation that none
of the contributing nations be perceived as aligned with any
of the conflicting parties. In Lebanon, the U.S. government
tended to see the Syrian forces and the Lebanese factions
supported by Syria as the most serious threat to the Marines
on the ground and U.S. national interest. 38 Therefore, as
U.S. aircraft and naval gunfire bombed the mountains
surrounding Beirut, the pro-Syrian guerrillas viewed the
United States as less of an impartial broker and increasingly
as aligned with Israel.
Another important lesson learned is that escalation from
a deterrent strategy to a coercive one does not necessarily
accomplish the original mission of a peace-support operation.
This is primarily true because, as discussed earlier, the
purpose of these types of missions is to neutralize rather
than defeat belligerents. This problem in peace-support
operations will be discussed further in Chapter III.
In the case of UNTAC, France's participation provides the
clearest example of the operational level problems of using
forces which may not be completely impartial . One of the
early blunders of the Cambodian operation, which impinged upon
its ability to remain neutral in the eyes of all of the
38Frank Gregory, The Multinational Force - Aid or Obstacle to
Conflict Resolution . Institute For The Study of Conflict, London,
1984, p. 29.
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belligerents, was committed when the French government
deployed its UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in
Cambodia) contingent through Vietnam, rather than Thailand,
without prior U.N. approval. While this maneuver may have
served France's purposes well in its normalization with
Vietnam, it immediately provided the Khmer Rouge with a reason
to begin claiming U.N. favoritism. 39
This pattern of unilateral activity by the French would
remain constant throughout the operation in Cambodia.
Predictably, other participants in the peace process have
grown upset with the increasing number of bilateral agreements
between France and the current authorities in Phnom Penh,
which include an offer to provide extensive military
assistance to the new government after the election. 40 It
appears that the French have been somewhat successful in
convincing the Cambodian leadership to move back into the
French sphere of influence. Besides signing a military
training agreement with the French, 41 the provisional
government of Cambodia is seeking full membership to the
Association of French Speaking Countries even though the
39Interview with LCOL Rich Rice.
40Nate Thayer, "The Grand Illusion," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 25 February 1993, p. 12.
41
"France to Provide Aid for Military," Associated Press Wire
Service, Phnom Penh Post . 16-29 July 1993, p. 3.
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majority of Cambodians feel that English would be a better
secondary national language. 42
Similarly the participation of secondary regional powers
as troop contributors yielded some of the same problems as
those associated with the linchpin powers. Two ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Malaysia
and Indonesia, were troop contributors to UNTAC. ASEAN was
created in 1967 primarily as a response to the perceptions of
external threat stemming from the Vietnam War. 43 The
increased cooperation between the ASEAN nations can be
directly traced to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the
Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia. 44
In 1982, ASEAN was instrumental in putting together a
coalition of Cambodian resistance factions, including the
Khmer Rouge, known as the CGDK (Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea) which occupied Cambodia's seat in the
United Nations. 45 As ASEAN nations, both Indonesia and
Malaysia aided the combined resistance factions in their fight
against what was considered Vietnamese expansionism, even if
42Ker Munthit, "Cambodia Chooses Francophone Path," Phnom Penh
Post . 13-26 August, 1993, p. 8.
43Steven Schlossstein, Asia's New Little Dragons . Contemporary
Books, Chicago, 1991, p. 31.
44Walt, p. 29, n. 40.
45Michael Leifer, Cambodian Conflict - The Final Phase? . The
Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, London, 1989, p. 3.
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that meant siding with a group like the Khmer Rouge. However,
this apparent lack of neutrality did not prevent the United
Nations from accepting them as troop contributors to UNTAC.
Even within the ASEAN alliance there were grave
differences concerning an approach to the Cambodian conflict.
For its part, Indonesia has indicated that it is dissatisfied
with the manner in which ASEAN had been drawn into an
alignment with China against Vietnam even though it regarded
China as its prime source of external threat. 46 As has been
shown by historical experience the disappearance of an
external threat will produce alliance disintegration. 47 The
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia further added to
cracks in the ASEAN alliance. With economic considerations
somewhat replacing geostrategic concerns the various regional
powers can be seen as using U.N. participation to further
their own national agendas and prevent others from emerging as
hegemonic powers. The mid-1989 announcement by Thai Prime
Minister Chatichai of his Souvannaphoum (Thai for "Golden
Peninsula") concept for establishing a pan-Indochinese
marketplace once the Cambodian conflict was settled, prompted
negative reactions from other ASEAN countries. 48 This was
46Leifer, p. 10.
47Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International
System . MacMillan Co., New York, 1967, p. 112.
48Schlossstein, p. 208.
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especially true of Indonesia, with whom Thailand has had a
historically volatile relationship.
Ostensibly, Malaysia's and Indonesia's stake in
volunteering for UNTAC is to promote regional stability.
However, asserting their own regional power comes along with
their participation. As pointed out by the UNTAC Malaysian
Battalion's Information Officer one of the reasons for
Malaysia's participation as a troop contributor was to match
Indonesia's deployment of troops to the Indochinese mainland
because "every neighbor is a potential enemy." Since both
countries had teams seconded to the Secretary General's
planning staff for UNTAC, the two Indonesian and one Malaysian
battalions were assured of strategically important locations
within Cambodia. 49 Because of pressure placed upon the United
Nations, one of the Indonesian Battalions was placed in
Kampong Thorn province, which is strategic to Cambodia
economically. 50 Unfortunately, this province also proved to
be a hotbed of Khmer Rouge activity and according to various
sources within UNTAC, the Indonesian forces were under
separate orders from their government not to use force against
any of the Cambodian factions.
49Interview with LCOL Richard Rice.
50Interview with LCOL Edward Waller, U.S. Army, Chief of
Information, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 03 May 1993.
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Thailand's participation in UNTAC can be viewed as a
double-edged sword. Because of Cambodia's virtually destroyed
infrastructure and the land mine threat, routes through
Thailand had to be used to emplace and resupply the U.N.
battalions in the northeastern provinces of Cambodia.
Therefore Thailand's cooperation with UNTAC was necessary for
its functioning. However, when diplomatic pressure was
applied to Thailand through the United Nations to enforce the
bans on lumber coming out of Cambodia, the Thai military
countered by cancelling air clearances for U.N. supply flights
which landed in Thailand. 51
Additionally, while Thailand did not participate within
UNTAC as a major troop contributor, it volunteered military
officers to work on the UNTAC staff and 2 engineer battalions,
not in the U.N. chain of command, to help rebuild the
infrastructure in Cambodia. In reality, because of their
economic ties with the Khmer Rouge and corruption within the
Thai military, their "aid" was seen as part of the problem
rather than part of the peace process. 52 In the first half of
1992, Thai engineers built seven roads from their border
51Interview with CAPT. Robert Thomas
52 Interview with LCOL Richard Rice.
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directly into Khmer Rouge-controlled territory53 to exploit
the lumber and precious gem trade.
One of the problems associated with using military forces
from countries where the military forces have significant
political power in U.N. operations is that they may not be
fully under the control of their governments. The Thai
military remained the conduit for Khmer Rouge trade in and out
of Cambodia. However, the United Nations could not exert too
much pressure on the Thai government because, in turn, the
inchoate Thai democratic government could not exert too much
pressure upon the Thai military. The argument was made within
UNTAC that if the Thai government impinged too strongly on the
corporate interests of the military, it may have prompted
another military coup. 54
As pointed out in Rebellion and Conflict , one of the key
tasks in reducing the level of violence in an intrastate
conflict is ensuring that the supply of weapons and ordnance
is denied to the belligerent forces. In an intra-state
conflict the various collectivities, in order to be effective,
retain an intense need for inputs of certain key resources,
such as arms and medicine, which are likely to come from
53Craig Etcheson, "The Peace in Cambodia," Current History .
December 1992, Vol. 91, No. 569, p. 415.
54Interview with LCOL Damien Healy, Australian Army, Mixed
Military Working Group, UNTAC.
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external sources. 55 This task is essential to U.N. operations
such as UNOSOM II where the U.N. forces are directly engaging
the belligerent parties. In an operations such as UNTAC
attempts to enforce restrictive measures to quell fighting
between the belligerent may only draw the peacekeepers into
the conflict.
The imposition of harsher sanctions may cause a backlash
effect against the United Nations forces on the ground.
During the UNTAC operation the Khmer Rouge tended only to
harass U.N. troops on the ground and not target them directly
because the U.N. did not directly threaten the Khmer Rouge,
However, the imposition of sanctions against them most likely
would have changed that. One Khmer Rouge spokesman said that
specific sanctions against them would be an act by the United
Nations "tantamount to war. 56 "
Furthermore, unilateral actions by any of the participants
in a multinational operation has the possibility of causing
anomosity against the entire force. Even seemingly innocuos
actions, such the airdrops of humanitarian relief in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by U.S. Air Force planes, have the potential to
affect the conflict resolution process. Ground commanders in
UNPROFOR viewed the airdrops as unwarranted and potentially
55Leites and Wolf, p. 76.
56Nate Thayer, "U.N. : No on Sanctions, Yes on Logging Ban,"
Phnom Penh Post . 20 November-03 December 1993, p. 16.
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dangerous considering the fact that they could get ground
convoys through in most instances. 57
The difficulty of imposing economic sanctions on a
recalcitrant party described in the previous section on
strategic level problems. However, part of the problem with
instituting such measures is having the political will and the
forces on the ground to enforce them. As long as regional
powers, with stakes in the outcome of these internal
conflicts, "partially contribute" to U.N. missions this
essential task will be unfulfilled. The irony of the
Cambodian situation was that by mid-1993 the Khmer Rouge had
become rich and well-armed enough that arms were no longer
imported into Khmer Rouge territory. Conservative estimates
put the Khmer Rouge's independent income from gems and logging
at $60 million annually. 58 They had such an abundant
stockpile that the weapons flow has reversed and former Khmer
Rouge weapons have been traced to insurgent forces in Burma. 59
The increase of U.N. activity in intrastate conflicts has
introduced a new dynamic altogether which exacerbates rather
57
"Unilateral U.S. Policy On The Balkans Tilts Peace Process,"
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy , London, 28 February
1993, p. 20.
58Catharin Dalpino, "Khmer Rouge's Riches," The Christian
Science Monitor , 26 March 1991, p. 18.
59Interview with Steve Johnson, Analyst of Indochina, United
States Department of State, Intelligence and Research Division,
February 23, 1993.
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than alleviates the fighting: outside powers using the U.N.
as cover for the delivery of military aid to one of the
factions. In July of 1993 the government of Saudi Arabia
shipped 120 tons of weapons in containers marked "humanitarian
aid" to Maribor Airport in Slovenia in violation of the U.N.
embargo on weapons to the former Yugoslavia. Saudi Arabia
then acquired 26 Russian Mi-8 helicopters and painted them
white to resemble United Nations aircraft. Slovenian
authorities discovered the weapons before they could be
distributed because the containers had to be opened to fit
into the helicopters. 60 In Somalia, prior to the UNITAF
deployment, the United Nations was using Russian aircraft
painted with U.N. markings to deliver humanitarian aid. In
June 1992 one of these Russian aircraft with U.N. markings,
but whose crew's contract with the U.N. had expired, delivered
weapons and newly printed Somali currency to one of the clan
leaders, Aidid's rival Ali Mahdi, in northern Mogadishu. 61
One of the key foundations of the integrity of the United
Nations' collective security system, as outlined by the
Charter, was the concept that it was not to be dependent upon
the states' perception of where their national interest lay.
60Yosef Bodansky, "Muslim Forces Plan Major Offensives After
a Peace Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Defense & Foreign Affairs
Strategic Policy . 31 July 1993, pp. 6-7.
61Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" Foreign
Policy . Summer 1993, p. 145.
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Conceptually, becoming a member of the United Nations entails
the decision that a state's national interest lies in ensuring
the efficacy of the collective security system. 62 However, it
has been displayed over numerous examples that states may
participate in a multinational peace-support operation
directly in the interest of their own security, or as an
expression of their power in the region. In the case of
weaker states with no apparent national agenda, such as Ghana
or Fiji, participation in U.N. operations may provide a means
of supplementing their military capability through equipment
and experience at an acceptable political and economic cost. 63
This fact may present U.N. operations outside the
traditional level of peacekeeping with an unsolvable paradox.
Deterrence theory has shown that the validity of a deterrent
strategy is directly related to a demonstrable relationship
between the commitment and the commitment-maker ' s real
national interest. 64 As the United Nations moves into
situations of higher levels of violence, only states with a
vested national interest in quelling the conflict will be
willing to participate because "the greater the expenditure of
62Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former
Yugoslavia," Journal of International Affairs , July 1993, p. 471.
63Gregory, pp. 5-6.
64Craig & George, p. 192.
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blood and treasure, the more imperative the demand that they
should be spent for a vital cause." 65
C. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: TACTICAL LEVEL
When the United Nations initiates a field operation it
does not have the capability of drafting forces; it must rely
on voluntary troop contributions from member states. When
asking states to commit troops, the U.N. attempts to maintain
a balance between several different factors. First and
foremost, it attempts to attain a global balance of forces.
While the highly trained and thoroughly equipped troops of the
more developed states may provide the most efficient forces
for an operation, constituting a force relying heavily on
these militaries "smacks of colonialism." According to
Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie, former UNPROFOR Chief
of Staff, "it is very important to have Third World developing
nation representation because we don't want this to become a
white Western club." 66 Additionally, by being able to force
the U.N. to make tactical level decisions based on political
considerations rather than efficiency, linchpin actors can
degrade the U.N. 's capablities by turning tactical
considerations into strategic problems.
65Van Creveld, p. 146.
66Ian Kemp, "'9 to 5' U.N. Criticized," Jane's Defence Weekly .
13 March 1993, p. 27.
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This "force divider" means that a U.N. force will pay an
operational price of having to assign some of the less self-
sustaining contingent forces to an area which is more
supportable but perhaps less desirable. The sparse road
networks, destroyed infrastructure and mine threats common in
mission areas such as Cambodia, Somalia and Western Sahara
demand decentralized operations with heavy reliance on air
transport (and water transport in the case of Cambodia) to
supplement the usual fleet of four-wheel drive vehicles which
are ubiquitous in all U.N. missions. Unfortunately, only the
armies from the so called "northern" states are able to deploy
battalion-size units with organic equipment to provide for
their own survival in the instances of rapid deployments into
harsh operating enviroments. In Cambodia, the U.N. attempted
to overcome these tactical constraints by cobbling together a
"U.N. air force" and a "U.N. navy" with mixed results.
Regardless of the force mixture, combined operations will
always fall prey to tactical level problems in five areas:
doctrine, training, equipment/logistics, language and,
culture/sensitivities. 67 These problem areas remain constant
67 In "The Challenges of Combined Operations," pp. 3-11,
Freeman, Hess & Faria list nine areas of operational level,
referred to here as tactical level, problems: goals, doctrine,
intelligence, language, training, equipment, logistics, culture and
sensitivities. Of these nine the area of goals is considered a
strategic and operational level problem; intelligence is covered in
depth in Chapter IV. Logistics and equipment are combined into one
section as are culture and sensitivities.
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even in a successful alliances, such as NATO, which have had
decades to work out problems of interoperability. In the ad
hoc operations put together by the U.N. the problems may seem
insurmountable or the cause of catastrophic mission failure.
1 . Doctrine
The need for military forces to have a concept of
operations (doctrine) is as old as organized armies
themselves. These doctrines are important because they
describe the system that enables military organizations to
execute specific operations. They are, in essence, the very
building blocks of an armed force. Doctrine is basically "an
authoritative, approved statement of how to perform a task." 68
The problem of doctrine as it applies to United
Nations operations is twofold. First, there is the problem of
"peace-support" doctrine itself. While problems are easily
identified in operations there is no standardized U.N.
doctrine covering the wide range of operations described in
the section New Definitions of Peacekeeping in Chapter II. As
described by UNTAC's Chief Plans Officer, "armies are accused
of preparing to fight the last war, but the U.N. does not even
train to keep the last peace." 69 Second, since the U.N. does
68Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam , The Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1986, p. 37.
69Interview with COL. Huijssoon, Dutch Army, UNTAC Chief of
Plans, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
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not have a common doctrine, the various areas of any U.N.
force will reflect the doctrine of the national contingent
posted there. This presents a minimal problem in traditional
peacekeeping where each contingent simply has a set area of a
buffer zone to control. However, in situations such as
Cambodia or Somalia, the difference in doctrine can prove to
be dangerous or disastrous.
Doctrine is a reflection of each country's character
and will affect and influence the command style and force
employment of each separate contingent. When the different
contingents are reguired to provide combat support to one
another, doctrinal differences will become glaring. This is
especially true of operations with a strong civil-military
mission. One of the problems of allowing United Nations
forces, engaged in civil-military type opertions, to abandon
the principle of using force only for self-defense is the
possiblity of the use of excessive force. Some contingents
come from armed forces which have been used to quell civil
unrest in their home countries with varying degrees of use of
force and respect for human rights.
The policy of using force only in self-defense has so
far served the U.N. well because it represents the lowest
common denominator. As mandates are expanded to include the
use of force to protect the mission, as happened in UNTAC when
its mandate was changed to include protection of the election
74
process or in Somalia where famine relief protection turned
into "nation building," the rules of engagement will be
subject to interpretation according to each of the
contingents' doctrines.
Doctrinal differences will always exist, but their
severity can be limited by institutionalizing operational
guidelines within the United Nations system and establishing
multilateral training programs in preparation for such
missions. For example, in September 1993, the United States
and Russia signed a pact for peacekeeper training exercises
between the U.S. Third Infantry Division and the Russian 27th
Motorized Rifle Division. 70 However, enhanced training or
greater experience within U.N. operations may not be enough to
overcome the conceptual characteristics of an army.
France, which appeared to be regaining some lost
imperial pride, 71 sent a battalion of elite paratroops when
UNTAC deployed in early 1992. While the French were arguably
the most proficient of all of the battalions in UNTAC, they
were also viewed as the most aggressive. Doctrinal
dissimilarities may also reflect the cultural differences and
independent political goals of the contingents. In UNTAC
70Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. and Russia Sign Peacekeeper
Training Pact," The New York Times , 09 September 1993, p. A6
.
71Murray Hieber, Nate Thayer and Nayan Chanda, "French
Dressing," Far Eastern Economic Review , 25 February 1993, pp. 10-
12.
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these differences within the force were clearly demarcated
between the French troops who were ready to actively engage
the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesians who would not only refuse
to return fire when attacked but turned over their weapons and
clothing to Khmer Rouge guerrillas or simple bandits.
The French military's characteristically aggresive
posture has been noted in other peacekeeping operations. As
part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),
France initially contributed an infantry battalion. However,
the French troops were considered too "aggressive" by many
U.N. officers who were said to want them "quietly withdrawn."
The French infantrymen seemed less suited than some of the
other contingents to the restraints of peacekeeping. 72 France
continued to contribute a logistical battalion to UNIFIL after
withdrawing their infantry battalion in 1987.
Armies, like any other organization, must be able to
adapt to new environments and missions. However, the
operational character of an army may have become deeply
imbedded and difficult to overcome. The operational doctrine
of some armies may even be antithetical to what is required
for peace-support missions.
72Alan James, Interminable Interim: The U.N. Force in
Lebanon, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, London,
1988, pp. 23-24.
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In The Army and Vietnam , Andrew Krepinevich describes
how the U.S. Army evolved into a superb instrument for
combating field armies in a conventional war but was an
inefficient and ineffective force for defeating insurgent
guerrilla forces in a "low-intensity" conflict. The key to
understanding how this happened is in the examination of the
U.S. Army's concept of war:
the Army's perception of how wars ought to be waged and is
reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its
troops for battle. The characteristics of the Army Concept
are two: a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and
a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize
casualties—in effect, the substitution of material costs at
every available opportunity to avoid payment in blood. 73
The U.S. Army's experience coming out of World War II and
Korea did not prepare it well for counterinsurgency wars. The
U.S. Army's difficulty in fighting a counterinsurgency can be
traced to its inability to overcome organizational inertia and
adapt to a different type of warfare. This same inability to
adapt doctrine may make it difficult for some armies to
participate with combat troops in peace-support operations.
As explained in Chapter II, many of the
characteristics of the force needed to be successful at
counterinsurgency, are the same needed for saving failed
states through peace-support operations. In situations like
Somalia the emphasis should be on firepower restraint, not its
73Krepinevich, p. 5.
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widespread application; and resolution of political and social
problems within the state targeted by the various counter-
state collectivities, not closing with and destroying their
field forces.
The U.S. military's success in Operation Desert Storm
may have "licked the Vietnam syndrome" 74 but it also may have
further cemented the Army's philosophy of "it is better to
send a bullet than a man." 75 Just as in counterinsurgency/
the use of force in these new types of peace-support
operations should place a premium on the protection of the
population which is often contradictory to the axiom of
liberally applied massive firepower. In response to the
killing of 23 Pakistani troops in an ambush in early June
1993, the United States used AC-130 Specter gunships and
attack helicopters to destroy locations in Mogadishu described
as a command and control center for Aidid's militia; a radio
station which U.N. officials said was used to incite hostility
against the United Nations, and "unauthorized" sites used to
store weapons. 76
74President George Bush, quoted in Ann Devroy and Guy
Gugliotta, "Bush to 'Move Fast' on Mideast Peace," The Washington
Post , 2 March 1993, p. A13.
75See: Krepinevich, p. 6.
76Donataella Lorch, "20 Somalis Die When Peacekeepers Fire at
Crowd," The New York Times . 15 June 1993, p. Al.
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This response, resulting in some of the initial cracks
in the UNOSOM II operation, showed the dynamic characteristic
of the various levels of coalition problems. The response,
caused by the tactical level problem of widely different
doctrinal behavior, gave rise to strategic and operational
level problems. On the strategic level, the Italian
government began to threaten withdrawal of its troops because
the original relief mission had "turned into a combat opertion
taking sides in a civil war." 77 The Italians in this case
could be considered a linchpin actor because of their former
colonial status in Somalia and the fact that they had the
second largest troop contribution. Additionally, on the
operational level, the response from various troop
contributors to the raid prompted the U.N. to warn several
governments that the troops in Somalia were part of a U.N.
force and not to be given orders through their independent
national command authorities. 78
2 . Training
The gap between the operational proficiency of various
contingents in a combined operation is due to numerous
factors: reliance on large number of short-term conscripts
77Alan Cowell, "Italy, In U.N. Rift, Threatens Recall of
Somalia Troops," The New York Times , 16 July 1993, p. Al.
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"Tweaking the Trunk of the United Nations," The Economist .
17 July 1993, p. 35.
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versus a professional force; vastly different officer and
noncommissioned officer development programs; lower
technical skills and educational level of the enlisted
personnel; resource limitations and degree of emphasis placed
on field training. 79 In any coalition operation, logically
the proficiency level of the various contingents, along with
equipment and logistics, should be the primary considerations
when assigning tasks and operational areas. However, since
maintaining a "global balance" is a requirement of the United
Nations and, as demonstrated, operational level factors often
determine the placement of units, training and operational
proficiency have often been secondary considerations.
The capability gap will be especially wide in a force
that mixes armed forces from highly developed states with
those from developing states. In some types of operations it
may be possible to bring the more poorly trained units up to
standard. However, most U.N. operations are deployed in
response to an immediate crisis and time will not permit for
an initial training period. The only feasible short-term
option is to recognize the capability gaps within a combined
force and plan accordingly. The need to overcome political
considerations in determining the placement of contingents is
especially acute in operations in environments of intense
79Freeman, Hess and Faria, p. 8.
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violence or harsh enviromental conditions. The lack of
training by some contingents can have deadly consequences. In
Mogadishu in February 1993, Nigerian troops panicked when
demonstrations began to turn violent. They began firing
automatic weapons at the crowds until they were practically
out of ammunition. 80
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, many developing
states will use U.N. operations as a way of gaining field
experience for their armed forces and have the United Nations
pay for it. This is also true to a certain extent of more
developed states like Ireland and Australia. According to the
Chief of the General Staff of the Australian Army, Lieutenant
General John C. Grey, participation in operations such as
UNTAC and UNITAF provides "excellent opportunity to exercise
a significant component of the Ready Deployment Force" and to
"enable significant numbers of the Australian Army to develop
further skills that are essential to its primary mission." 81
In the older, more established operations, like
UNIFIL, troop contingents usually rotate home every six
months. Some of the contributing states' armed forces have
developed training programs to prepare the troops for the U.N.
80Stevenson, p. 141.
81Lieutenant General J.C. Grey, "Peacekeeping: The Australian
Army View," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter , June-July 1993, p. 8.
81
mission prior to their deployment. 82 However in situations
like UNTAC, where the mandate is extended beyond the original
redeployment date and certain battalions are not rotated, the
overall force capability is in danger of falling below the
original lowest common denominator.
The original operations plan for UNTAC redeployed six
of the twelve battalions in October 1992. When the cantonment
and disarmament phases failed, the U.N. requested that all
twelve battalions remain in Cambodia to provide security for
the election process. 83 As the most dangerous period of the
UNTAC mission (the May 1993 elections) approached, battalions
such as the Malaysian contingent had been unable to conduct
even the most rudimentary training for almost a year. 84
Obviously contributing states which were financially
strapped to deploy troops could not afford to rotate their
battalions and most troops ended up spending over 15 months in
the mission. A significant cause of force capability
82For a description of the Norwegian Army's peacekeeping
training school see: Tom Dunkel, "In The Fight To Keep Peace,"
Insight On The News , 3 January 1993, pp. 4-9, 22-23; For a
description of the newly established Australian Defense Force
Peacekeeping Centre see: Herschel Hurst, "Training for the Task,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter , June-July 1993, p. 13.
83Interview with LCOL Mat Yusuf, Malaysian Army, UNTAC Desk
Officer, Office of the Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, New York, 25 February 1993.
84Interview with CAPT. Mazur, Malaysian Battalion Information
Officer, UNTAC, Battambang, 01 May 1993.
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denegration is the lack of budgetary authority by an
operation's Force Commander. The way that U.N. operations are
designed, the military Force Commander has no budgetary
discretion. The result is that a Force Commander cannot make
training decisions for his force based upon changing tactical
situations. For example, UNTAC Force Commander, Lt. General
Sanderson, requested increased funding for training ammunition
after UNTAC 's mandate was extended; U.N. Headquarters in New
York denied his request. 85 Because of the enormous cost of
the mission the U.N. risked paying an operational price to
save money. By not funding additional training or paying for
the rotation of battalions UNTAC became a hollow force which
could not have withstood a serious threat from any of the
armed factions in Cambodia if it had materialized.
3. Equipment and Logistics
Emplacement of a functioning logistics system to
support a large force in the field is one of the most
demanding problems that combined operations face. The problem
appears so unmanageable that the basic NATO policy for the
last four decades has been to make logistics purely a national
responsibility. 86 Obviously this is an impossible option when
planning a U.N. operation. Because of varying resources of
85Interview with CAPT. Bob Thomas.
ODFreeman, Hess, & Faria, p. 9.
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the troop contributing states, contingents will have to rely
on a unified logistics system.
UNTAC was unique among U.N. missions in that it had a
long lead time for planning and the benefit of two technical
evaluation surveys of the country prior to deployment.
However, even with these advantages it appears that the first
real danger that UNTAC faced in 1992 was the possibility of
collapsing under its own weight because of the inadequacies of
the U.N. logistics system. Forces, which were not self-
sustaining, began to deploy into Cambodia before a logistics
train was in place to support them. In fact the early
headquarters staff in Phnom Penh only became aware of the
Malaysian Battalions early deployment into the country by a
Voice of America news brief three days before their arrival. 87
Paramount among the problems of the U.N. logistics
system is the lack of understanding by permanent U.N.
civilians of what is required for a large military operation.
For example, during the initial planning stage in New York,
the military logistics component of UNTAC was "capped" at 827
personnel by the civilians in the Field Operations Division
over the protests of the military planners. 88 Normally a
87 Interview with MAJ. Gilles Briere, Canadian Army, Logistic
Coordination Cell, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
88Report by UTAC Deputy Chief of Logistics, LCOL Bruce
Harding, Canadian Army, "UNTAC Early Mission Logistics
Difficulties," 5 March 1993.
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logistics support group of 1800 would be required to support
an operation the size of UNTAC (22,000 total at its peak).
One of the results of the technical evaluation
missions noted earlier was the promulgation of a "Guideline
for Contributing Countries" that listed equipment and
logistics requirements for the forces deploying to Cambodia.
One of the primary requirements put forth by the U.N. was that
each of the battalions should be self-sufficient for a minimum
of 60 days. However, it appears that the guidelines that were
developed were largely ignored; mainly because of resource
limitations of some of the contributing states. The most
egregious examples of this was the battalion from Ghana which
deployed to Cambodia without the capability of sustaining
itself for even one day. 89 Arriving with only personal
equipment, the Ghana Battalion was, by necessity, placed in
the Phnom Penh "Special Zone." In short, UNTAC was
effectively missing one battalion. Not only could UNTAC HQ
not deploy the battalion; it had to pull resources designated
for other functions to support the battalion.
In peace-support missions operating in environments of
high levels of violence the tactical level cost of having
under-equipped contingents as part of the force may be the
direct cause of the loss of life; of both the peacekeepers and
89Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, Chief Operations Officer
UNTAC.
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the population they are attempting to help. For example in
Mogadishu the Pakistani forces' lack of armored personnel
carriers and flack jackets contributed to their high casualty
rate when they were ambushed on 5 June 1993. Similarly, the
lack of proper riot gear was a contributing factor in the
killing of Somali civilians when Pakistani troops fired
automatic weapons to dispel angry crowds. 90
However, not all contingents arrive with less than the
required equipment lists. Forces from the more developed
states often arrive with equipment not required by the United
Nations. This too, however, can cause friction between the
U.N. and the troop contributor. Because the United Nations
often makes decisions based more on budgetary considerations
than mission needs, contributing countries are not compensated
for the cost of deploying, operating, or maintaining equipment
above the guidline list. In the case of UNTAC the Dutch
Battalion arrived with four of its own helicopters, which
proved invaluable for the battalion which was deployed in one
of most dangerous provinces in northwestern Cambodia. Also
the French Battalion deployed with 250 vehicles more than
90Donatella Lorch, "U.N. Moves Troops to Somali City And Vows
Punishment for Attacks," The New York Times . 8 June 1993, p. Al and
"20 Somalis Die When Peacekeepers Fire at Crowd," The New York
Times , 15 June 1993, p. Al.
86
"required" by the guidelines. The cost of these "luxury"
items is not reimbursed by the United Nations. 91
The wealthier force contributing states may be able to
absorb these costs in order to better protect their troops,
but the resulting disparity is at cross purposes to cohesion
and the capability for effective action. For example,
battalions deployed to UNPROFOR where ordered to bring only 15
armored personnel carriers (APCs). The Canadian contingent
deployed with 83 APCs and were told to send back the
additional vehicles on the next troop rotation. 92 If the
Canadians had done so, UNPROFOR would have been unable to
deploy to Sarajevo when the UNPROFOR mission was expanded.
The Canadians were sent because they were the only battalion
capable of reaching Sarajevo relatively safely. By placing
budgetary considerations before mission requirements, as
perceived by U.N. civilians, the United Nations also loses the
capability of adapting a force to the changing tactical
situations inherent in these types of new missions.
4 . Language
The tactical level problem of language also has a dual
nature. First, English and French are the working languages
of the United Nations but usually only a few staff officers in
91Interview with COL. Huijssoon, UNTAC Chief Plans Officer.
92 Ian Kemp, "'9 to 5' U.N. Criticized," Jane's Defence Weekly,
13 March 1993, p. 27.
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each of the contingents has a working knowledge of either.
During the initial planning phases of UNTAC French planners
wanted equal number of French and English speaking
battalions. 93 Part of the rationale for this request was the
fact that Cambodia was a former French colony and French was
perhaps a more widely spoken "international" language than
English. However, this requirement would have meant that a
significant portion of the battalions would have come from
Western Africa. As was the case with the Ghanese Battalion,
units from these states may be unable to provide for their own
deployment or initial survival in the field. The French
request also ignored the fact that most French speaking
Cambodians were killed or driven from Cambodia during the
Khmer Rouge's pogroms against all those "influenced" by
foreigners.
In the Cambodian case, this lack of "international
language" speakers in the population was particularly severe.
However, this communication barrier demonstrates the second
level of language problems. As peace-support operations take
on more civil-military type operations there is an increasing
requirement for personnel to be able to communicate in the
local language. In the cases of both Cambodia and Somalia
neither of the native languages are spoken anywhere else in
93Interview with: LCOL. Damien Healy, Australian Army, Mixed
Military Working Group, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
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the world. This means that the only means of communicating
with the local population will be through native interpreters.
In a situation like Cambodia, admittedly it is uniquely
severe, these interpreters were a scarce resource and not
every unit on the tactical level was able to have an
interpreter.
The language problem between the troop contributing
contingents is one of the most significant limiting factors in
effective operations at the tactical level. It is especially
constraining on the degree to which smaller units can be
integrated for supporting activities. The language barrier
between the contingents means that U.N. operations become
"stove-pipe" organizations where liaison between the various
units only takes place at the headquarters level. This
problem is especially acute with contingents where only one or
two members of the headquarter staff have a working knowledge
of English. According to the UNTAC Chief of Operations this
was the case with both the Indonesian and Bulgarian
Battalions; it was his estimation that only 70% of his




The language problem took on special significance in
the case of the UNTAC Indonesian Battalions because of their
94Interwiew with COL. Aris, UNTAC Chief of Operations.
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strategic placement in Kampong Thorn province. One of the
watershed events of the UNTAC operation was the killing of a
Japanese election volunteer, Atsuhito Nakata, and his
Cambodian interpreter in Kampong Thorn province on 15 April
1993. This killing, more than any other single event, threw
the prospect of proceeding with the May elections into
question. 95 It prompted opposition to Japanese participation
by Japanese citizens and caused U.N. election officials in
Cambodia to question the wisdom of continuing with the
election plan if the UNTAC military component could not
protect them. The killing, initially blamed on the Khmer
Rouge, may have been preventable because Nakata had been in
radio contact with other U.N. personnel in the area and had
requested help. However, Indonesian troops did not quickly
respond to his distress calls, possibly because the local unit
commanders did not understand English.
The requirement for heavy reliance upon air
transportation, as discussed earlier, also highlighted the
need to address the language problems. The fact that very few
of the Russian pilots spoke English caused severe problems
with air traffic control and reporting emergencies.
Eventually the UNTAC Headquarters had to request that there be
95Kevin Barrington, "Tragedy Throws Polls into Question,"
Phnom Penh Post . 23 April-06 May 1993, p. 1.
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at least one English speaker aboard each Russian aircraft at
all times. 96
5. Culture and Sensitivities
Differences in culture and cultural sensitivities
between troop contingents will impact on the performance of
any combined operation. The differences will be minimal in
coalitions formed with forces from similar cultures. However,
in a combined force formed from states that have widely
divergent cultures the differences will seem endless. The
impact of cultural differences on mission performance is
relatively minor in more static operations of "traditional
peacekeeping" where the troop contingents have limited
interaction with one another. However, in the more dynamic
missions of the "new era" cultural differences will become
more than a nuisance. They may directly affect mission
performance.
The problem is further exacerbated in recent
operations that have an increasing civil-military aspect.
Cultural friction between the one of the military contingents
and the local civilian population has the potential to affect
the mission as a whole. As noted in Problems of Coalitions:
Operational Level, unilateral actions by any of the force
96Interview with LCOL Deheul, French Air Force, Chief of Air
Operations, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
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participants has the possibility of causing anomosity against
the entire force.
One of the advantages of participation of the
Indonesians and Malaysian Battalions in UNTAC was the cultural
similarities between the troops from these Asian states and
the population of Cambodia. Cultural similarity meant that
contingents from these Asian states were accepted by both the
political elite and general population more readily than
forces from global powers or non-Asian countries because they
were viewed as possibly having "imperialistic" goals in
Cambodia. 97 Similarly, the non-U. N. peacekeeping mission in
Liberia, The Economic Community of West African States Cease-
Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), has the advantage of being an
all sub-Saharan African force. However, as shown by the
example of the ASEAN countries' participation in UNTAC, states
with regional interests in a conflict tend to bring their own
regional agendas to an operation. In ECOMOG, the Nigerian
leadership, Major General Adejunji Olurin, turned the force
into another combatant committed to defeating the Charles
Taylor faction. 98
97Frederick H. Fleitz, Central Intellegence Agency, Lecture at
the Naval Postgraduate School, 3 December 1993.
98Frederick H. Fleitz, Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations.
1993 . Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, May
1993.
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Operations planners need to recognize and compensate
for cultural differences. Failure to do so may cause friction
within the force and between the contingents and the civilian
population. Perceived slights can become matters of national
honor. Censure of individuals by a commander of a different
nationality is virtually impossible within a U.N. operation
because small events tend to escalate to the strategic level
quickly. At the mission level, attempting to change a troop
contingent for tactical reasons is strategically difficult.
General Sanderson's desire to repatriate the Bulgarian
Battalion from UNTAC because of mounting problems with the
contingent" was not allowed by U.N. Headquarters in New York
because of political considerations. 100
D. CONCLUSION: A STANDING U.N. FORCE?
Even if the U.N. was willing to ignore its self-imposed
requirement for a global balance and request only more self-
sufficient forces for operations with an unforgiving operating
environment (i.e. the lack of supporting infrastructure in
Cambodia or Somalia or the threat level in Bosnia-Herzogovina)
these troops may not always be available. With the geometric
increase in U.N. operations many contributing states already
"See the following section.
100Interview with LCOL Aris, UNTAC Operations Officer
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feel that they are over-committed. One telling comment by a
member of the UNTAC staff about the force that was finally put
together was that once again Cambodia was a "sideshow" to
other international events. Initially, a great deal of
enthusiasm was declared for the U.N. mission. In late
1991/early 1992 officials in UNAMIC had expected more troop
contributions from European and other Western militaries.
However, these troops were unavailable when countries such as
Great Britain and Canada deployed their forces to UNPROFOR in
the former Yugoslavia. 101
The problem of over-extension by the U.N. worldwide in the
early 1990s meant that ongoing operations suffered. For
example, the overriding concern for the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia averted international attention away from other
U.N. missions such as UNOSOM I in Somalia. With only 500
Pakistani troops, the U.N. force was able to accomplish
nothing but protecting their compound in the Mogadishu
airport. As a result, Boutros-Ghali berated the Security
Council for ignoring Somalia because of its ethnocentric
concern with a "rich man's war." 102
101Interview with Mary Fisk, Assistant to the U.N. Special
Representative in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, May 1993.
102Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia," Foreign
Policy . No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 148.
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In short, the United Nations is caught on the horns of a
dilemma. These new classes of peace-support operations
require the military capabilities of world powers or strong
regional powers to independently deploy and temporarily
sustain themselves. As noted in Problems of Coalitions:
Tactical Level, only these powers have the necessary training
and equipment to operate effectively in harsher environments.
However, these powers, by the nature of their status, will
either have neo-imperial goals or be perceived as having such.
Even the seeming altruistic operation in Somalia (the U.S. -led
humanitarian mission, UNITAF) was perceived by some in the
Middle East as a neo-colonial operation to control the
geopolitically vital choke-point coming from the Suez
Canal. 103 Forces from states considered to be absolutely
neutral often do not even have the organic capabilities to
provide for their basic survival in the environment in which
they're asked to operate. This conundrum seems to lend
credence to the idea of forming a standing U.N. force, or a
U.N. legion. 104
103Stephen C. Pelletiere, Humanitarian Operations and The
Middle East: The Hostility Factor . Strategic Studies Institute,
Carlisle, PA, May 1993.
104John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt & Timothy w. Stanley, To
Unite Our Strength . University Press of America, New York & London,
1992, pp. 44-48.
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Clausewitz recognized this problem with allied forces and
coalitions. His writings of over 160 years ago seem as though
they could have been written this year in a call for a
standing U.N. force:
It would all be tidier, less of a theoretical problem, if
the contingent promised - ten, twenty, or thirty thousand
men - were placed entirely at the ally's disposal and he
were free to use it as he wished. It would then in effect
be a hired force. But that is far from what really happens.
The auxiliary force usually operates under its own
commander; he is dependent only on his own government, and
the objective the latter sets him will be as ambiguous as
its aims. 105
The existence of a United Nations auxiliary force which
answered to no other operational commander than the Security
Council would appear to solve the unsolvable paradox which
faces the United Nations: forces from militarily weak states
cannot sustain themselves and forces from militarily strong
states have their own agendas and will not surrender
operational control. However, the formation of peace-
enforcement units, as suggested in An Agenda For Peace , or
rapid deployment forces made available to the U.N. by major
powers on short notice 106 would still face the problem of
independent control by the contributing states. Only a force
105Clausewitz, p. 603.
106French President Francois Mitterand offered, with certain
conditions, to make one thousand French troops available to the
Security Council on 48 hours notice. See: "Security Council
Summit," Foreign Policy Bulletin . U.S. Department of State,
January-April 1992, p. 80.
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whose units are not tied to a sovereign state would be truly
under the control of the United Nations. Also, a "completely
U.N." force would be less prone to developing separate force
dividing relationships with the belligerents it is attempting
to control. However, Clausewitz was correct in pointing out
that any force not constrained by the factors of national
allegiance is, in effect, a hired force.
1. Prospects for a Standing Force
Any standing U.N force would have to be formed from
individuals willing to renounce allegiance to their home
country and profess sole allegiance to the United Nations.
Basically, it would be no more than a mercenary force. While
it can be posited that certain individuals would enlist in
this force because of Utopian goals, the reality is that
mercenary soldiers usually claim allegiance to only one thing,
money. However, monetary gain has always been one of the
primary attractions of U.N. service. Any observer of U.N.
missions worldwide recognizes that the majority of long term
U.N. bureaucrats stay in the U.N. because of the lucrative
salaries.
In the past, arguments over corruption and inflated
salaries in the U.N. have caused rifts within the system. The
United Nations' financial crisis in the mid-1980s was prompted
by the U.S. Senate's Kassebaum Amendment which sought to
control corruption and exorbitant salaries by limiting the
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United States' assessed contribution to all United Nations
organizations to 20% of the total U.N. budget until the U.N.
undertook significant administrative reforms. These reforms
included budgetary changes and a reduction of U.N. employees'
salaries and pensions to levels comparable to U.S. civil
service employees. 107
The stories of high salaries for U.N. employees and
the problems that it causes were evident in UNTAC. Disputes
over pay and compensation between the civilian components and
the military contingents led to bitter exchanges, hate mail
and even death threats. 108 Much of the controversy was
centered around the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MA)
received by all U.N. civilian employees and some of the
military staff in UNTAC. The subject of much of the criticism
was the fact that the original MA for Cambodia was exorbitant:
145 U.S. dollars per day in a country with an average annual
income of 170 U.S. dollars.
However, the root of the controversy lay in the fact
that many of the military staff, not attached to a supporting
unit from their home state, did not receive the same MA as the
civilians even though they were forced to live off of the
economy. The situation reached a crisis point according to
107Congressional Quarterly , 15 June 1985, p. 1176.
108Kevin Barrington, "Pay Dispute Undermines UNTAC Morale,"
Phnom Penh Post , . 12-25 March 1993, p. 13.
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the Force Commander, General Sanderson, who received a
threatening letter stating that, "there may be cases of
physical assault on some VIPs including senior civilian
officers. There may be incidents like killings also." 109
The problems of having a force with little or no
allegiance to the mores, norms, and culture of a society at
large show themselves in instances of mutinies and
fraggings. 110 This behavior was clearly demonstrated by the
Bulgarian Battalion in UNTAC which was recruited through local
newspaper ads 111 and caused more problems in the Cambodian
situation than they solved. At one point the Bulgarian troops
mutinied against their officers who were said to be stealing
their pay. There were also reports that members of the
Bulgarian Battalion were involved in business ventures with
Khmer Rouge cadre. Simple banditry was initially reported as
the motivation behind the killing of three Bulgarian soldiers
by the Khmer Rouge in April 1993. 112 However, later reports
pointed to a possible disagreement over a business deal as the
cause.
109Ibid," p. 13.
110Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in





112Keven Barrington, "K.R. Slay Bulgarian Hosts of Peace
Dinner," Phnom Penh Post . 09-22 April 1993, p. 3.
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Additionally, a standing U.N. force will be unable to
develop the organizational cohesion matching national armed
forces. Research has shown that organizational cohesion, "the
commitment to a principle of patriotism, just war, ideology,
or belief in the nation's principles" is necessary for
soldiers to withstand the stress of combat. 113 While soldiers
involved in peace-support operations may not necessarily be
subjected to combat conditions, there is evidence that the
cumulative stress of peacekeeping operations in situations of
high levels of violence, such as UNIFIL in southern Lebanon,
can be as stressful as combat. 114
Another major problem with the idea of a standing U.N.
army is the problem of development of agendas within the
United Nations that move the organization beyond the role of
an independent broker. Presently the organization exists more
as a process or system than as an actor. Unless there is a
revolutionary restructuring of the notion of state
sovereignty, the United Nations will be more successful
retaining its traditional strengths as a system in which
actors maneuver, instead of assuming the characteristics of an




could begin to assume the traits of sovereign actor and thus
develop its own agendas.
A trend in this direction is already evident in the
evolution of the United Nations' peacekeeping function. For
example, the personal antagonism that was widely reported
between Mohammed Farah Aidid and Boutros Boutros-Ghali 115
fundamentally compromised the Secretary-General's position as
a neutral representative of the organization. Following the
Security Council's decision to seek a "political solution" to
the escalating situation in Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali
continued to personalize the conflict by pressuring the
Security Council, in a four page letter to its members, to
continue trying to apprehend and detain Aidid , 116
A U.N. Security Council with its own army would, in
practice, only be able to use its forces against small, weak
states or non-state actors which do not pose a significant
threat to the force. A small force used for a preventive
deployment to deter a possible aggressor would in most cases
be a largely symbolic. Relying on the moral authority of the
U.N. as a tripwire against aggression, however, is more likely
to be effective against state actors. The non-state
collectivities within a failing state, such as the Khmer Rouge
115Stevenson, p. 149.
116Michael Elliot, "High Hurdles and Low Moans," Newsweek , 11
October 1993, p. 39.
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or Aidid's clan, have far fewer reasons to respect the moral
authority of the United Nations.
In fact, development of a U.N. army could sow the
seeds of destruction of the organization. If the Security
Council was able to overcome the strategic level problems of
employing a U.N. standing force, which is unlikely, the
tactical level problems would be minimized. However, this
would not change fact that the five permanent members and
their client states are inevitably treated differently than
other states. States that are powerful militarily or
politically would still find it somewhat easy to ignore
United Nations resolutions.
Additionally, a collective security arrangement based
on states with widely varying goals and views can only be
effective in a narrow set of circumstances. Evidence has
shown that in diffuse international systems, alliances tend to
be temporary because objectives derive from interests more
than a common set of beliefs or ideologies. 117
Imbalances in the distribution of international power,
perceived or otherwise, will always cause new alliance
formation. 118 A United Nations with its own army would begin
117K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis . Prentice-Hall Press, Englewood N.J., 1967, p. 110.
118Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power .
Cornell University Press, Ithaca & New York, 1955, pp. 61-62.
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to take on the characteristics of an autonomous actor, and
thus a possible threat, to other actors too weak to counter
it. It is possible to imagine the formation of anti-U.N.
blocs within the international system.
Less developed countries (LDCs) would have the most to
fear from a U.N. with its own army. Historically, one of the
primary objectives of the less developed countries in the
United Nations has been the sustainment of their sovereignty
and territorial integrity. This concern was expressed by the
former U.N Under-Secretary-General for African Affairs,
Abdulrahim Abby Farah of Somalia, who noted that the
overwhelming view of the less developed countries, as
expressed by the 1991 General Assembly debate concerning
humanitarian assistance, is that sovereign rights of states




2 . Suggestions for Improvement
When viewing the quantitative and qualitative growth
of U.N. peacekeeping operations "evolution" is the proper term
to use. 120 In nature whenever dynamic polarities exist there
are two possiblities: conflict and equilibrium. Equilibrium
119Kevin Cahill, A Framework for Survival . p. 5.
120See: William Durch, The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping , and
Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,"
International Affairs . Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993, pp 451-464.
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itself is the result of conflict between opposing forces of
equal strength. Charles Darwin recognized that conflict was
the primary force at work in evolution. 121 The method to the
madness of U.N. operations has evolved out of the bureaucratic
necessities of doing business within a system of widely
different cultures and interests. Peacekeeping evolved as it
did because of the uneasy equilibrium between the superpowers
during the Cold War. The gridlock of the Cold War prevented
the Security Council from making meaningful decisions. It may
also have prevented the Security Council from undertaking
operations that were outside the capabilites of the
organization. When opposing forces become unequal, conflict
resumes until a new equilibrium is established. The United
Nations' security function will attempt to grow in fits and
starts until a new equilibrium is reached within the U.N.
system.
Relying on ad hoc coalitions to respond to larger
threats to international peace is more realistic than
developing a permanent worldwide security structure. The best
option for strengthening United Nations peace-support
operations dealing with lesser threats and humanitarian
assistance, without developing a potentially threatening
121Anthony Stevens, The Roots of War; A Junaian Perspective .
Paragon House, New York, 1989, p. 9.
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force, is to enhance its logistics capabilities and command
and control apparatus for peacekeeping operations.
In An Agenda For Peace , Boutros-Ghali stated that the
infantry units that are the cornerstone of peacekeeping
operations, are generally available in the required numbers.
Satisfying the United Nations' logistics and transportation
requirements, however, poses a greater problem because few
states can afford to spare or underwrite the use of such
assets for extended periods. 122 As shown earlier in this
chapter, the initial logistics problems in the deployment of
UNTAC could have been the most likely cause of catastrophic
mission failure early in the operation if not for good fortune
and the extremely hard work of the small military logistics
staff. 123
The best way for the United Nations to improve its
ability to deploy operations should involve the development of
capabilities to support them in the field. First and
foremost, this would entail the development of a standing
military staff at U.N. Headquarters in New York substantially
122Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace , p. 30.
123From the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords
until the deployment of the first battalions of UNTAC there were
only three staff officers on the ground in Phnom Penh planning the
entire deployment and supporting the advance mission, UNAMIC.
Interview with Major Briere, UNTAC Logistics Staff Officer.
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larger than the present Military Advisor's Group (MAG). 124
Second, would be the development of capabilities that the U.S.
Army refers to as combat support and combat service support
(logistics units, engineer units, etc.) to maintain the armed
battalions drawn from troop contributing states. Since many
of the tasks of combat service support have high applicability
in the civilian sector (i.e. construction, transportation
management, etc.), if a U.N. capability were developed and
administered properly, it would have the added benefit of
training individuals from less developed countries in skills
which are in short supply in their own country.
UNTAC provides some important lessons learned in the
area of logistcs for these types of operations in the future.
Even though Cambodia was relatively small in size (roughly the
size of Missouri) and population (approximately 8 million) it
was difficult to establish a presence in all areas of the
country because of the lack of infrastructure, the land mine
threat, and the area covered by water during the flood season.
A land mine threat will continue to be a challenge in
operations following intrastate wars because they are an
extremely cheap method available to belligerents for
protecting defended locations and to delay and demoralize
124In early 1993 there were only 8 officers in the Military
Advisor's Group responsible for 13 missions worldwide. Interview
with LCOL Yosuf, UNTAC Desk Officer, MAG, U.N. Headquarters, New
York.
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advancing infantry (called "nuisance mining"). 125 The
widespread use of nuisance mining combined with advances in
technology have made it much more difficult to find and disarm
mines. Additionally, poor or nonexistent mapping of the
minefields makes the mine threat greater in conflicts like
Cambodia and Somalia than it might otherwise be in
conventional conflicts. Cambodia's long civil war was the
first conflict in history where mine casualties surpassed
injuries caused by all other weapons. 126 The United Nations
specifically formed a separate entity within UNTAC, the
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), to train Cambodians for
the herculean task of demining the country. At the current
rate of demining, some observers have estimated that it will
be as much as 200 years before Cambodia is completely mine
free. 127 The growing use of mines in these types of conflicts
in the future suggests that the U.N. should develop an
organizational organic engineering capabilty before attempting
to form and outfit combat units.
125Remi Russbach, "Casualties of Conflicts and Mine Warfare,"
Framework For Survival: Health. Human Rights, and Humanitarian
Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters , Kevin M. Cahill, ed.
,
Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, p. 124.
126Eric Stover & Dan Charles, "The Killing Minefields of
Cambodia," New Scientist . No. 1791, 19 October 1991, p. 27.
127Craig Etcheson, "The 'Peace' in Cambodia," Current History .
December 1992, Vol. 91, No. 569, p. 415.
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UNTAC was unique among U.N. operations because it was
the first time that a large maritime component was
required. 128 Approximately 70% of Cambodia's rural population
lives along the banks of either the Tonle Sap or Mekong River
and transportation is primarily conducted via the waterways,
especially during the flood season. These facts necessitated
the development of an UNTAC Naval Component. 129 While
approximately 40% of the unarmed military observers in UNTAC
were maritime based, the cost of outfitting a "U.N. navy" was
prohibitive. The original UNTAC plan was to use vessels that
the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) turned over during
the cantonment phase. Once the cantonment process failed, the
U.N. was forced to rely on vessels manned by CPAF sailors to
transport the military observers, making it impossible for the
military observers to fulfill one of their functions:
deconfliction with Khmer Rouge forces. It also provided the
Khmer Rouge with more opportunity to claim U.N. bias.
Once again the U.N. paid an operational price by
ignoring mission requirements and attempting to accomplish
tasks as cheaply as possible. In order to convince wealthier
states to fund high cost operations properly in the future,
128The U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) had two
marine patrol vessels. Durch, The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping ,
p. 247.
129Interview with CAPT Musmano, Uruguayan Navy, Commander,
UNTAC Naval Component, Phnom Penh, 03 May 1993.
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the U.N will have to administer them properly. This means
fundamentally re-prioritizing the way that money is spent in
operations. No longer can the United Nations afford to budget
the way that it did in UNTAC, where five times as much money
was expended in magazine and newspaper subscriptions than in
external auditing of the operation. 130
The most pragmatic, but politically unlikely, approach
to strengthening the United Nations' ability to conduct
peacekeeping opertions is to realize the advantages and
disadvantages that are inherent in the contribution of
different types of states. The future of peacekeeping
operations should lie in developing peacekeeping forces
structured around the principle of "comparative advantage."
The theory of comparative advantage shows that countries will
manufacture goods which they have a relative or comparative
advantange in producing; in other words, specialization. 131
For operations on the lower ends of the continuum of
conflict (peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, etc.)
relying on states that are not global or regional powers to
supply the infantry battalions means they are less likely to
bring separate agendas along with their participation. Of
130„A New Mocjel United Nations," The Economist , 26 September
1992, p. 37.
131James Eggert, Invitation to Economics , Mayfield Publishing,
Mountain View, CA, 1991, p. 274.
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course they would have to be bolstered by the support
capabilities of the larger powers. Wealthy states which are
prohibited from deploying troops overseas because of self-
imposed restrictions, such as Japan and Germany, should make
their contribution through financial support.
The presence of troops from a powerful state is a two-
edged sword in operations such as a preventive deployment of
troops. While the participation of a strong power gives an
operation more deterrent value, troops from these states
present greater political targets to spoilers in the peace
process. Operations at the peak of the continuum of conflict
(peace-enforcement) would have to be left to ad hoc coalitions
led by powerful states, such as Desert Storm.
However, applying the theory of comparative advantage
to U.N. military operations may be politically unfeasible.
While it may be pragmatic, this approach may seem racist
because soldiers from the "south" would be placed in harms way
more often than soldiers from the "north." Of course
considering that the vast majority of these types of new
generation U.N. operations are likely to occur in the "south,"
it is more in the interest of these states to provide for the
stability and continued sovereignty of the less developed
countries.
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IV. PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION
To one degree or another all U.N. operations will suffer
from the coalition-building problems described in the previous
chapter. While these problems will always exist, by
recognizing them and planning appropriately, their impact upon
the operation may be minimalized. Having said this, however,
it should be noted that the new types of operations that the
United Nations has taken on have specific requirements that
will magnify the "force dividers" described in Chapter III.
Specifically, the problems encountered in these "second
generation" U.N. operations involving the administration of
large tracts of territory, resemble the difficulties that an
occupying army faces following the defeat of another country.
An occupation can be defined as "the effective control of a
power (be it one or more states or an international
organization, such as the United Nations) over a territory to
which that power has no sovereign title." 1
The classification of U.N. military troops as an
"occupying force" has been discounted in past missions such as
the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The U.N.
Special Representative in charge of that operation, Ralph
2Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation ,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, p. 4.
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Bunche, stated that "the United Nations Force is in the Congo
as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation." 2
While the Congo operation was of significant size, with over
19 thousand troops at its peak strength, 3 and had a quasi-
internal defense function, it did not have a mandate of the
scope of either UNTAC or UNOSIM II. The large expansion in
the scope of these U.N. mandates will highlight the
substantial problems of intervention in the internal conflicts
of a state.
The areas of concern that will become more important in
these types of operations are centered around five basic
issues: first, the dilemma of uncertain mandates and "mission
slip" that is inevitable when the requirements for these
missions is combined with the U.N. modus operandi; second, the
obstacles faced when trying to establish authority over large
areas with essentially minimal military force and the possible
absence of popular support by the population; third, the
difficulties that face the U.N. when it authorizes the use of
force against belligerents that do not recognize the moral
authority of the organization; fourth, the need for enhanced,
yet decidedly different, intelligence capabilities in
2Security Council Document S/4451 , 21 August 1960.
3Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N,
Congo Operation . The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967, p. 187,
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operations of this nature; and fifth the necessity of
reforming the failing state's security mechanisms.
A. MANDATES AND MISSION SLIP
The mandates of all U.N. missions are, by necessity, vague
in order to fulfill all of the constraints placed upon it by
various powers. Consensus for decisive actions within the
Security-Council or General Assembly is difficult to reach
because of the divergent ideologies, interests and outlooks of
the member states. In order to avoid points of contention
which can block entire resolutions, mandates must be
deliberatley ambiguous on specific points. This means that
all mandates are open to wide interpretation by the Secretary-
General, his Special Representative or any of the various
contributing contingents.
The requirements for U.S. involvement in U.N. operations
established by the President Clinton in late 1993 included the
need to identify and "end point" in advance and developing
clear exit strategies. 4 These requirements ostensibly block
future U.S. participation in the type of operations in which
the U.N. has recently been involved. While these requirements
taken at face value seem wise they are, in fact, mutually
4Elliot, p. 39.
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exclusive of both the types of missions that the U.N. has
taken on recently and the way that the U.N. does business.
Having a precise exit strategy and date when establishing
peace-support missions in intrastate conflicts is an
unrealistic requirement given their dynamic and intractable
nature. The United Nations will find that a more realistic
option is to determine if an outside military force is capable
of aiding in the resolution of the conflict. To that end, the
U.N. leadership must understand the inherent limitations of
forces under its control. If a U.N. force cannot help toward
a solution, the best it will be is a burden on the member
states who contribute. At worst, the force may create a
barrier toward a solution or weaken the United Nations as an
institution. In the past, political cleavages among the
member states over the mandates of operations, the United
Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) specifically, and
peacekeeping in general have caused serious crises for the
organization. The Soviet Union and France's disagreement with
the U.N. Secretary-General over his handling of that operation
resulted in a severe weakening of the organization. 5
Realization of the limits of United Nations forces should
have prevented one of the most obvious examples of a U.N.
5Georges Abi-Saab, International Crises and the Role of Law:
The United Nations Operation in the Congo. 1960-1964 , Oxford
University Press, Oxford & London, 1978, pp. 148-149. and Lefever,
Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation , p. 199.
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peacekeeping force being deployed in a conflict in which it
had no chance of bringing about a solution: the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) . Since its
inception and deployment in 1978, UNIFIL has lost at least 183
soldiers in the conflict. 6 If this figure is not alarming
enough, it should be noted that while UNIFIL was never
considered an open-ended operation, with its mandate reviewed
every six months, it consitently failed to fulfill its stated
mission objectives for over fifteen years.
UNIFIL 's original mandate assigned three tasks to the
force: one, to monitor and confirm an Israeli withdrawal;
two, to restore peace and security; and finally, to help the
government of Lebanon re-establish its authority in the area. 7
From the beginning of the operation, UNIFIL has been in
violation of one of the preconditions of a peacekeeping force,
in spirit if not in letter. Traditionally, the United Nations
has only deployed peacekeeping forces with the consent of all
of the belligerents. While the Israeli Government agreed to
UNIFIL 's deployment, it has never displayed much respect for
the force's presence or the U.N. 's authority. The Israeli
government very likely was pressured to accept the presence of
a peacekeeping force by the United States. The U.S. was
6This figure comes from the author's own experience as a
UNIFIL staff officer and briefer while attached to UNTSO.
7James, p. 1.
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chiefly interested in attaining a quick withdrawal of the
Israeli forces so that the invasion would not derail the
Middle East "peace process" on which the Carter Administration
was embarked.
While UNIFIL was named as an interim force, there was
little illusion within the United Nations that the mandate
would be filled quickly or easily. The term interim was
proposed by the U.N. Secretary-General to imply that force was
only a short-term solution to the problem and to gain
acceptance by all parties involved.
Initially, UNIFIL did enjoy some success in fulfilling the
first two tasks of its mandate. The area of Southern Lebanon
had become relatively stable. A de facto cease fire was
arranged between Israel and the PLO, and the border was almost
completely quiet for a year between July 1981 and June 1982.
However, the Israeli government claimed that all hostile acts
against it by the PLO should have stopped, whether they were
across the Lebanese border or not. A rash of terrorist
incidents against Israeli targets overseas, combined with an
alleged buildup of PLO long-range artillery prompted the
Israelis to overrun the U.N. force and drive for Beirut in
operation "Peace for Galilee." 8
8Ariel Sharon and David Chanoff, Warrior, An Autobiography ,
Simon and Schuster Inc., 1989, p. 453.
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Given that the U.N. force was lightly armed for self-
defense, UNIFIL had no option but to let the massively
superior Israeli force bypass its position, even if its
mandate had authorized resisting the invading army. The
Israeli army would stay in Lebanon in force for the next three
years and has never fully withdrawn. Israel imposed a
"security zone" in Southern Lebanon which overlapped the
UNIFIL area of operation and permanently claimed portions of
Lebanese soil for tactical reasons. These "high ground"
tactical positions became known as permanent violations in
U.N. jargon.
The third task, aid in re-establishing authority over the
area by the Lebanese government, proved impossible because of
the disintegrating situation caused by the civil war. With no
effective government in place, which possessed statewide
legitimacy or acceptance, the U.N. Secretariat felt that
withdrawal would have simply meant the return to anarchy which
existed previously.
Of course, part of the problem with UNIFIL is that during
the majority of the operation's history, the U.N. was
constrained by the dictates of Cold War politics. A more
comprehensive U.N. effort, which would encompass almost all of
Lebanon, was proposed by the French in 1984 as the non-U. N.
peacekeeping effort disintegrated. While the proposal did not
generate much enthusiasm in the Security Council, all but two
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of the members voted for it. It was defeated by a veto from
the Soviet Union which did not want to strengthen a western-
oriented state in Lebanon. 9
With the end of the Cold War, resolutions to mandate and
deploy ambitious peacekeeping efforts around the world
initially met with little resistance. However/ cost and
commitment aside, the United Nations began to intervene in
situations which were as complicated, if not more so, than the
quagmire that existed in Southern Lebanon. Considering that
the majority of recent peacekeeping operations have been
established to resolve civil wars and not international
disputes, 10 the measure of agreement within the international
community that "something must be done" in these intractable
situations is of little consequence. Clear mandates and easy
solutions are impossible in situations like Lebanon, Cambodia
or Somalia where there are long-standing ethnic rivalries,
numerous warring factions, and nearly every adult male carries
a weapon.
Furthermore because of political nature of Security
Council, the U.N. usually establishes mandates which are very
generalized that do not address specific issues. The
application of generalized mandates to specific and dynamic
9James, p. 10.
10Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations,"
Foreign Affairs . Winter 1992/93, p. 90.
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situations invariably results in two interpretations: one
based upon strict interpretation of the mandate and the other
predicated by the day to day situation in which the mandate is
applied. 11
The inevitability of differences in interpretation of
mandates between the troop contributors and the U.N. was
evident from the very beginning of the U.S. -led UNITAF in
Somalia. The Security Council resolution authorizing force in
the operation called for the establishment of a "secure
environment." When U.S. forces refused to disarm individual
clan gunmen, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to
then U.S. President George Bush outlining what he thought the
requirement for a secure environment entailed: removing heavy
weapons, disarming individual gunmen and clearing land mines
widely scattered during the civil war. U.S. commanders
refused to disarm individual gunmen and would only destroy
weapons that appeared to present a clear and present danger to
the force, such as the truck-mounted heavy weapons driven by
the so called "technicals." In fact, in order to avoid a
possible backlash reaction by the population, U.S. commanders
ordered French Legionnaires under their control to return
seized weapons to their owners. 12
11Abi-Saab, pp. 18-19.
12
"Somalia: The Right To Bear Arms," The Economist , 19
December 1992, p. 42.
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The disagreement over disarmament between the UNITAF
commander, U.S. Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnson, and
the U.N. Secretary-General also belied the United States'
desire to avoid high-risk operations beyond opening supply
routes for humanitarian relief. Additionally, de-mining and
disarmament operations would have required a long-term
commitment of U.S. forces that the Bush Administration did not
envision. 13
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali argued that he could only
recommend to the Security Council the transition of
responsibility from the U. S. -commanded, and mostly U.S.-
manned, UNITAF operation to the U.N. -commanded UNOSOM II
mission after his definintion of a "secure environment" was
established. 14 Boutros-Ghali 's insistence on disarmament in
Somalia should be viewed in the context of the United Nations'
situation in other operations at that time. The Somali
operation began only a month after the U.N. publicly
recognized that the voluntary disarmament in Cambodia had been
a complete failure.
As in the Somalia operation, Boutros-Ghali hoped to garner
support for an expanded mandate in Cambodia to use force to
13Samule M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian
Intervention in Somalia , Lynne Riener Publishers, Boulder & London,
1993, p. 71.
14See: Security Council Document S/24992, 19 December 1992.
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disarm the Khmer Rouge and stop repeated cease-fire
violations. On the 15th of February 1993, Boutros-Ghali held
talks with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazwa and Foreign
Minister Michio Watanabe. The primary focus of the meeting
was to gather backing for the idea of using more heavily armed
"peace-enforcement forces," including the Japanese Self
Defense Force, to salvage the disintegrating situation in
Cambodia. 15 Prime Minister Miyazawa rejected the proposal,
stating that, "the United Nations has never adopted the idea
of organizing peace-enforcement units with heavy weapons as
its own responsibility." 16
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY
Authority is the key word in the Cambodia operation's U.N.
designation: "United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia." The concept that the United Nations could
establish effective authority over the essential functions of
a state, more than any other criteria, established a radical
departure in the scope of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
However, UNTAC decidedly failed to establish the authority in
Cambodia necessary to accomplish its mandate. In fact, UNTAC
15
"Miyazawa Wary of Proposed U.N. Force," Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, East Asia Report , 19 February 1993.
16Ibid.
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did not even establish basic authority over its own
operations.
For example, UNTAC used a civilian contractor, Morris
Catering, to resupply food to the battalions in the field.
Because of the delays in ground transportation, due to the
mine danger and threat of banditry, it was preferable to move
fresh food by air. However, the contractor was refused
licensing rights for its aircraft because the State of
Cambodia's government wanted its carrier, SK Air, to deliver
the food. 17 This curiosity is by no means restricted to
UNTAC. In fact, it is a persistent theme in U.N. operations.
UNIFIL provides another example the U.N. 's inability to
exert even nominal authority over its own operations. It is
a clear lack of authority that has rendered the U.N. force
incapable of even ostensibly controlling the passage of their
own troops through the border between Lebanon and Israel. It
is a military reality that UNIFIL could not stop an Israeli
armored column. However, it is a lack of political authority
which dictates that U.N. forces must pass through Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) checkpoints to traverse the border and
that passage is subject to Israeli whim.
17Colonel Mamczur, Polish Army, UNTAC Chief Logistics Officer,
Internal Memorandum: "UNTAC Ration Contract - Current Problems," 28
April 1993, p. 5.
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Furthermore, the UNIFIL battalions were never equipped or
mandated to deal with a modern army which did not recognize
their authority. UNIFIL forces could not effectively control
their areas of operation as long as the IDF could act with
impunity well beyond their established "security zone." One
of the key factors in this situation is the virtual air power
monopoly that the IDF had over Southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL
battalions had no mandate or capability of stopping Israeli
close air strikes into their areas of operation.
The requirement that a U.N. force be accepted by all
belligerents in a conflict has been one of the traditional
prerequisites for that force's approval and deployment.
However, as the United Nations enacts mandates for
intervention in situations where the belligerents' consent is
waivering or non-existent, U.N. military force will be forced
to rely less on moral suasion and neutrality than on coercive
ability.
Because of its low coercive potential, the U.N. will be
unable to establish effective control over its areas of
operation without the continued acquiescence of all
belligerent parties. One of the reasons the United Nations
Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was seemed
successful was that all of the parties, both internal and
external to the conflict, benefitted more from peaceful
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resolution than continuation of the conflict. 18 Part of the
problem with UNTAC was that the United Nations tried to use
the same operational plan in Cambodia that worked in
Namibia, 19 not recognizing that the situations were completely
different. Unlike the South West African People's
Organization (SWAPO) guerillas in Namibia, the Khmer Rouge had
very little to gain from cooperation with the United Nations.
1. Responsibilities of Authority
In his work, The International Law of Occupation . Eyal
Benvenisti points out that two of the primary concerns in the
administration of an occupied territory, according to the 1907
"Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land," are: first, to preserve the sovereign rights of the
government (or in the case of state disintegration, the local
variation of contenders for authority), and second, to protect
the local population from exploitation. 20 This second
requirement covers protection from exploitation by both the
the belligerent parties and the occupying force.
In the case of UNTAC, the United Nations fulfilled the
first consideration, arguably to a fault, through formation of
the Supreme National Council (SNC) which represented the
18Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance
Group," The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping , p. 372.
19Interview with COL. Huijssoon, UNTAC Chief Plans Officer.
20Benvenisti, p. 28.
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sovereignty of the Cambodian people through the four factions
in the conflict. Similarly, in Somalia, sovereignty is
embodied in the Transitional National Council. In fulfilling
the second consideration of occupation, protection of the
local population, UNTAC unquestionably failed. In an attempt
to deter the increasing number of acts of banditry and
violence, UNTAC used its military units to patrol major
roadways and establish roadblocks. Neverthless, violence
motivated by material gain became as significant a problem as
political violence. 21
Perhaps even more disturbing was UNTAC 's inability to
protect ethnic minorities from violence directed at them from
all of the factions within Cambodia. After the signing of a
peace plan in 1991 and the institution of United Nations
sponsored elections, the question of ethnic identity would
once again play a major role in the affairs of Cambodia. The
issues of the "Vietnamization" of Cambodia and Khmer
nationalism dominated the Khmer Rouge's arguments against
continued participation in the peace agreement.
As the May 1993 elections approached, the number of
attacks on ethnic Vietnamese increased, including massacres of
Vietnamese "floating villages" along the Tonle Sap, causing
21Peter Eng, "Highway Robbery Replaces Warfare as Biggest
Security Threat," Phnom Penh Post , 07 August 1992, p. 1.
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the largest mass migration in Indochina in over a decade. 22
By May 1993, over 21,000 ethnic Vietnamese had left Cambodia
in response to anti-Vietnamese violence. 23 The ethnic
massacres, generally blamed on the Khmer Rouge, were condemned
by all of the political parties in Cambodia. However, only
the political party of the Vietnamese- installed State of
Cambodia (SOC) did not express the opinion that the ethnic
Vietnamese should leave Cambodia. 24
It was readily acknowledged by UNTAC officials that
the U.N. force was powerless to protect the ethnic Vietnamese.
After the massacre of 33 ethnic Vietnamese in Siem Riep, UNTAC
Force Commander, Lieutenant General Sanderson, responded to
the issue of whether the U.N. could prevent such attacks, by
stating, "we are here on a peacekeeping not . . . internal
security mission." 25
22Nate Thayer, "Wretched of the Earth," Far Eastern Economic
Review , 15 April 1993, p. 21.
23Sonya Hepinstall, "Cambodian Economy Hurt by Fleeing
Vietnamese," Bangkok Post , 7 May 1993, p. 5.
24Kevin Barrington, "Massacre Condemned But..." Phnom Penh
Post , March 26 - April 8, 1993, p. 1.
25Katrina Peach, "UNMOs Powerless to Protect Ethnic
Vietnamese," Phnom Penh Post . 26 March -08 April 1993, p. 4.
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However, maintenance of public order was an
established requirement according to UNTAC's mandate. 26
Implicit in the disarmament of a state's
capability to protect public order, as originally envisioned
in the UNTAC mandate, is the requirement not to allow the
situation to revert to banditry. In situations like Cambodia
or Somalia, where weapons are readily available to large
groups that are not under the control of an established
command structure, the security requirements present a
significant challenge to the ability of an occupying force to
establish authority. 27
It must be realized that those who are most willing to
disarm are those who have the most to gain from a negotiated
settlement; these individuals are less likely to present a
direct threat to the U.N. force or the local population
regardless of whether or not they are disarmed. Disarming the
population in a society where the rule of force has been the
dominant principle has possible unintended consequences.
26United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Fact Sheet , United Nations Department of Public Information, May
1992, p. 2.
27 In early 1993 the going rate for a hand grenade in
Battambang, Cambodia was the equivalent of 92 U.S. cents, an AK-47
went for approximately $31. John Kreiger, "Behind the Khmer Rouge
Lines: 'We'll Kill Anyone Who Tries To Stop Us'," U.S. News &
World Report . 24 May 1993. According the UNTAC Special
Representative Akashi's aid, Mary Fisk, the legal cost of an AK-47
in Phnom Penh was $80.
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These unforseen consequences intensify the requirement for an
U.N. force to maintain public order. For example, in Somalia,
as American and Belgian troops confiscated the weapons of
relief agency guards, who were relatively easy to disarm,
there was an increase in the looting and violence against
foreign relief agencies by clan gunmen who were not so easy to
disarm. 28
While UNTAC 's responsibilities, as the "authority" in
Cambodia, to maintain public order may have been negated by
the refusal of government forces to disarm, a significant
reason for diminished backing of UNTAC in Cambodian public
opinion was the ineffective ability of the United Nations to
protect the local populace from Khmer Rouge terror, State of
Cambodia (SOC) intimidation, and simple banditry. A
confidential UNTAC report, quoted in the Far Eastern Economic
Review , states that the U.N. 's inability to intervene is one
reason why there is "a serious erosion of public confidence in
UNTAC and the peace process." 29 In fact, UNTAC's inability to
control the countryside was so severe that it had to rely on
CPAF (Cambodian People's Armed Forces - the army of the SOC)
28Diana Jean Schemo, "Worry in Gunless Somalia Aid Offices,"
The New York Times . 01 March 1993, p. A5.
29Nate Thayer, "Shattered peace," Far Eastern Economic Review .
11 February 1993, p. 11.
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soldiers to provide protection for polling sites during the
May 1993 elections.
As stated previously, an occupying force must also
meet the requirement for protecting the local population from
exploitation by its own soldiers. Criminal acts by any member
of a U.N. force denegrates the ability of the force as a whole
to maintain the benign support of the local population and
thus undermines the occupying force's legitimacy. Obviously,
the United Nations is venturing into relatively unchartered
legal territory by deploying large multinational military
forces amongst civilian populations with uncertain mandates
for action and no status of forces agreements.
A body of armed soldiers that is uncertain about the
use of force, for what ends and under what circumstances, and
by what means is less of an army than a mob. 30 While the
likelihood of an entire U.N. force turning into an
uncontrollable mob is remote, the distinction between
combatant and non-combatant will inevitably blur in situations
where regular forces are employed against guerrillas or simple
criminals. 31 The necessity to regulate the actions of
soldiers thrust into operations in the midst of civilian
unrest has been demonstrated by the 1984 conviction of a
30Van Creveld, p. 90.
31Van Creveld, p. 92.
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British soldier of murder while on duty in Northern Ireland32
and the April 1993 conviction of a U.S. Marine for assault in
the shooting of two Somalis. 33
Historically, the United Nations has claimed that the
use of force by the U.N. against an aggressor is legally
different from war by a state. During the Korean conflict The
Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations
concluded that "the purposes for which the laws of war were
instituted are not entirely the same as the purposes of
regulating the use of force by the United Nations," and that,
"for the time being the United Nations should not feel bound
by all the laws of war but should select those laws that fit
its purposes such as the rules on prisoners of war and on
belligerent occupation." 34
However, the United Nations has no judicial mechanism
for controlling the actions of soldiers placed under its
mandate. 35 While United Nations has created task forces in
32Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma? , Institute for
the Study of Conflict, London, 1986, p. 23.
33
"Marine Is Guilty in Shooting of Two Somalis," AP Wire
Service, New York Times , 07 April 1993, p. A5
.
340scar Schachter, "Authorized Uses of Force by the United
Nations and Regional Organizations," Law and Force in the New
International Order . Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer
(eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1990, p. 75.
35Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, UNTAC, Chief Operations
Officer.
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the past to investigate alleged illegal activities by soldiers
in a U.N. force, 36 the requirement for disciplining criminal
acts is left to the contributing states. The potential for
problems in interpretation is greatly exacerbated by the
coalitional problems outlined previously. Furthermore, it is
doubtful that most states would allow their soldiers to be
adjudicated by a supranational judiciary. Any attempt to
force this requirement upon contributing states would cause
further hesitation in volunteering forces.
2. Controlling Territory
Historically, United Nations forces have not been
direct targets of the belligerents in a conflict. United
Nations casualties in the past have generally occured as the
result of being caught between belligerents when a cease-fire
or truce breaks down. The first line of defense for U.N.
operations has been the moral authority of operating under the
U.N. flag and a non-threatening posture. Because of the
limitations on the use of force and the non-offensive nature
of most United Nations operations, a U.N. force must assume a
basically defensive and reactive (as opposed to proactive)
posture.
However, belligerents may target U.N. forces in order
to evoke an escalatory response or withdrawal of one of the
36Michaels, pp. 66-67.
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U.N. contingents. This is especially true in intrastate wars
where maintenance of the status quo is not in the interest of
one or more of the belligerents. As pointed out in Chapter
II, most intrastate conflicts have an inherent zero-sum
quality to them. Gains by one of the parties are, by
definition, losses for the others. Because of this quality,
a U.N. force in the middle of a civil war must be able to
effectively defend itself from a wider range of threats than
in traditional peacekeeping operations. It is an unusual
paradox that U.N. forces may be able to better defend
themselves against a conventional force than guerrilla
organizations. However, in order to execute more elaborate
mandates, in areas such as the protection of an electoral
process or delivery of humanitarian aid, the United Nations
will have to realize the consequences of attempting to control
territory in a guerrilla threat environment.
Clausewitz first recognized the effectiveness of
guerrilla warfare against a conventional occupying army as he
returned from the Russian front in 1813 and witnessed first
hand the problems of controlling vast tracts of occupied
territory:
The immensity of the Russian landscape prevents the
assailant from occupying and holding the country
strategically. He simply moves forward, without being able
to secure his rear. Having thought on the matter at length,
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I am now convinced that a great civilized European country
cannot be conquered unless there is dissension within it.
From his experience with guerrilla warfare Clausewitz
developed a series of broad conditions under which a general
uprising can be effective:
1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke.
3. The theater of operations must be fairly large.
4. The national character must be suited to that type of
war.
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of




These five conditions seem tailor made to the situations in
the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia. What makes these
conditions as valid today as they were in 1830 is the fact
that the development of weaponry which delivers high firepower
and is man-portable has allowed guerrillas to grow stronger at
a pace greater than regular organized armed forces. Just as
the invention of the crossbow and firearms removed the
advantage of the armored knight, the Stinger Missile and
rocket propelled grenade reduce the advantage of a
technologically advanced force fighting a guerrilla war. So,
just as the Yugoslavian partisans during World War II were
able to immobilize more German troops than the entire Anglo-
37Camille Rougeron, "The Historical Dimension of Guerrilla
Warfare," Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the
Long March to Afghanistan . Edited by Gerard Chaliand, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1982, p. 46.
38Clausewitz, p. 480.
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American force on the Italian front, 39 modern day guerrillas
can effectively and indefinitely tie down large numbers of
U.N. troops.
Interestingly, the humanitarian corridors and safe
havens used by UNPROFOR are suprisingly similar to lines of
communication and strong points utilized by the Germans in the
Balkans in World War II. The discriptions of these strong
points in a 1954 U.S. Army publication, German Antiguerrilla




resemblance to the U.N. placement of forces in fortified
positions from which they conduct humanitarian assistance.
While the purpose of the German occupying force was completely
different from the U.N. mission, they share common weaknesses
in the face of guerrilla tactics. Indeed all modern
mechanized armies share the same vulnerability to guerrilla
forces.
Historically there has been a category of troops
proven to be unaffected by the use of guerrilla tactics:
"special purpose" troops organized to be independent of their
lines of communication and to operate in the guerrilla's
environment. 41 Highly effective units employed by the Germans
39Rougeron, p. 47.
40U.S. Army, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans
1 1941-1944) . Department of the Army, p. 47.
41Rougeron, p. 40.
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were the Jagdkommando (ranger detachment) which operated with
precisely these methods. 42 However, the employment of these
types of units is antithetical to the very nature of U.N.
operations, even those with an enforcement mandate such as
UNOSOM II. The employment of special operations type units is
an operational quantum leap that United Nations mandates and
methods are unable to handle.
Similarly, methods such as surgical strikes or no-fly
zones will have very little effect on compelling belligerents
to cease aggression since heavy artillery, armor, or air-
strikes have never been effective against an irregular force
which is careful to avoid direct confrontation. 43 The U.S.
Army's primary strategic document (FM 100-1, The Army)
recognizes "the fundamental truth is that only ground forces
possess the power to exercise direct, continuing and
comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its people
. . . landpower can make permanent the otherwise transitory
advantages achieved by air and naval forces."** If
involvement in United Nations operations shifts from the arena
of deterrence to coercion, the political and military
leadership will have to realize that it will require the
42German Antiauerrilla Operations , p. 48.
43Rougeron, p. 48.
44Field Manual 100-1. The Army . Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 8.
135
active engagement of dismounted infantry to defeat and disarm
the warring factions or at least bring aggression below the
acceptable threshold.
In a strictly defensive operation, the troop
requirement for establishing effective control over large
tracts of territory against a guerrilla threat can be
described by the "air defense model." 45 Since defenders
countering air attacks must effectively cover every potential
target their requirements are driven more by the number of
targets than the size of their adversary's air force.
Similarly, conventional forces who counter a guerrilla army
must spend most of their resources on defending potential
targets. Since the forces of non-state actors, which the U.N.
will have to deal with in these types of operations, generally
have the attributes of a guerrilla army (flexibility, mobility
and non-attachment to territory), the number of potential
targets, more than the size of the threat, will dictate the
number of troops required to protect the growing number of
functions under U.N. control.
As UNTAC prepared for the mission of protecting the
electoral process in May 1993 it faced an "air defense"
requirement that was not envisioned in the original operations
plan. Because of the Khmer Rouge and CPAF's pervasive
45Leites & Wolf, pp. 68-69.
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presence throughout the country, all of the approximately 1400
polling stations required protection against possible attacks.
This was a daunting task considering that of UNTAC's total
strength of 22,000 only 10,600 were actual combat troops. 46
As the elections approached, it appeared that the
Khmer Rouge would specifically attack U.N. targets in order to
disrupt the process. The effects of not being able to disarm
the factions became a critical factor to mission success. In
order to respond to international pressure to carry out the
elections despite the lack of a "secure environment," UNTAC
planners were willing to continue decreasing the number of
polling sites in inverse proportion to the Khmer Rouge threat.
If Khmer Rouge forces had attacked U.N. targets in earnest
UNTAC would have responded by collapsing the mission upon
itself until it could attain a satisfactory degree of
protection for whatever polling sites remained.
As it turned out, the Khmer Rouge chose not to disrupt
the elections for as yet unclear reasons (see the section in
Chapter IV: Theories of Victory) . Just as UNTAC should not
have been planned around the apparent U.N. success in Namibia,
the requirements for future missions of this type, if there
are any, should not be planned around the assumption that
UNTAC was able to effectively control either territory or the
46Interview with COL. Huijssoon, Chief Plans Officer, UNTAC.
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election. In the future the U.N. will have to make
fundamental choices in the way that it mandates the use and
non-use of force in operations if the belligerents do not
grant or withdraw their acceptance of a U.N. force.
C. THE USE AND NON-USE OF FORCE
In operations like UNTAC or UNOSOM II the United Nations
has attempted to assume the state-like monopoly of the use of
legitimate force. The act of establishing control over the
monopoly of force means that at least the tacit acceptance of
the belligerents is necessary and they must be willing to
disarm. If this approval is missing the U.N. force has
basically two options: it can choose to use force to
accomplish its goals, or it can choose to abstain from the use
of force. While this choice may seem simple on the surface,
it is possibly the most crucial question that must be
considered in this new generation of U.N. missions.
During the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
from 1960 to 1964 the U.N. faced the question of the use of
force more than once. Part of ONUC's original purpose was to
"restore and maintain law and order throughout the Congo." 47
During the initial stages of the ONUC operation a controvery
arose over whether to use force to disarm the Congolese
47Lefever, Uncertain Mandate , p. 21.
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National Army (ANC). Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
argued that the operation's emphasis should,
be put on the protection of the lives of the civilian
population in the spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This may necessitate a temporary
disarming of military units which, in view of present
circumstances are an obstacle to the reestablishment of law
and order in the interest of the people and the stability of
the nation. 48
The line of reasoning that the prevention of human rights
violations and genocide had primacy over the principle of non-
intervention was the legal line of reasoning used by
Hammarskjold. ONUC did not, however, use force to disarm ANC
soldiers because of protests by the Soviet Union's
representative. ONUC was latter authorized to use force




In Cambodia, where all the factions signed an agreement to
disarm, the United Nations did not pursue disarmament through
force. In Somalia, where there was no such agreement amongst
the factions, the Secretary-General chose to make disarmament
a priority. In reviewing past operations the use of force
question usually revolves around whether or not the U.N.
should have used force. Perhaps the more appropriate question
48U.N. Document S/4482, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General




to ponder first is could the U.N. have used force effectively?
In the Congo operation, when the U.N. used force it was




It has been shown in the dynamics of an insurgent
conflicts that a counter-state can use violence to persuade
important sectors of the population to switch allegiance from
government to challenger. The counter-state undermines the
state's authority by demonstrating its inability to maintain
order, forcing it to resort to an unwarranted, arbitrary, and
indiscriminate use of power that often lead to further
withdrawl of support. 51 Similarly in U.N. operations which
are responsible for maintenance of public order, the use of
force by one or more of the belligerents without an effective
response by the U.N. will result in a loss of credibility.
1. The Efficacy of Force
In conflicts with high levels of violence, and the
lack of acceptance by one or more of the belligerents, the
requirements for intervention need to closely match the
conflict itself. In order to protect the population, an
enforcement strategy of counter-force targeting may be
50Abi-Saab, p. 140.
51Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown. & Reequilibration , The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore & London, 1978, p. 15.
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necessary. This is especially true where the armed
belligerents are untrained or not under the control of a state
actor. Because of the presence of heavy artillery and other
technical weapons systems in the hands of uneducated and
largely untrained combatants, the civilian population is
inevitably drawn into the conflict. In Somalia heavy weapons
were used by untrained combatants who fired weapons in the
general direction of targets with no systematic attempt at
accuracy, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. 52
An occupying force in a peace-support operation does
not have the option of using heavy weapons systems including
artillery, missiles and attack aircraft against a recalcitrant
belligerent. These weapons systems are still not sufficiently
accurate to only target a belligerent who is "extremely
dispersed, or indistinguishable from the civilian environment
or intermingled with friendly forces. Because of this fact,
intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
population, and extreme dispersion have become the normal
practice in low-intensity conflicts." 53
52Jennifer Leaning, "When the System Doesn't Work," A
Framework for Survival: Health. Human Rights, and Humanitarian
Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters , Ed. by Kevin M. Cahill,
Basic Books & Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993,
pp. 112-113.
53Van Creveld, p. 208.
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Clausewitz, in the One War chapter "The Character of
Strategic Defense," acknowledged that military force, "peace-
enforcement" in this case, can be used for dissuasion or
coercion as well as for actual combat. 54 Later in the book
Clausewitz stated that one "must be willing to wage such
minimal war, which consists in merely threatening the enemy,
with negotiations held in reserve. 55
A strategy of coercive diplomacy must display the
effective use of force in order to demonstrate resolution.
Additionally, the determination to use more force, if
necessary, must be emphasized. 56 Clausewitz recognized this
fact in his statement that "Even when the only point of the
war is to maintain the status quo, the fact remains that
merely parrying a blow goes against the essential nature of
war, which certainly does not consist of merely enduring." 57
In a situation which warrants an enforcement mandate,
the issue may not be whether or not to use force. Instead it
is: what are the circumstances under which force will be used
and to what degree? According to theorists of intrastate
conflicts, particularly revolutionaries themselves, "the
54Clausewitz, pp. 370-371.
55Clausewitz, p. 604. (emphasis in original text).
56Craig & George, p. 197.
57Clausewitz, p. 370.
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inefficient use of force, or reluctance to use it is decisive
in the transfer of legitimacy to the opponents of the
regime." 58 Similarly, a requirement for enforcement-mandated
peace-support operations is the ability to demonstrate force
to compel factions to observe cease-fires, disarm or adhere to
other agreements without resorting to excess force thereby
alienating the population. So far the United Nations has been
unable to meet this requirement.
If the use of force is necessary in civil-military
operations it must be used with both efficiency and restraint.
The methods applied by the British Army in Northern Ireland
display the need for firepower restraint.
Perhaps the most important quality that a strong force
engaged against a weaker one needs is self-control; and
indeed the ability to withstand provocation without losing
one's head, without overreacting and thereby playing into
the enemy's hands, is itself the best possible measure of
self-control. There must be a voluntary weakening, even
approximately equal terms ... A good case in point is
provided by the British who have been fighting and taking
casualties in Northern Ireland for the last twenty years. 59
A conventional military's use of force against irregular force
interspersed amongst the civilian population will never be as
effective as the use of force against another conventionally
formed army. The necessary restraint on the use of force has
special significance in U.N. peace-support operations because
58Linz, p. 23.
59Van Creveld, p. 177.
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they rely more heavily on consent and neutrality than a
traditional occupying army that can use coercive measures more
easily.
2. Neutrality and Force
One of the key unresolved issue in this new class of
peace-support mission is to what extent is the United Nations
capable of effectively dealing with non-state belligerents? 60
The traditional strength of United Nations' operations lies in
operating with the consent of all belligerent parties and with
the moral authority of being under the U.N. flag to accomplish
mandates. Thereby U.N. forces only have had to use force in
self-defense. The principle of the non-use of force is




As a rule, however, non-state actors will be swayed
less by the moral authority of the United Nations: an
international body in which they do not have membership.
Therefore they are less likely to consent to U.N. operations
that may decrease their power. In order to be effective the
United Nations may have to intervene against the wishes of
whatever authorities claim to be in control. By forswearing
the basic peacekeeping principles of strict neutrality and the
60Leaning, p. 120.
61F.T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of
Force . Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1992, p. 11.
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non-use of force the United Nations is venturing into
territory that is outside its traditional strengths.
Furthermore, the use of force in these new U.N. missions will
still have limited effectiveness because the objective is to
neutralize, not defeat, the belligerents.
Even if a United Nations operation does not have a
mandate for the use of force, deployment of a force without
continued consent will cause some of the belligerents to
perceive the force as a threat. The mere existence of a large
U.N. Force will affect the political situation, if only by
changing the context within which the struggle for power takes
place. In these circumstances every action, or inaction,
taken by a U.N. force can have a potential effect on one or
more of the belligerents and the balance or relative power
between them. As shown by the experience of ONUC, attempting
to maintain law and order "in a situation of relative chaos
and a power vacuum," inevitably has an impact on the political
balance of power. 62
This is especially true where one of the belligerents'
primary goals is to deny the other parties their version of
law and order. In Somalia, Mohammad Farah Aidid and the other
clan leaders had little motivation to contain domestic
anarchy. Insecurity in the domestic situation was to the
62Abi-Saab, p. 65.
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"technicals" advantage because it provided them with the basis
of their power and revenues. As pointed out by sociologist
Barrington Moore, Jr.,
insofar as a political leader working in a chaotic situation
organizes his own armed bands, he of course partly frightens
the population into supporting him. A great deal of
revolutionary support by 'the people' is obviously synthetic
and the result of sheer bullying. But the revolutionary's




Similarly in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing and migratory genocide
through displacement of population centers are not an
incidental by-products of the war. The strategic use of
brutality and terror are the belligerents' very objective.
Therefore, deploying U.N. humanitarian missions to situations
like Bosnia or Somalia by definition means that U.N. personnel
will not be considered impartial and that they will therefore
become potential pawns in the conflict. 64
Proponents of peace-support operations with increased
mandates for the use of force are attempting to attain two
goals which are mutually exclusive: one, an increase in the
ability to use force and two, the maintenance of a high degree
of neutrality by shielding the operation under the umbrella of
the United Nations. The mutually exclusive nature of these
63Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of




two goals is displayed diagramatically in Figure 4. As a
military operation uses greater amounts of force to carry out
its mandate it will lose the support of at least certain
sections of the population.





The unstated hope of U.N. "peacekeeping" operations
with an enforcement mandate is that somehow the U.N. will be
able to solve the unsolvable equation of maintaining an
"ideal" relationship of neutrality and the use of force.
Realistically, the amount of force used will inversely affect
the perceived neutrality of the force by at least some
segments of the population. This unsolvable paradox is
exacerbated in situations where U.N. forces are dealing with
non-state actors who have less respect for the moral authority
of the United Nations. An ever present danger is that the use
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of excessive force, real or perceived, will cause a
"destabilizing event" which causes the eventual failure of the
operation.
Escalation, as was seen in UNOSOM II or MNF II in
Lebanon, is a game which peacekeeping forces cannot play. The
disinterested quality (no hidden agendas or national
interests) that the U.N. desires in its troop contributors
means that the U.N. force will have a much lower "threshold of
pain" than almost any foe they counter. As was seen in the
United States' and France's experiences in Vietnam,
belligerents in an internal conflict can attrite the will of
an external actor by simply attacking his manpower without
defeating his military strategy. 65 Furthermore, the "will" of
a United Nations force, or any coalition, is much easier to
destroy than the national will of a unitary actor.
The aerial bombardment by U.S. aircraft and ensuing
ground actions by Pakistani, Moroccan and French troops that
resulted in the death of more than 70 Somalis, many of them
evidently not gunmen, prompted a revenge response from
factions within the Somali population. Mobs killed four
foreign journalists and international aid workers, prompting
the Italian government to threaten withdrawal of their troops
65Pillar, p. 156.
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from Somalia. 66 The ensuing withdrawal of forces from UNOSOM
II can be traced back to the escalating effect that a
distabilizing event has on any operation that relies, at least
in part, on the neutrality of the occupying force.
The use of force, especially the use of lethal force,
for civilian population control will inevitably lead to the
loss of neutrality by an occupying U.N. contingent. This
problem is not unique to U.N. operations. When the British
Army was first deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969,
the Catholic population viewed them as an impartial force that
would protect them against Protestant attacks which the Royal
Ulster Constabulary had been unable or unwilling to do. The
Catholic population accepted the British Army as long as it
"adopted a relatively low profile, reactive policy toward
disturbances." 67 However, the British Army's development of
a more forceful and intrusive strategy to counter the
increasing threat posed by the newly-formed Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) progressively alienated the Catholic
community. The army's use of coercive tactics proved to be a
great asset for the PIRA. The killing of 13 civilians on 30
January 1992, "Bloody Sunday," by British paratroopers
finished the Catholic community's acceptance of the force and
66
"Tweaking the Trunk of the U.N." The Economist , 17 July
1993, p. 35.
67Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma? , p. 22.
149
an increased acceptance of PIRA operations which had resulted
in civilian casualties. 68
Similarly, the use of lethal force by United Nations
troops in crowd control situations alienated the Somali
population and increased Mohammad Farah Aidid's popularity by
portraying him as the only force within Somalia that could
stand up to foreign domination. The implementation of the
Security Council Resolution to arrest Aidid69 and the
distribution of reward posters offering $25,000 for his
capture70 were the declarations of a mini-war between the U.N.
and the clan leader. The escalating nature of this event led
to the eventual distabilization of the UNOSOM II operation.
The use of force to simply neutralize a belligerent and not
defeat him may not serve its intended purpose and can make a
settlement even more difficult. According to Fred Charles
Ikle, in Every War Must End , this fact is true of all limited
wars:
the conditions on which both sides can agree for ending the
fighting are not independent of the level of fighting.
Hence, escalation that falls short of defeating the enemy
may cut both ways. On the one hand, it may raise the
ambitions on one or both sides and thus widen the gap
between what one side would settle for and what the other
68J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979 . Poolbeg
Press, Ltd., Dublin, Ireland, 1990, pp. 384-385.
69See: U.N. Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993.
70George Church, "Anatomy Of A Disaster," Time . 18 October
1993, p. 46.
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demands. It is these opposed effects of escalation that
make it so hard to plan for limited wars and to terminate
them. 71
In U.N. operations escalations in the use of force
fundamentally compromise the organization's ability to remain
a neutral broker. Former U.N. Undersecretary-General for
Peacekeeping, Brian Urquhart, understood that violation of the
principle of the non-use of force "almost invariably leads to
the peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict and therefore
part of the problem." 72 In fact, UNTAC's apparent success can
be ascribed to the fact that UNTAC was not allowed to expand
its mandate to enforcement and thereby it never became a
direct threat to the Khmer Rouge. In fact, it can be argued
that UNTAC took on the characteristics more of post-conflict
peace-building than peacekeeping. Figure 5 shows how various
operations have relied on a mix of the use of force and/or a
neutral postion to attempt accomplishment of their mission.
Generally the operations which have enjoyed the greatest
success have relied more on their position as a neutral broker
than on the use of force. Certainly no peace-support
operation, including UNOSOM II, has had as much firepower as
the second Multinational Force (MNF II) in Lebanon. However,
increases in firepower did not translate into success.
71 Ikle, Every War Must End , p. 42.
72Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War , W.W. Norton & Co.,
New York and London, 1987, p. 179.
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The ability to carry out an unrealistic mandate does not
materialize with the application of greater force. In the
case of UNTAC, the chances of a destabilizing event were
reduced by maintaining the neutrality of the operation and
steering clear of the use of force. In the end UNTAC
resembled more of a peace-building operation than a peace-
enforcement. The result of that strategey are discussed in
the next chapter.
In Somalia, on the other hand, the shift toward the
use of force from UNITAF to UNOSOM II resulted in
destabilization of the operation. Once the U.N. Security
Council decided to issue a warrant for General of Aidid, a
questionable decision in itself, UNOSOM 's legitimacy within
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Somalia rested with its ability to arrest Aidid with low
casualties of both U.N. troops and Somalis. In a situation of
establishing public security nothing is more likely to enhance
the authority's legitimacy in the eyes of the population than
a demonstrated capacity to locate and punish criminals. 73
This being the case, one of the contributing causes underlying
the ineffectual use of force in Somalia was the inability of
the U.N. to find and track General Aidid. 74 This shortfall
can be attributed, in part, to the United Nations lack of
intelligence assets.
D. INTELLIGENCE
Any successful public security operation is dependent upon
good intelligence. This is especially true in situations, as
in Northern Ireland (and similarly Somalia), where the focus
of operations shifts from the control of large crowds to the
neutralizing of a comparatively small number of violent
activists. 75 This operational requirement led to the
development of a network of intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the British Army and local
gendarmaries in Northern Ireland. As the focus of operations
73Leites and Wolf, p. 137.
74Douglas Waller, "When the Bad Guy Has No Phone to Tap,"
Newsweek . 18 October 1993, p. 38.
75Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma? , p. 24.
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in Somalia developed to include the capture of Aidid, UNOSOM
II had a similar intelligence requirement. However, the
ability to develop a comprehensive intelligence network is
fundamentally against the United Nations' nature.
According to a U.S. House of Representatives intelligence
committee member, "The United Nations is so disdainful and
fearful of intelligence operations that it has banished the
word from its vocabulary." 76 Instead the intelligence
branches of U.N. military operations are euphemistically
called "Military Information." In part, the United Nations is
fearful of an intelligence function because of the pejorative
meaning that the term has to many countries. In many states
an intelligence apparatus is associated with an instrument of
state coercion such as secret police or death squads. 77
Besides its general antipathy toward intelligence
operations, the United Nations is not able to establish a
cohesive intelligence capability because of its organizational
nature. This creates, in effect, another "force divider."
One of the inherent difficulties of establishing an
intelligence operation within a multilateral effort is the
associated the operational level problem of variable goals of
the contributing states described in the previous chapter. An
76Waller, p. 38.
77Interview with LCOL Waller.
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example of this was provided by the UNTAC Chief of Military
Information. UNTAC had a Thai officer as part of the Military
Information Branch because of the requirement to provide a
geographical balance in each of the branches of U.N.
operations. Given the relationship between the Thai military
and the Khmer Rouge described in the Chapter III/ this
situation to provided a possible direct link for the Khmer
Rouge to sensitive UNTAC operational plans. 78
It is a valid argument that, just as the U.N. should not
possess its own army, an organic intelligence capability is
inappropriate for the organization. To a large degree the
U.N. must rely on the intelligence collection capabilities of
contributing states. However, states will be reluctant to
share intelligence with the U.N. because other contributing
members, who may be considered adversaries in another context,
will have access to the information. As with much
intelligence information, the overridding concern may not be
as much the information itself as the methods of collection. 79
The requirements for reliable intelligence are different
for a military force involved in an insurgent conflict than
those in a conventional war. Leites and Wolf point out that
information may be more important in intrastate conflicts than
78Interview with LCOL Waller.
79Interview with LCOL Rich Rice.
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in other forms of conflict because improvements in
intelligence are likely to be more important (productive) than
increases in mobility or firepower. 80 Similarly, the
intelligence requirements for U.N. operations in an intrastate
war are decidely different than those for classic
peacekeeping. Especially if the operation has a pro-active
enforcement character instead of the reactive nature of
traditional peacekeeping missions.
However, as U.N. operations become more offensive in
nature, such as the manhunt for Mohammed Farah Aidid, the
contingents within the force will be hesitant to share
information with one another because of possible leaks
generated by unilateral relationships between contingents and
belligerents. Reports emerged from Somalia in this context,
that Italian officers, who disagreed with the policy of
attempting to capture Aidid, tipped off his followers in
advance of raids on his hiding places. 81
The information requirements for these "occupation like"
peace-support operations are more human intelligence (humint
in intelligence jargon) intensive than the technical
intelligence that is important in conventional conflicts. The
intelligence requirements are centered around intentions more
80Leites & Wolf, p. 137.
81Eliot A. Cohen, "A Nasty Little War," National Review . 1
November 1993, p. 50.
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than capabilities. In short, to be capable of operations
beyond classic peacekeeping (with a purely defensive posture),
the United Nations must be able to deal more effectively with
the requirements for intelligence.
E. REFORMING THE SECURITY MECHANISMS OF THE STATE
While the legal status of a U.N. force as an occupying
power is debatable, the necessity of building or reforming the
security mechanisms of the state saved from failure is
irrefutable. Without a professionalized, non-politicized
judiciary and military and police force the new state
apparatus, to which the U.N. has been the mid-wife, will be
unable to face the challenges which caused state
disintegration in the first place.
One of the most immediate problems facing a new government
is struggling with the security establishment inherited from
its predecessor. The organizations of the security
establishment will rarely undertake self-reform under the new
government. Therefore, it is predictable that security
organizations will continue repressive tactics under the new
government unless reformed. 82 Serious problems can also arise
from security establishments that are replaced in the
82Ronald J. Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal
Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland , University of
California Press, Berkely, Los Angeles & Oxford, 1990, p. 19-20.
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transition of governments, or have become highly politicized
by the conflict (especially in communist militaries like the
Cambodian People's Armed Forces). Officers in the military
and other security organizations often have strong political
ideologies and may greatly resent their loss of power or
status in the new order. Often the leaders of these
organizations will actively work to bring down the new
government. 83 The role of the United Nations forces in the
process of reforming a state's military in past operations has
been unclear.
From the beginning of the Congo operation it was assumed
that one of its major tasks of the mission was to assist the
Congolese Government in reorganizing and retraining the Armee
Nationale Congolse (ANC). The solicitation of such assistance
was explict in the initial communications between Prime
Minister Patrice Lumumba and Secretary-General Hammarskjold in
July 1960 requesting the deployment of a U.N. force. 84
The ANC could be referred to as an army in only the most
euphemistic of terms. In fact it was "an undisciplined
confederation of armed units, each of which was directed by
83Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in
The Late Twentieth Century . University of Oklahoma Press, Norman &
London, 1991. p. 232.
84Lefever, Uncertain Mandate , p. 67.
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former non-commissioned officers." 85 The ANC and the
gendarmerie were indeed two of the major sources of disorder
in the Congo. If the ANC, which had no logistics system, had
to deploy over any distance it was required to survive by
"appropriating" from the local populace. This usually meant
stripping the population in its path of anything of value. 86
The most fundamental problem facing the Congolese Government
and the U.N. in exerting control over the ANC was the lack of
a competent officer corps to replace the Belgian officers who
had departed when the Congo gained its independence.
The U.N. began a several fledgling retraining programs in
late 1960. However, the programs were discontinued within a
matter of months. The reason for discontinuation of the
programs according to the U.N. force commander, Carl von Horn,
was the recruits' propensity to begin training and then
disappear in a few days with their equipment. 87 However, one
of the ultimate sources of Congolese non-cooperation with the
U.N. can be traced to, then Commander of the ANC, General
Joseph Mobutu's desire not to have the U.N. remove his base of
85Arthur H. House, The U.N, in The Congo: The Political and
Civilian Efforts . University Press of America, Washington D.C.,
1978. p. 142.
86Ibid.
87Carl von Horn, Soldering for Peace , David McKay Company,
Inc., New York, 1967, p. 228.
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power by reforming the military. 88 Mobutu preferred bilateral
external military support, especially from Belgium, because it
did not intrude into his domain by requiring restructuring and
professionalization.
In order to force compliance with a retraining program,
the U.N. force would have required a stronger mandate from the
Security Council for which the Secretary-General was unwilling
to ask. The eventual price of not being able to "reform" the
ANC meant that the army remained a disruptive force in the
Congo and was latter unable to meet the internal security
needs of the Congo. The United Nations' inability to develop
any meaningful foundation for the maintenance of public order
or internal security, through the retraining the army, after
the departure of the U.N. is an example of the inherent
problems in using an international organization for what the
U.S. Army terms "foreign internal defense." According to
Lefever:
Historically, states needing military assistance have turned
to a close ally or friendly state, and not to an
internationally authorized multinational staff.
Collaboration in the vital matters of national security
implies a degree of mutual trust and some common political
objectives. Such mutuality is vitually impossible between
a sovereign government and a multinational U.N. mission.
Even at best, relations between two close allies tend to be
strained on sensitive national security problems. The Congo
experience suggests that an international instrumentality is
probably not psychologically and politically competent to
88House, p. 151.
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assit effectively in a task as sensitive as the building of
the military establishment of a sovereign state. 89
Similarly, in Cambodia the U.N. recognized the need to
provide provisions for the maintenance of security through the
exertion of some modicum of control over the military.
However, in Cambodia this took the form of payment and
observation more than retraining. The military units of all
of the factions had resorted to banditry during the U.N.
operation because of the end of the external aid which had
funded them prior to the Paris Peace accords. As the U.N.
prepared to withdraw its military forces there was a fear that
the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) and the remaining
non-communist guerrillas would "slide into warlordism.
"
90 The
possiblity of military units becoming more pronouncedly
autonomous would have given the inchoate government, elected
two months previously, little possiblity of controlly events
outside of Phnom Penh.
Following the June 1993 agreement to integrate the the
non-communist guerrillas with the CPAF into the Cambodian
Armed Forces (CAF) the U.N. established a mechanism to pay the
salaries of Cambodia's civil service and newly formed army.
An estimated 11 million U.S. dollars was made available
89Lefever, Uncertain Mandate , pp. 71-72.
90John C. Brown, "U.N. Comes Through With Budget Aid," Phnom
Penh Post , 30 July - 12 August 1993, p. 1.
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through the Cambodian Trust Fund , which was made up of
voluntary contributions from U.N. member nations. 91 While
UNTAC officials saw the budget support issue as critical to
the military's continued committment to the democratization
process there was still the problem of training the armed
forces to combat the Khmer Rouge.
The publicized "successful" offensive which immediately
followed the consolidation of the three factions into the
CAF, 92 showed an underestimation of the tactical acumen and
patience of the Khmer Rouge. The United Nations payment of
the CAF soldiers salaries was useful in the short term to
inhibit the return to banditry by the military. However, the
CAF, which is primarily composed of soldiers and equipment
from the CPAF, is not even a mediocre army by Third World
standards. This army, which had no luck in defeating the
Khmer Rouge for over a decade with the assistance of a 100,000
plus man Vietnamese occupation force.
Reforming Cambodia's judiciary also presented severe
problems for UNTAC. In January 1993, UNTAC chief Yasushi
Akashi introduced special powers of arrest, detention and
prosecution for the U.N. force to combat the wave of political
violence. UNTAC 's issue of arrest warrants for seven CPAF
91Brown, "U.N. Comes Through With Budget Aid," p. 2.
92Michael Hayes, "New Unified Government Army Assaults Khmer
Rouge," Phnom Penh Post . 27 August-9 September 1993, p. 1.
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soldiers accused of murdering opposition opponents showed the
inadequacies of the U.N. 's authoritative abilities. 93 Since
UNTAC had no judicial apparatus within Cambodia, it had to
rely on the courts of existing administrative structure to try
suspects. This presents grave problems when one considers
that all of the judges were members of the political party of
the Hun Sen regime. Implementing Cambodia's new constitution,
after UNTAC s withdrawal, will be difficult when one considers
that, all of the judiciary present at that time belonged to
the Hun Sen Government's political party. According to U.N.
officials, all of the lawyers in the country ready to become
senior judges, of which there were only four, belonged to the
CPP. 94
93Kevin Barrington, "Objections Raised to UNTAC Prosecution, H
Phnom Penh Post . 12-25 March 1993, p. 1.
94
"Cambodia: Paper Hopes," The Economist , 25 September 1993,
p. 43.
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V. UNTAC CASE STUDY - THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In order to understand this new type of "nation building"
mission that the U.N. has taken on, one must be able to
demarcate the inherent mission limitations, described in the
previous two chapters, that are common to all of these
operations as opposed to the limitations that are situation
specific to each United Nations effort. While all of these
operations have some commonalities, dictated mostly by the way
that the United Nations does business, the situation-specific
problems may make a political solution more difficult in one
case than another.
In the case of Cambodia, the May 1993 elections
represented the culmination of over a decade of diplomatic
efforts and a two year peacekeeping operation by the United
Nations, to bring an end to the state of civil war which has
existed in Cambodia for almost a quarter of a century. By the
some estimates the UNTAC effort has cost close to $3 billion 1
and the lives of at least a dozen peacekeepers in the field. 2
The perceptions of whether the effort was a success or a
1Nate Thayer, "Shot to Pieces," Far Eastern Economic Review .
20 May 1993, p. 10.
2Emily MacFarquhar, "The U.N. 's Other Quagmire," U.S. News &
World Report , 24 May 1993, p. 45.
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failure will have a direct effect on the international
community's willingness to invest in similar ventures in
places such as the former Yugoslavia. 3
According to the Agreements On A Comprehensive Political
Settlement Of The Cambodia Conflict , otherwise known as the
Paris Peace Accords, signed in October 1991 in order to
restore and maintain peace in Cambodia, to promote national
reconciliation and to ensure the exercise of the right to
self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and
fair elections . . . only a comprehensive political settlement
... will be just and durable. 4
However, the result of one of the largest and most expensive
United Nations operations 5 was that UNTAC officials salvaged
the appearance of success without having really attained "a
peaceful, just and durable solution to the Cambodian
conflict." 6 Instead of providing a vehicle for a
comprehensive political solution through free and fair
elections, the means became the ends for UNTAC. The end goal
was simply to hold the "best possible" election given the
3Jonathan Power, "Cambodia Is a Test for the U.N. in Bosnia, n
Los Angeles Times , 14 May 1993.
4Agreements On A Comprehensive Political Settlement Of The
Cambodia Conflict , Paris, 23 October 1993, p. 1. (italics added)
5 It is estimated that the U.N. operation in Somalia may
surpass UNTAC in size and cost. Interview with Mr. Behrooz Sadry,
UNTAC Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Phnom
Penh, 5 May 1993.
6Securitv Council Resolution 717 , 16 October 1991.
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political realities of Cambodia and extricate the U.N. from a
"political hot potato" as soon as was politically possible. 7
According to all observers the requirements for "a neutral
political environment" as envisioned by the 1991 Paris Peace
Accords was abandoned for an election held under conditions
described as "reasonably free and fair and acceptable." 8 The
distance between the original goal and the final reality meant
that fighting continued on a large scale between the new
Provisional Cambodian Government and the Khmer Rouge as UNTAC
withdrew from the country. 9
A. BACKGROUND
Prior to the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, the
Cambodian civil conflict was formed around four warring
factions: the Vietnamese installed regime and three
resistance groups. These four factions, through an odd
mixture of alliances and associations, have been fighting each
other for control of Cambodia for almost three decades. They
all have displayed a chameleon-like ability for changing their
political positions.
7Sadry Interview, 5 May 1993.
8Nate Thayer, "Shot to Pieces," Far Eastern Economic Review .
20 May 1993, p. 10.
9Ker Munthit, "Thousands Flee Government Offensive," Phnom
Penh Post . 22 October - 4 November 1993, p. 1.
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The central figure in any discussion of Cambodian politics
is Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He was chosen by the Cambodian
Regency to ascend to the throne in 1941 at the age of
eighteen. He was the head of the Cambodian Government in one
form or another from Cambodia's independence from France in
1953 to his deposition by a military coup led by his defense
minister, Lon Nol, in 1970. He spent almost all of the next
21 years in exile in China. He aligned with the Khmer Rouge
against the Lon Nol Government and was reinstated as the Head
of State following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975. However,
a year later he was placed under house arrest and returned to
exile in China in 1978 following the Vietnamese invasion.
While considered eccentric and temperamental, it would be a
mistake to underestimate the popularity that this former "god-
king" enjoys with a large percentage of the Cambodian populus.
Sihanouk founded one of the major non-communist resistance
factions, the National United Front for an Independent,
Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCIPEC). In
1982 he was named president of the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the tripartite resistance
organization which also included the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). This coalition
maintained the United Nation's seat for Cambodia rather than
the Phnom Penh regime. This arrangement caused a great deal
of acrimony. Even many who believed that the Phnom Penh
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regime, the State of Cambodia (SOC), was nothing more than a
puppet regime for the Vietnamese and Russians, could not
fathom granting an accord of international recognition to a
pariah organization, such as the Khmer Rouge, out of Cold War
necessity. Following the 1989 withdrawal of the Vietnamese
army, Western governments began to acknowledge the fact that
the Hun Sen Government acctually had the support of
significant portions of the local population. 10
The one term that has become universally synonymous with
the civil war in Cambodia is "Khmer Rouge." The Khmer Rouge
(KR) is an extremist, Maoist organization which was in power
from 1975 to 1978. The Khmer Rouge hoped to re-establish a
purely agrarian, purely Khmer society within Cambodia11 by
forcing the evacuation of the major urban centers and purging
all non-ethnic Khmers from the population. During that time
it was responsible for purges that resulted in the deaths of
between one and three million people, through outright murder
or neglect.
It is evident from the accounts of refugees that the
greatest cause of deaths during this period were hunger,
disease and exposure. The official United States Department
10
"Phnom Penh, Eye on West, Tries to Shed Image as Hanoi
Puppet, The New York Times . 8 January 1990, p. Al.
1:LPresently 88% of the population is ethnically Khmer.
The remainder are generally Vietnamese or Chinese.
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of State's estimate of the number of deaths attributable to
the Khmer Rouge is 1.2 million, while Amnesty International's
figure is 1.4 million. Pol Pot, the secretive and elusive
leader of the Khmer Rouge, estimated a modest 800 thousand. 12
The population of Cambodia was estimated at 7.1 million in
1972 (the last census was taken in 1962). Using a figure
which is the difference between the State Department and
Amnesty International estimates, the Khmer Rouge was
responsible for the unnatural deaths of nearly 20% of the
Cambodian population.
Since being driven from power in 1979, the Khmer Rouge has
existed as an insurgent group in northwest Cambodia and in
camps along the Thai border. The military arm of the Khmer
Rouge is the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) . It
was generally recognized as the best equipped and best
organized of all of the resistance groups. Its strength
before the Peace Accords was estimated between 40,000 and
50,000 combatants. 13 However, its true strength at the time
of the 1993 elections was between 13,000 and 14,000.
Throughout the struggle the Khmer Rouge attained virtually all
of its aid from the People's Republic of China, with Thailand
acting as a conduit for the shipment of goods and equipment.
12Department of the Army, Cambodia; A Country Study .
Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 51.
13 Ibid., p. 269.
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The Khmer Rouge, which formally changed its name to the
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), attempted to alter its
public image following the peace agreement of 1991. While
"new" Khmer Rouge rhetoric criticized the "excesses of the
past," evidence indicates that the party's goal is to regain
complete control of the Cambodian state. 14 Part of this
public image campaign to achieve legitimacy was the
"retirement" of Pol Pot. He was officially listed only as an
advisor to the party. This was widely viewed as a ploy to
enhance the Khmer Rouge's badly damaged reputation, both
domestically and internationally. The conventional wisdom is
that Pol Pot was still the most influential leader within the
Khmer Rouge. However, the nominal front man for the Khmer
Rouge throughout the negotiations in the late 1980s and early
1990s was Khieu Samphan. He is highly educated, holding a
doctorate in economics from the University of Paris, and
presented a polished and moderate image to the public.
Of the two non-communist resistance factions, the one most
closely associated with Prince Sihanouk was FUNCIPEC. It was
organized in 1981 to oppose the State of Cambodia and its
Vietnamese backers. While receiving support from a broad base
of foreign powers including China, ASEAN (Association of
14Christophe Peschoux, The "New" Khmer Rouge:




Southeast Asian Nations), and the United States, FUNCIPEC
remained largely a collection of royal family cronies and
loyal supporters of Sihanouk. Following the signing of the
Paris Peace Accords, FUNCIPEC was nominally run by Sihanouk's
son Prince Ranariddh.
The armed force of FUNCIPEC was the National Army of
Independent Kampuchea (ANKI), formerly called the Sihanouk
National Army (ANS). ANKI was largely viewed as an
ineffective fighting force with little chance of success
against the army of the Phnom Penh regime or the Vietnamese
armed forces occupying Cambodia. Troop strength estimates
ranged anywhere from 7,000 to 11,000 combatants. 15
The other non-communist resistance faction was the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). Formed in 1979 by
the remnants of the Lon Nol Government, it was the weakest of
the three factions in all respects: financially, militarily
and politically. Since its inception the KPNLF was
characterized by the factionalism and incompetence that were
the legacy of the Lon Nol Government. The internal schisms of
the organization debilitated any effectiveness that it might
have developed. Its military entity received arms from China
and ASEAN nations, especially Singapore and Malaysia.
15Department of the Army, Cambodia: A Country Study , p,
276.
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Fielding a maximum of 8,000 troops at any given time, 16 it was
never considered a significant factor in the fighting between
the CGDK and the Phnom Penh regime.
The State of Cambodia (SOC) was the de facto government
installed in Phnom Penh by the invading Vietnamese Army that
drove the Khmer Rouge from power in January 1979. It was a
Marxist-Leninist creation of the Vietnamese Government that
was built around numerous former members of the Khmer Rouge.
The leadership of the SOC had defected from Khmer Rouge to
avoid being purged as the organization began to devour itself
toward the end of its reign. 17 The two leading figures in the
SOC faction were Chea Sim and Hun Sen, both members of the
Khmer Rouge before defecting to Vietnam in 1978. However,
after the U.N. -brokered peace agreements, the political wing
of the government, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
(KPRP), attempted a drastic change in its image. Having
changed its name to the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), it
supposedly renounced communism and embraced democracy and free
market economics. The military wing of the SOC was the
Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF). In the decade from
1979 to 1989 the CPAF was bolstered by the Vietnamese
16Ibid., p. 274.
17David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History;
Politics. War, and Revolution since 1945 , Yale University
Press, New Haven and London, 1991, p. 313.
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occupation force. It received training and the majority of
its equipment directly from Vietnam. However, it did receive
some aid directly from the Soviet Union. Its total strength
was estimated to be approximately 100,000 troops. 18
B. THE UNTAC PLAN AND THE RESULTS
The key elements of the Cambodian peace plan developed by
the United Nations were: a cease-fire by all parties; the
cessation of all outside military aid; the formation of a
Supreme National Council (SNC); U.N. organized elections by
May 1993; the interim control of all critical state functions
by the U.N.; the repatriation of 360,000 refugees from the
Thai border camps; and the disarming and demobilization of an
estimated 200,000 combatants. In order to accomplish these
considerable tasks, the U.N. plan called for an eighteen month
deployment of 22,000 personnel.
The U.N. peace plan originally envisioned, among other
things, the presence of thousands of its own administrators
and the multinational military force which would oversee the
disarmament and demobilization of 70% of the warring factions'
troops. 19 Initially, the main functions of the peacekeeping
18Guide to Key Players in Cambodia , A Reference Aid
prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, p. 7.
19U.N. Security Council Document S/21689 , 30 August 1990,
p. 7.
173
force (16,000 military personnel of the entire 22,000 UNTAC
contingent) had little to do directly with the election
process.
According to the original Security Council plan, the
actual military force of twelve infantry battalions
(approximately 10,000 troops) had four main functions: one,
verification of Vietnamese troop withdrawal and non-return;
two, monitoring the cessation of arms supplies from foreign
countries; three, finding arms caches, confiscating weapons
and cantoning troops from all warring factions; and four,
establishing a mine clearance plan for demining Cambodia. 20
Originally, UNTAC military and police components were only to
provide security arrangements for registration and polling
stations in special circumstances. 21
The four-month cantonment and demobilization phase was the
only phase of UNTAC in which it was planned to have a full
strength international contingent of twelve infantry
battalions. During this phase the leadership of each faction
was to move its troops under its own command to various
cantonment sites where they would take possession of all
weapons and hand them over to U.N. authorities. Following
20Ibid, p. 11.
21U.N. Security Council Document S/23613 , 19 February
1992, p. 5.
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this phase UNTAC was to move into the six-month electoral
phase and six of the battalions would be repatriated. 22
The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Yasushi
Akashi, and the military Force Commander, Australian
Lieutenant General John Sanderson, arrived in Cambodia on
March 15th, 1992 to assume command of UNTAC. Battalions from
the various participating nations began to deploy on the 1st
of May to monitor the proposed cease-fire, which was scheduled
to begin on the 31st of May 1992, and supervise the cantonment
and demobilization of the faction's armed forces.
In one of the initial missteps of UNTAC, Akashi decided
that 100% of the combatants should be demobilized. When asked
how the factions might respond to this last minute change, a
U.N. official answered, "What choice do they have?" 23 This
change from the agreed upon demobilization procedure may have
further encouraged the factions to resist demobilization
completely. According to U.N. documents, of the 200,000
combatants to be disarmed, only 52,000 were cantoned by the
10th September 1992. This included 42,000 from the Cambodian
People's Armed Forces (CPAF) and the 10,000 man total combined
22 Ibid. , Annex 2.
23Craig Etcheson, "The 'Peace' in Cambodia," Current
History . Vol. 91, No. 569, December 1992, p. 414.
175
forces of the non-communist resistance. 24 The Khmer Rouge's
armed forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
(NADK), had cantoned no one at this point.
The Khmer Rouge used various assertions as ploys to refuse
to cooperate with the planned demobilization. These included
assertions that Vietnamese troops were still present in
Cambodia, that UNTAC illegitimately strengthened the SOC, and
disagreement over the speed of demobilization. 25 In order to
retain its right to compete in the political process, the
Khmer Rouge made a last minute concession in October 1992 by
symbolically demobilizing a few guerrilla battalions, but
retained the bulk of its forces and armaments. (The term
"battalion" here has no equivalency to a conventional force's
definition. An average Khmer Rouge division contains on the
average 450 men. ) Due to Khmer Rouge intransigence, the SOC
also halted the demobilization of the CPAF. Thus, the two
most bitter rivals for power within Cambodia maintained the
ability to affect the outcome of the 1993 election and future
political activity through coercive force.
24Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia . 21
September 1992, p. 5.
25Lois B. McHugh, United Nations Operations in Cambodia ,
CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library
of Congress, January 25, 1993, p. 10.
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When it became apparent that the demobilization phase of
UNTAC was failing, one of the key decisions made by Akashi and
Lt Gen. Sanderson was to ask that the multinational battalions
remain in the country to help protect the electoral process.
Since the demobilization phase had failed, the only way to
maintain the "secure environment" for the elections was to
retain the military presence of troops on the ground. This
subtle shift in mission placed the U.N. soldiers in a
potentially more adversarial role with any faction that might
want to disrupt the registration or election process.
Since a neutral political environment had not been
attained through the disarmament phase, the U.N. needed to
rely on its 16,000-man military force to establish secure
conditions for the elections. However, it was realized early
on that UNTAC 's military strenth was grossly insufficient to
adequately protect the estimated 1,400 election sites that
were initially considered necessary to canvas the registered
population. When one considers that the "teeth" of the
military force really only consisted of 10,000 armed men from
the infantry battalions, 26 UNTAC 's situation became even more
tenuous. In order to provide adequate security for the
polling stations, UNTAC had to turn to the CPAF for soldiers.
Thus, UNTAC found itself tacitly aligned with one of the
26U.N. Security Council Document S/23613 , 19 February
1992, p. 13.
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factions which it was supposed to disarm, thereby providing a
modicum of truth to Khmer Rouge propaganda of UNTAC/SOC
complicity. Furthermore, UNTAC was forced to reduce the
number of polling stations in areas where the Khmer Rouge
could deny them access. Three weeks prior to the elections
the estimated number of polling stations was reduced to 1,400.
The areas where UNTAC felt that it could safely establish
polling sites excluded approximately 25% of the eligible
voters in Cambodia. 27
The Khmer Rouge consistently tried to undermine the peace
process by claiming that there were still large numbers of
Vietnamese troops in the country and that the U.N. has shown
preferential treatment to the SOC. As proof of U.N.-SOC
complicity, the Khmer Rouge pointed to the large number of
mid-level SOC functionaries who helped UNTAC run the country.
The Khmer Rouge demanded that the U.N. completely dismantle
the SOC government bureacracy. This, of course, was an
impossible reguest simply because there were no other
qualified individuals available to perform the necessary day
to day duties of the government. Additionally, Annex 1 of the
Paris Agreements specifically recognized that the SOC
27Interview with LT S. Hines, Royal Canadian Navy,
Information Officer, UNTAC Naval Component Headquarters, Phnom
Penh, 5 May 1993.
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Administration would have to operate the everyday governmental
functions of Cambodia. 28
A second critical decision made by UNTAC authorities was
to allow the election timetable to proceed without the
participation of the Khmer Rouge. According to the U.N. plan,
in order for a political party to be considered valid it had
to be able to provide verifiable membership lists of at least
5,000 registered voters. 29 As the 31 January 1993 deadline
for voter registration established by UNTAC passed, there were
22 parties officially registered, minus the Khmer Rouge.
The leaders of the SOC intermittently saw the advantage of
distancing themselves from UNTAC. A show of resolve and
effectiveness against the Khmer Rouge prior to the elections
could only strengthen the SOC's position in the minds of the
Cambodian people. Being able to present themselves as the
only barrier to a Khmer Rouge return to power once the U.N.
forces departed was an undeniable advantage that the SOC had
over the other parties.
Prince Sihanouk also used the failings of the U.N. mission
to further his own agenda. By unleashing a diatribe upon
UNTAC, Sihanouk was been able to project himself as the only
28Robin Davies, "Blue Berets, Green Backs: What was the
impact?," Phnom Penh Post , 22 October - 04 November 1993, p.
16.
29Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia , 19
February 1992, p. 5.
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hope for some sort of unified government. Sihanouk attempted
to marginalize UNTAC's influence with the various factions and
external actors by statements such as:
In order to be able to tell the U.N. and the world that they
succeeded in their mission, UNTAC is going to have an
election despite the fact none of the conditions for the
election have been met. None. It is a hideous comedy. 30
and
UNTAC is very unpopular . . . The four factions detest each
other, but UNTAC has brought unanimity of the factions
against itself. They are unanimous in saying that UNTAC is
very bad. I want to put myself above UNTAC, that is, to
exercise power not in place of UNTAC but to do what UNTAC
cannot or will not do . . I am fed up, but I am not going to
expel UNTAC. I'll do everything to help UNTAC hold the
election, because that is the best means of getting rid of
UNTAC. 31
So strong was his appeal that, as the UNTAC plan appeared to
be unraveling, the ASEAN foreign ministers proposed that
Sihanouk form a coalition government before the elections with
all four factions, including the Khmer Rouge. 32 The idea was
rejected outright by Hun Sen and the SOC faction.
30Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer, "I Want To Retake Power,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 4 February 1993, p. 21.
31Nayan Chanda, "Sharp Words," Far Eastern Economic
Review , 4 February 1993, p. 23.
32Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer, "I Want to Retake Power,"
p. 20.
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C. IDEOLOGICALLY OPPOSED FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS
Any analysis of the Cambodian situation begs the question:
how could an electoral settlement be expected to succeed in a
zero-sum conflict where victory for one has meant extinction
for the other? History shows that electoral solutions are
extremely difficult in intrastate conflicts where the factions
are not only battling over control of the state, but over
ideological perceptions about the very nature of the state.
In such "polarized political cultures" compromise is defined
as betrayal of one's side. 33
Work by some analysts suggests that the decision by both
the regime and rebel leaders to seek a democratic "exit" from
a conflict is based upon rational cost/benefit calculations of
playing the competitive electoral game versus continuing the
armed conflict. 34 The very nature of intrastate conflicts,
that are neither separatist nor irredentist movements,
suggests that neither side can be expected to settle for
negotiated terms of an electoral competition if it anticipates
it can improve its position by continued warfare. Only
factions whose military power is reduced to insignificance
33Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics , Little & Brown, Boston, 1978, p. 28.
34Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Guerrillas and Elections: An
Institutionalist Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and
Competition," International Studies Quarterly , Vol. 36, No. 1,
March 1992, p. 121.
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(i.e. ,FUNCIPEC and KPNLF) will readily opt for a negotiated
settlement. A democratic solution is a distant second-best
solution for parties that retain military power strong enough
to win or at least effectively contest.
While the Khmer Rouge was the first party to reject the
demoblization process, the SOC also used military force to
increase its political standing. Within hours after the 31
January deadline for political party registration had passed,
the CPAF launched a series of attacks against Khmer Rouge
territory. This move was considered to be a political
maneuver more than an operation of military significance. The
January 1993 offensive by CPAF troops against Khmer Rouge
positions in Battambang province was seen more as a ploy to




The fact that both the Khmer Rouge and the SOC maintained
their coercive capabilities throughout the electoral process
had significant effects on the elections. According to legal
scholars, the international monitoring of elections to ensure
the implementation of a population's "participatory
entitlement" according to The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights requires that voting be not only secret and honest but
35Interview with LCOL Ed Waller, Phnom Penh, 4 May 1993,
also see: Nate Thayer and Nayan Chanda, "Shattered Peace,"
Far Easter Economic Review , 11 February 1993, p. 11.
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that campaigning be free of intimidation and repression. 36
Incidences of Khmer Rouge violence directed against both SOC
and UNTAC targets usually resulted in an increase in SOC
popularity. The more the Cambodian population perceived the
Khmer Rouge as a clear and present threat, the more they saw
the SOC as the only force standing between them and another
Khmer Rouge takeover. This feeling was exacerbated by general
misgivings of UNTAC 's peacekeeping job in Cambodia. Many
Cambodians were confused by UNTAC 's reluctance to actively
search out and engage the Khmer Rouge and felt that they could
only rely on the CPAF to protect them.
However, the leadership of the SOC government's party (the
Cambodian People's Party - CPP) also displayed a willingness
to use violence and political terror. In fact, while the
Khmer Rouge received much of the negative press regarding
coercive tactics prior to the 1993 elections, CPAF troops, as
an instrument of the CPP, were accused of responsibility for
a high percentage of the political violence. 37 This includes
assassinations of at least 50 opposition party candidates and
workers prior to the actual campaign period, intimidation of
36Thomas M. Franck, "Intervention Against Illegitimate
Regimes," Law and Force in the New International Order , Lori
Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer (eds.), Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 167.
37Philip Shenon, "Cambodia Factions Use Terror Tactics in
Crucial Election," The New York Times , 10 May 1993, p. Al.
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the population, and prevention of canvassing by opposition
parties. °
Additionally, while the Khmer Rouge was not on the ballot
per se, its military strength gave it the ability to deny the
election's, and thus the new government's, validity in any
area that it effectively controlled. Essentially, this meant
that it could have attempted to establish a separate de facto
state in approximately one quarter of the country. 39
Clearly, the Khmer Rouge would have benefitted most from
a clear FUNCIPEC victory. An outright FUNCIPEC victory might
have meant an invitation into the new government by Sihanouk,
and the opportunity to subvert the new government. Reports by
Chinese diplomats that Prince Sihanouk offered the Khmer Rouge
a role in the future government of Cambodia in return for a
promise not to disrupt the election. 40 Following these
reports, both the United States and France threatened to
withhold aid if the provisional Cambodian administration
included the Khmer Rouge in the new government. 41 In fact,
38
"Khmer Blues," The Economist , 20 February 1993, p. 36.
39Interview with LCOL Waller, 4 May 1993.
40
"Shock in Cambodia - Nobody Killed, The Economist . 29
May 1993, p. 39.
41Associated Press Wire Service, "Khmer Rouge 'Upping
the Ante'," Phnom Penh Post , 13-26 August 1993, p. 4.
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voters from Khmer Rouge held territory reported that Khmer
Rouge cadre had instructed them to vote for FUNCIPEC. 42
A clear CPP victory would have been the worst case
scenario for the Khmer Rouge because it would legitimize the
SOC Government in the eyes of external actors, thereby
providing them with access to military and economic aid. It
was unlikely that the SOC would have been willing to surrender
control of the military if it had lost the elections outright.
In fact, some western powers saw a clear CPP victory as the
best possible outcome because it would have ensured that the
militarily strongest faction would not negate the results. 43
An overwhelming FUNCIPEC victory could have also triggered a
potential coup by the CPAF. Prior to the elections it had
been rumored that a FUNCIPEC victory would only provide the
military leadership with an excuse for a coup to ostensibly
protect the Cambodian populous from an opportunistic Khmer
Rouge attack.
The fears of a possible rejection of results or a military
coup were grounded in some measure of truth. Following the
effective tie between FUNCIPEC and the CPP a faction within
42
"Khmer Rouge Puzzle: Softer Strategy," The New York
Times, 28 May 1993, p. A3.
43Interview with Mr. Mark Strella, Political Officer,
U.S. Mission to Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 27 April 1993.
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the SOC rejected the election results in certain provinces and
attempted to form a rump state in the eastern provinces. 44
While the newly formed Cambodian Armed Forces (CAF) was
subordinated to the provisional coalition government, it still
must contend with an insurgent force that it has not been able
to defeat for thirteen years even with a huge Vietnamese
presence. The CAF's attempts to finally defeat the Khmer
Rouge will take more than a massive influx of military aid.
Presently the CAF is not even a mediocre army by Third World
standards and is beset with the same nepotism and corruption
that is evident in the rest of the Cambodian bureaucracy.
The second best scenario for the Khmer Rouge was the
result: an nearly even split between FUNCIPEC and the CPP.
FUNCIPEC won 58 of the 120 seats in the national assembly,
while the CPP won 51 seats. 45 This result ensured a weak and
inherently unstable new provisional government that may yet be
unable to consolidate an effective government. Sihanouk, in
his typical mercurial fashion, used the instability of the
consitituent assembly to further his own power within the new
government. By playing both ends against one another Sihanouk
44Philip Shenon, "Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to




was able to have himself crowned King on the 24th of September
1993. 46
The newly elected assembly's primary task was to draft
a new constitution which was adopted on the 21st of September
1993 and ratified by Sihanouk at his coronation. However,
many observers of the constituent assembly's process remarked
that the United Nations had spent $2 billion "to bring back
the old forms of government." 47 While the Constitution states
that the King "reigns but does not rule," it grants Sihanouk,
among other things, the power to declare a state of emergency
if the prime minister and cabinet agree. 48 This requirement
may not present much of an obstacle considering that the Prime
Minister is his son, Prince Ranariddh.
The constitution is also weak on the protection of
minorities. Some of the rights in the constitution seem to
refer only to Cambodian citizens (ethnic Khmer) and not to all
of the residents of the country. 49 While free and fair
elections may be the sine qua non of a democratic process,
46
"Sihanouk Again Becomes King and Picks Government," The
New York Times , 25 September 1993, p. A3.
47John C. Brown, "NGOs Express concern over Draft
Constitution," Phnom Penh Post , 27 August - 9 September 1993,
p. 8.
48




democracy generally means "rule by the majority with respect
for the rights of minority." 50
Regardless of whether an external actor's ability to
institute a "comprehensive political solution" to a failing
state is within the realm of the possible, it should be
realized that the bottom line is that it is generally true
that successful electoral solutions to internal wars have only
occurred when the rebels were demobilized prior to the
elections. 51
D. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF VICTORY
In the end it appears that the United Nations and the
Khmer Rouge had the same theory of victory for UNTAC: namely
the appearance of a successful election and the prompt
withdrawal of the multinational force. For the ultra-
xenophophic Khmer Rouge the "infecting influence" of thousands
of foreigners on Cambodian soil was an ideological nightmare.
For the leadership of the United Nations, the successful
completion of the election was necessary to maintain the
momentum they had been gathering to implement a stronger U.N.




A central operational goal of any organization is
organizational health. 52 "Most organizations define the
central goal of 'health' in terms of growth in budget,
manpower, and territory." 53 The organizational growth of the
United Nations, like that of other organizations, is
determined by the leadership of the primary executive agents
and bureacracies within the organization. However, the
personality of the Secretary-General is perhaps more important
in determining the direction of the U.N. than that of the




The work of various Secretaries-General to increase the
power of the United Nations has resulted in the development of
broader operational goals. In implementing these goals, the
U.N. leadership has attempted to move the organization more in
the direction of a supra-national actor. For example, through
the development of the organization's preventive diplomacy
capability Secretary-General Dag Hammarskhold felt that the
organization had gained "a certain independent position, and
that this tendency has led to the acceptance of an independent
52Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis , Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview,
Illinois, 1971, p. 90.
53Allison, p. 93.
54Lee, von Pagenhardt, and Stanley, p. 27.
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Zealous proponents of a strengthened United Nations
military capability were happy with the selection of Boutros-
Ghali as the Secretary-General and categorized him as an
"activist" Secretary-General like Hammarskjold or Trygve
Lie. 56 Boutros-Ghali 's attempts to broaden the power of the
United Nations range from the queries to the Japanese Prime
Minister about changing the nature of UNTAC to an enforcement
mission (see Chapter IV; Mandates and Mission Slip) to his 29
November 1993 letter to the Security Council showing his
preference that the U.S. -commanded UNITAF mission be under
U.N. command and control. 57
In early 1993, with the United Nations' credibility
already suffering from its inabilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Somalia, the U.N. desperately needed a success in
Cambodia. According to one commentator:
In international politics, nothing succeeds like success.
Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement.
The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one
55Speech to the Students Association, Copenhagen, 2 May
1959, quoted in Leon Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General and
the Maintenance of Peace , Columbia University Press, New York
and London, 1967, p. 157.
56Lee, von Pagenhardt, and Stanley, p. 27.
57Makinda, p. 70.
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side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon
collects those on the sidelines. 5
As the date of the election approached, it was apparent that
UNTAC was on the verge of unraveling. Cambodia was becoming,
in the words of UNTAC 's Deputy Special Representative, "a
political hot potato." 59 If UNTAC was unable to declare the
vote "acceptable, " the Cambodian operation would be the U.N. 's
"most expensive and humiliating failure." 60 With other
operations ailing, UNTAC was the United Nations' chance to
gain momentum.
As outlined earlier in this chapter, the appearance of
success was not to be lost, even if the election was held in
only a portion of Cambodia. To most observers' suprise, the
Khmer Rouge did not disrupt the elections. However, UNTAC
still had to deal with possible spoilers to keep their success
intact. One week after the election Prince Sihanouk declared
that he would form a coalition government with the Cambodian
People's Party and FUNCIPEC. The creation of this government
would have been in violation of the 1991 peace treaty which
dictated that the new government was supposed to emerge out of
the deliberations of the National Assembly. The U.N.
58W. Scott Thompson, "The Communist International
System," Orbis, 20, No. 4, 1977, quoted in Stephen M. Walt,
The Origins of Alliances , p. 19.
59Interview with Behrooz Sadry.
60MacFarquhar, p. 46.
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leadership displayed their desire to salvage the appearance of
success, at the expense of the implementation of the Cambodian
electorate's resolution, by appearing willing to accept
Sihanouk's coalition government. 61 The United Nations'
apparent acquiescence to Sihanouk's whims showed that the
UNTAC political leadership did not want to snatch defeat from
the jaws of victory now that their biggest threat, the Khmer
Rouge, was apparently subdued.
While the Khmer Rouge appeared to be isolated and
vulnerable because of their reluctance to attack the political
process designed by UNTAC, the significance of their political
weight should not be dismissed now or in the future. The
Khmer Rouge's strongest political weapons remain viable:
ultra-nationalism (particularly anti-Vietnamese xenophobia),
secrecy and guile. Given the Cambodians' popular perception
that the Vietnamese are still intent on colonizing their
country, 62 the Khmer Rouge's nationalist appeal should not be
underestimated
.
Experts on the Khmer Rouge point out that in the past this
guerrilla organization has effectively used the tactic of
infiltrating agents into both allied and opposition parties.
61Philip Shenon, "Sihanouk Names a Government, Then
Withdraws in Family Feud," The New York Times , 4 June 1993, p.
Al.
62Rodney Tasker, "Uninvited Guest," Far Eastern Economic
Review , 26 August 1993, p. 13.
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According to these analysts, this tactic probably remains in
use today. 63 The presence of numerous Khmer Rouge agents
within the FUNCIPEC party would not be surprising since they
were allies for over a decade. In fact, according to
statements made by Pol Pot to a gathering of his cadre in
1988, the re-establishment of Sihanouk as the leader of the
Cambodian state is part of their strategy: "Let Sihanouk be
the president. He is only the peel of the orange, while we
are the fruit . . . although he and the outside world do not
fully comprehend this." 64 It should be remembered that the
Khmer Rouge came to power in the mid-1970s partly through co-
opting Sihanouk as their titular leader. This fact alone
could account for the Khmer Rouge allowing Cambodians from
their controlled territory, as well as their own soldiers, to
vote in the election with instructions to vote for FUNCIPEC.
However, there may be another reason for this action.
To many observers, the Khmer Rouge decision not to disrupt
the elections translated as the inability to do so. According
to the Chief of the U.S. Mission to Cambodia, Charles Twining,
the peaceful voting turnout proved that "the Khmer Rouge have
failed . . . This leaves the Khmer Rouge in the forest - and I
63Craig Etcheson, "Pol Pot and the Art of War," Phnom
Penh Post , 13-26 August 1993, p. 7.
64Peschoux, pp. 22-23.
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hope they like it there." 65 This statement ignores the fact
that for over a decade the Khmer Rouge has been using a
strategy of infiltrating cadre into villages for clandestine
political work66 and that according to the U.N. 's own
intelligence maps at the time of the election, the guerrilla
organization was "operating with varying degrees of impunity
in 25 percent of the country; and in another 25 percent of the
country they (were) operating freely by day and in control by
night." 67
The appearance of defeat is perhaps exactly the image that
the Khmer Rouge wished to present. Sun Tzu, a fourth century
B.C. Chinese general and author of the "longest existing and
most widely studied military classic in human history" 68 ( The
Art of War ) , wrote that, "All warfare is based on deception.
Therefore when capable, feign incapacity: when active,
inactivity." 69 The theory that the Khmer Rouge emerged from
the election in a better position to return to power than any
65Philip Shenon, "Defying Rebels, Voters Throng Cambodia
Polls," The New York Times , 24 May 1993, p. A4.
66Peschoux, pp 109-132.
67John Pilger, "The West's Lethal Illusion in Cambodia,"
New Statesman & Society , 9 July 1993, p. 14.
68Roger T. Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare , Ballantine
Books, New York, 1993, p. 3.
69Sun Tzu, The Art of War , Chapter 1:17 & 18, Translated
by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, Oxford &
London, 1963, p. 66.
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time since 1979 has been referred to as the "Sun Tzu
Thesis." 70
The military philosophy of Sun Tzu drew the attention of
contemporary strategists following the guerrilla campaigns of
Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minn. 71 The strategies of the Khmer
Rouge have been based on those of Mao's People's Liberation
Army, 72 and reflect more the style of Sun Tzu than Clausewitz.
Sun Tzu's theory of victory, recognized to be profoundly anti-
Clausewitzian, stresses using time rather than force to defeat
an enemy. 73
The only way for the Khmer Rouge to "defeat" their
greatest threat (namely, the international community's
attention focused on Cambodia during UNTAC's tenure) was to
use time rather than force. The presence of over twenty
thousand foreigners on Cambodian soil was an ideological
catastrophie for the xenophobic group that had attempted to
remove all traces of foreign influence from their society
during the late 1970s. Had the Khmer Rouge denied UNTAC its
70Etcheson, "Pol Pot and the Art of War," p. 7.
71John Keegan, A History of Warfare , Alfred A. Knopf
Publishers, New York, 1993, p. 202.
72David Chandler, Bother Number One: A Political




"victory" perhaps the U.N. leadership would have been prompted
to remain in Cambodia past their projected withdrawal date.
As in the past, the U.N. is reluctant to abandon an
operation that is unsuccessful, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon,
because the alternative appears worse. Because the elections
were completed in relative calm, both the Khmer Rouge and
UNTAC achieved their ironically common goal: the quickest
possible withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodian soil. In
the end, both UNTAC and the Khmer Rouge employed the same
tactics to achieve success: the willingness to trade
territory for time and the use of time rather than force to
achieve success. For the United Nations, UNTAC s success
meant the continued organizational growth of the "new era" of
peacekeeping. For the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC 's success meant that
the world's attention would again turn away from Cambodia.
196
VI . CONCLUSIONS
At the outset of this analysis I proposed that the new
type of peace-support mission being taken on by the United
Nations posed four broad questions: one, what are the
requirements for an external actor to broker solutions to
intrastate conflicts and form stable governments in failing
states? Two, is the U.N. capable of the decisive, effective
action required in these operations given its inherent
limitations as an organization of politically diverse member
states? Three, what are the principal difficulties in the use
of external military force to solve intrastate conflicts? And
finally, can the "successful" completion of a United Nations
peacekeeping operation ensure the future viability of the
state? This final chapter will highlight the answers to the
questions discussed in the four previous chapters.
A. THE NEW ERA OF PEACEKEEPING
One of the conflict trends of the emerging in the
aftermath of the Cold War, has been the disintegration of
sovereign states. Two of the largest U.N. peace-support
efforts (UNTAC in Cambodia and UNOSOM II in Somalia) have been
deployed to help states that had failed or were on the verge
of failing because of the effects of internal crises.
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For years, these severely atrophied states have had
sovereignty only in terms of legal statehood. Legal statehood
provided these states with the right of self-determination and
freedom from outside interference, but they did not possess
the capacity for effective government. Many of these
"pseudo" states continue to exist in the international system,
but lack real substance and power. The trend of catastrophic
deterioration following the Cold War has resulted in a group
of states that are incapable of sustaining themselves. In
fact, in some of these states the combination of war, disease
and crime have resulted in complete anarchy.
The existence of instant world-wide telecommunications and
"supranational" organizations such as the U.N. means that
social systems can no longer dissolve without the effects
being felt around the globe. The converging trends of these
failing states and the globalization of information have
prompted the United Nations to forsake its founding principle
of non-intervention in domestic affairs.
In extreme cases, the state ceases to function and
authority is fragmented among various collective actors
(collectivities) that effectively become miniature counter-
states. These collectivities may consist of failed previous
governments, nations, clans, tribes, various guerrilla
organizations, or any combination of these. This challenge to
the authority of the state and redirection of legitimacy
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toward these collectivities begins to erode state sovereignty.
In a failed state, the state can no longer assert authority.
At the same time, it is seldom the case that any one quasi
counter-state is able to gain a sufficient power base to fill
the vacuum.
The United Nations has attempted to fill the vacuum
created by the failing state in peace-support operations such
as UNTAC or UNOSOM II. The organization has moved into a new
mission area beyond the separation of belligerents and is
attempting to administer sovereign authority over the
territory of the state. In short, the United Nations is
attempting to assume the role of the state in many respects,
especially with respect to the state's excluseive authority to
use force.
In using peace-support operations to quell the violent
fragmentation of failing states, the United Nations has
developed a new class of mission which is inherently more
difficult than traditional peacekeeping. Additionally, this
new class of mission is qualitatively more difficult than the
challenge faced by a sovereign state fighting an insurgent
war. In order to be successful, the United Nations must
effectively assume the monopoly over the legitimate use of
force (at least temporarily), and it must do so while
remaining ostensibly neutral and denying itself some of the
tools available to a sovereign state.
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The dynamics of this new class of mission involve the
United Nations attempting to control or neutralize the
fragmented collectivities of society. In an insurgent
conflict the state targets the counter-state for destruction.
However, in a peace-support operation the U.N. will seek to
either weaken or bolster these collectivities' relationships
with society. This may take the form of active disarmament of
factions or reforming the law enforcement capabilities of the
government. In both Cambodia and Somalia the United Nations
has used the intervention of military forces to create
mechanisms for re-establishing state authority through interim
governments.
B. THE PROBLEMS OF COALITIONS
The United Nations, in its present form, will find it
difficult if not impossible to effectively prosecute the new
class of mission described in Chapter II. It is clear that
the United Nations does not act as a cohesive unit under the
best of circumstances. The key factor in the U.N. 's inability
to successfully execute these missions is that it does not
have the cohesive decision-making power of a sovereign actor.
The effectiveness of the United Nations, as an association
of independent, sovereign states depends upon the capacity of
its members to agree and cooperate. The organization's
effectiveness suffers to the degree that this capacity is
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limited. As the U.N. takes on more complex missions, moving
from conflict containment to conflict resolution, lack of
cohesion will no longer simply inhibit operations; it may
result in mission failure.
As the United Nations moves into this "new era, " the
surprisingly familiar realities of alliance politics and
coalition building are evident regardless of the operation.
Member states will still attempt to influence the outcome of
disputes to their advantage. If they have no agenda within
the dispute, they will tend to abstain or look for an
advantage in participation within a larger context, such as
credibility or power within the Security Council. With a few
notable exceptions, most states do not contribute to U.N.
missions without some "national interest" in the conflict.
Operations using multinational forces have always faced
problems of cohesion. Because of their very nature,
coalitions function with inconstant commitment from the
contributors. The problem of determining the degree of force
appropriate for an operation is compounded by the problem of
interpretation by different actors within a coalition.
Coalition partners bring particular national agendas to the
coalition which other members choose to tolerate. The fact
that the coalition happens to be under the umbrella of the
United Nations does not make this assertion less valid.
Although peacekeeping forces are under the command of the
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U.N. , it is well recognized that most national contingents
will clear orders with their national command authority before
acting. This is particularly true in operations involving
higher levels of violence.
Operating under a United Nations mandate provides a
certain legitimacy to the application of military force.
However, the multilateral nature of a U.N. operation imposes
"force dividers" that inhibit effective action. These force
dividers mean that any force operating under United Nations'
control cannot operate at the same efficiency of a unitary
actor.
These force dividers exist on three broad levels: the
strategic level of interaction between the contributing states
and the United Nations; the operational level of interaction
between the conflicting parties and the United Nations forces;
and the tactical level of interaction between the forces
themselves.
On the strategic level, deployments of military forces
under the mandate of the United Nations will always require
the leadership and funding of "linchpin" actors. Great power
support will always be necessary for the deployment of forces
because lesser powers, while often prepared to make a manpower
contribution, rarely have the ability to rapidly transport and
sustain them. Additionally, the contributions of "linchpin"
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states may be necessary to encourage the participation of
other troop contributors.
This category includes any state which is a permanent
member of the Security Council because of their possession of
veto power. Certain states may be considered linchpin actors
in one operation and not another if they have a vital regional
interest in containing or suppressing the conflict or if their
presence is necessary to hold the operation together.
It is not uncommon for "linchpin" actors to demand a
larger role in operations in order to protect their
investments of personnel, money, or prestige. This is
especially true when combat troops are involved, or if the
mission is considered particularly dangerous. Another major
drawback to "linchpin" actors, aside from their insistence on
exerting more control over an operation, is that while their
leadership is necessary in putting together U.N. operations,
their withdrawal or faltering leadership can bring about
critical weakening or even catastrophic failure of an
operation.
At the operational level, one of the key problems facing
multilateral operations is the varying relationships that the
different contributors develop with the belligerents. While
one of the overriding principles of U.N. operations is the
strict neutrality of forces, different national contingents
will often establish decidedly non-neutral relationships with
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the belligerents. As U.N. operations shift toward enforcement
missions this reality will have a compounded negative effect
on the force's ability to act cohesively. Furthermore, it
should be remembered that unilateral actions by any of the
participants can create animosity against the entire force.
The concept that participation in U.N. operations is not
to be soley dependent upon a contributing states' national
interest is one of the key foundations of the integrity of the
United Nations' collective security system. Conceptually,
becoming a member of the United Nations entails the decision
that a state's national interest lies in ensuring the efficacy
of the collective security system. However, U.N. operations
outside the traditional realm of peacekeeping are faced with
an unsolvable paradox. As the United Nations moves into
situations of higher levels of violence, only states with a
vested national interest in quelling the conflict will be
willing to participate because of the greater the expenditure
of resources. In fact, it has been displayed over numerous
examples that states may participate in a multinational peace-
support operation directly in the interest of their own
security, or as an expression of their power in the region.
In the case of weaker states with no apparent national agenda,
participation in U.N. operations may provide a means of
supplementing their military capability through materiel
acquisitions and experience at a price they can afford to pay.
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When asking states to commit troops to a field operation,
the United Nations attempts to attain a global political
balance of forces, regardless of capabilities. While the
highly trained and thoroughly equipped troops of the more
developed states may provide the most efficient forces for an
operation, constituting a force relying heavily on these
militaries is politically unworkable within the U.N. system.
This "force divider" means that a U.N. force will pay an
operational price of having to assign some of its less self-
sustaining contingent forces to areas where they are more
easily supported. Unfortunately, only the armies from the so
called "northern" states are able to deploy battalion-size
units with organic equipment to provide for their own survival
in the instances of rapid deployments into harsh operating
enviroments.
Regardless of the force mixture, combined operations will
always fall prey to tactical level problems in five areas:
doctrine, training, equipment/logistics, language and
culture/sensitivities. These problem areas remain constant in
all coalition forces, even in successful ones which have had
ample time to work out problems of interoperability. In the
ad hoc operations put together by the U.N. the problems may
seem insurmountable or the cause of catastrophic mission
failure.
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The problem of doctrine as it applies to United Nations
operations is twofold. First, there is the problem of "peace-
support" doctrine itself. Presently, there is no standardized
U.N. doctrine covering the wide range of new operations.
Second, since the U.N. does not have a common doctrine, the
various areas of any U.N. force will reflect the doctrine of
the national contingent posted there. This presents a minimal
problem in traditional peacekeeping where each contingent
simply has a set "buffer" area to control. However, in these
new missions the differences in doctrine can be dangerous and
even disastrous. When the different contingents are required
to provide combat support to one another, doctrinal
differences will become glaring. This is especially true of
operations with a strong civil-military mission.
The gap in training, and therefore operational
proficiency, between the various contingents in a combined
operation is due to many factors: reliance on large number of
short-term conscripts versus a professional force; vastly
different officer and noncommissioned officer development
programs; lower technical skills and educational level of the
enlisted personnel; resource limitations and degree of
emphasis placed on field training. Logic dictates that the
tactical proficiency of the various contingents, along with
equipment and logistics requirements, should be the primary
considerations when assigning tasks and operational areas.
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However, since maintaining a "global balance" is a requirement
of the United Nations and political considerations often
determine the placement of units, training and operational
proficiency are usually secondary considerations.
The capability gap will be especially wide in a force that
mixes armed forces from highly developed states with those
from developing states. In some types of operations it may be
possible to bring the more poorly trained units up to
standard. However, most U.N. operations are deployed in
response to an immediate crisis and time and resource
constraints will rarely permit a preliminary training period.
The only feasible short-term option is to recognize the
capability gaps within a combined force and plan accordingly.
The need to overcome political considerations in determining
the placement of contingents is especially acute in operations
in environments of intense violence or harsh enviromental
conditions.
Developing a functioning logistics system to support a
large force in the field is one of the most demanding problems
that combined operations face. The problem appears so
unmanageable that the basic NATO policy for the last four
decades has been to make logistics purely a national
responsibility. Obviously this is an impossible option when
planning a U.N. operation. Because of the widely varying
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resources of the troop contributing states, contingents will
have to rely on a unified logistics system.
Significant among the problems of the U.N. logistics
system is the lack of understanding by permanent U.N.
civilians of what is required to conduct large military
operations. Key decisions are often made by default and
operational considerations are usually secondary. The cost of
having under-equipped contingents as part of a force in
violent situations may be the loss of life; among both
peacekeepers and the population they are there to assist.
The problems of coalition building and maintenance
outlined in Chapter II would seem to call for the existence of
a standing United Nations force which answers to no other
operational commander than the Security Council. The
formation of peace-enforcement units or rapid deployment
forces made available to the U.N. by major powers on short
notice would still face the problem of independent control by
the contributing states. Only a force whose units are not
tied to a sovereign state operationally or logistically would
be truly under the control of the United Nations.
Any force not constrained by the factors of national
allegiance would be, in effect, a mercenary force. Any
standing U.N force would have to be formed from individuals
willing to renounce allegiance to their home country and
profess sole allegiance to the United Nations. While it can
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be posited that certain individuals would enlist in this force
because of Utopian goals, the reality is that mercenary
soldiers usually claim allegiance to only one thing: money.
Additionally, an independent force controlled by an
organization of states with widely varying goals and views
could still only be effective in a narrow set of
circumstances. Evidence has shown that alliances for
enforcement type actions tend to be temporary because
objectives originate from interests more than common beliefs
or ideologies.
In fact, development of a U.N. army could sow the
seeds of destruction of the organization. Imbalances in the
distribution of international power, perceived or otherwise,
will always cause new alliance formations. A United Nations
with its own army would begin to take on the characteristics
of an autonomous actor, and thus a possible threat, to other
actors too weak to counter it. It is possible to imagine the
formation of anti-U.N. blocs within the international system.
C. PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION
The problems encountered in these new U.N. operations
resemble the difficulties that an occupying army faces
following the defeat of another country. The large expansion
in the scope of U.N. mandates will highlight the substantial
problems of intervention in the internal conflicts of a state.
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The three areas of consideration that are most important
in these types of operations are: one, mission slip that is
inevitable when the requirements for these missions is
combined with the U.N. modus operandi; two, the obstacles that
are faced in the process of establishing authority over large
areas with minimal military force and the possible absence of
the population's support; and three, the problems of
effectively using force against belligerents that do not
recognize the moral authority of the United Nations.
The mandates of all U.N. missions are, by necessity, vague
in order to fulfill all of the constraints placed upon it by
various powers. This means that all mandates are open to wide
interpretation by the Secretary-General, his Special
Representative or any of the various contributing contingents.
This fact combined with the dynamic characteristic of
intrastate conflicts will inevitably lead to "mission slip" in
this new class of operations.
The concept that the United Nations can establish
effective authority over the essential functions of a state,
more than any other criteria, establishes a radical departure
in the scope of U.N. operations. However, the United Nations
has not historically displayed the ability to establish the
authority necessary to accomplish the mandates required in
these types of operations. Generally, the U.N. cannot even
establish basic authority over its own operations. Because of
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its low coercive potential, the U.N. has been unable to
establish effective control over its areas of operation
without the continued acquiescence of all belligerent parties.
Acceptance by all belligerents of a U.N. force has been
one of the traditional prerequisites for its approval and
deployment. However, where the United Nations assumes the
mandate to intervene in situations where the consent of the
belligerents is waivering or non-existent, U.N. military
forces will be forced to rely less on moral suasion and
neutrality than on coercive ability.
Two of the primary concerns in the administration of a
failing state by an external force are the preservation of the
sovereign rights of the government (or in the case of state
disintegration, the local variation of contenders for
authority), and the protection of the local population from
exploitation by both the the belligerent parties and the
United Nations force. Maintenance of public order is an
unquestionable requirement of these expanded mandates.
Implicit in the disarmament of a state's capability to protect
public order is the requirement not to allow the situation to
revert to banditry.
While the United Nations' responsibilities, as the
"authority" in failing states, to maintain public order may be
negated by the refusal of belligerent forces to disarm, the
inability of the U.N. force to protect the local populace from
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political violence or simple banditry will be a significant
reason for diminished popular backing.
As stated previously, a U.N. force must also meet the
requirement for protecting the local population from
exploitation by its own soldiers. Criminal acts by any member
of a U.N. force denegrates the ability of the force as a whole
to maintain the support of the local population and thus
undermines the force's legitimacy. However, the United
Nations has no judicial mechanism for controlling the actions
of soldiers placed under its mandate. Obviously, the United
Nations is venturing into relatively unchartered legal
territory by deploying large multinational military forces
amongst civilian populations with uncertain mandates for
action and no "status of forces" agreements. While United
Nations has created task forces in the past to investigate
alleged illegal activities by soldiers in a U.N. force, the
requirement for disciplining criminal acts is left to the
contributing states.
In this new class of operation the United Nations has
attempted to assume the state-like monopoly of the use of
legitimate force. The act of establishing control over the
monopoly of force requires the coopertion of each of the
belligerents, who must be willing to disarm. If this
cooperation is not forthcomin, the U.N. has two options: it
can choose to use force to accomplish its goals, disarming the
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recalcitrant parties by force, or it can choose to abstain
from the use of force an attempt to proceed politically in an
unstable military environment. While this choice may seem
simple on the surface, it is possibly the most crucial
question that must be considered in this new generation of
U.N. missions.
One of the problems of allowing United Nations forces to
abandon the principle of using force only for self-defense is
the possiblity of the use of excessive force. Some
contingents come from armed forces which have been used to
quell civil unrest in their home countries with varying
degrees of use of force and respect for human rights. The
policy of using force only in self-defense has so far served
the U.N. well because it represents the lowest common
denominator. As mandates are expanded to include the use of
force to protect the mission, the rules of engagement can be
expected to be subject to interpretation according to each of
the contingents' doctrine and experience.
In the evaluation of current operations the question of
the use of force usually revolves around whether or not the
U.N. should use force. Perhaps it is more appropriate to
first question whether U.N. forces can use force effectively.
The inability to use force effectively or discriminately may
lead to the withdrawal of the necessary popular support. In
U.N. operations that are responsible for maintenance of public
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order, the use of force by one or more of the belligerents
without an effective response by the U.N. will result in a
loss of credibility. History has been shown that an insurgent
can use violence to persuade important sectors of the
population to switch allegiance from government to challenger
by demonstrating the state's inability to maintain order and
by compelling it to resort to indiscriminate uses of force
that often lead to further withdrawal of popular support.
One of the key unresolved issues in this new class of
mission is the extent to which the United Nations is capable
of effectively dealing with non-state belligerents. As a
rule, non-state actors will be swayed less by the moral
authority of the United Nations - an international body in
which they do not have membership. Thus they are less likely
to consent to U.N. operations that may decrease their power.
In order to be effective the United Nations may have to
intervene against the wishes of whatever authorities claim to
be in control. The principle of the non-use of force is
closely tied to the requirement of consent by the
belligerents. By forsaking the basic peacekeeping principles
of strict neutrality and the non-use of force the United
Nations is venturing into territory that is outside its
traditional strengths. Furthermore, the use of force in these
new U.N. missions will still have limited effectiveness
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because the objective is to neutralize, not defeat, the
belligerents.
Even if a United Nations operation does not have a mandate
to use force, deployment of a force without continued consent
may well cause one or more of the belligerents to perceive the
force as a threat. Attempting to maintain law and order in an
effective power vacuum will inevitably influence the local
political balance of power. The mere existence of a large
U.N. Force will affect the political situation, if only by
changing the context within which the struggle for power takes
place. In these circumstances every action, or inaction,
taken by a U.N. force can have a potential effect on one or
more of the belligerents and the balance of power between
them.
The unstated hope of United Nations operations with
enforcement mandates is that somehow the organization will be
able to resolve the inherent conflict over the need to
maintain a neutral posture and the right to the use of force.
Realistically, the amount of force used will inversely affect
the perceived neutrality of the force. Additionally, an ever
present danger is that the use of excessive force, real or
perceived, will cause a "destabilizing event" which causes the
eventual failure of the operation.
In the final analysis, the United Nations security
apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-suited to deal with
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situations as intractable as Cambodia or Somalia. The
organization's inherent limitation as an collection of
politically diverse members inhibits the effective execution
of large military operations.
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ANKI National Army of Independent Kampuchea ( formerly
the Sihanouk National Army [ANS]; renamed in April
1990)
.
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations; members are
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Brunei.
BLDP Buddihist Liberal Democratic Party (formed by Son
Sann's followers within the KPNLF faction).
CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea;
former tripartite resistance group composed of
FUNCIPEC, KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge; changed name









Cambodian People's Party (ruling party of the State
of Cambodia faction; formerly the Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP]; renamed in
October 1991)
.
National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful,
Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia; strongest of two
non-communist resistance factions; formed by Prince
Sihanouk; now headed by his son.
Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces.
Khmer People's National Liberation Front; weakest
of two primary non-communist resistance factions.
Khmer Rouge (informal term for Pol Pot's Democratic
Kampuchea [DK]).
Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Sinai:
deployed following the Camp David Accords
Non-United Nations Force deployed to Beruit in
1983.
NADK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (military arm















National Government of Cambodia; see CGDK.
French accronym for the United Nations Operation in
the Congo now Zaire; deployed from 1960 to 1964.
Party of Democratic Kampuchea, proper name for the
Khmer Rouge as a political party
State of Cambodia; Phnom Penh regime founded by Hun
Sen and Vietnamese government; (formerly the
People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], renamed in
April 1989).
Supreme National Council; largely symbolic ruling
body formed by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords;
composed of members from the four main factions in
Cambodia; chaired by Prince Sihanouk.
U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia
U.N. Disengagement and Observer Force; deployed on
the Golan Heights since the end of the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War.
U.N. Force in Cyprus; deployed since 1963.
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon; deployed since 1978.
United Task Force; U . S . -commanded force deployed to
Somalia in December 1992; relieved by UNOSOM II.
U.N. Operation in Somalia; original United Nations
force deployed to Somalia in 1992.
UNOSOM II Significantly larger U.N. Operation in Somalia;
relieved UNITAF in May 1993.
UNPROFOR U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia;
originally deployed to Croatia and Slovenia in
January 1992; later expanded to include the
delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNTAC U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO U.N. Truce Supervision Organization; the original
U.N. observer mission; deployed in Israel and the




Richard H. Appleton, Analyst for Southeast Asia, United States
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence & Research.
Mohd Aris, COL, Malaysian Army, UNTAC Chief Of Operations.
Gilles Briere, MAJ, Canadian Army, UNTAC Logistics
Coordination Cell.
LCOL Deheul, French Air Force, UNTAC Chief Air Operations
Officer.
William J. Durch, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson
Center, Senior Editor, The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping .
Mary Fisk, Assistant to the U.N. Special Representative in
Cambodia, UNTAC.
Damien Healy, LCOL, Royal Australian Army, UNTAC Mixed
Military Working Group.
LT. S. Hines, Royal Canadian Navy, Information Officer, UNTAC
Naval Component.
COL. Huijssoon, Dutch Army, UNTAC Chief Plans Officer.
Stephen T. Johnson, Analyst for Indochina, United States
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence & Research.
Thomas Kearney, COL, USAF, Military Adivsor to the Ambassador,
U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
J.W. Kinzer, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of
Staff - Office of the Department of the Army Operations
Center.
COL. Mamczur, Polish Army, UNTAC Chief Logistics Officer.
CAPT. Mazur, Malaysian Battalion Information Officer, UNTAC.
CAPT. Musmano, Urguayan Navy, UNTAC Naval Component Commander.
219
Richard Rice, LTC, U.S. Army, Southeast Asia Desk, Department
of the Army, Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Intelligence Estimates Division.
Mr. Behrooz Sadry, UNTAC Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
Mr. Mark Strella, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to Cambodia.
Robert Thomas, CAPT, USAF, Airlift Coordinator, Office of the
Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, United Nations.
David Wallace, Advisor to the Ambassador for Asian Affairs,
U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
Edward Waller, LCOL, U.S. Army, UNTAC Chief Information
Officer.
Mat Yusuf , LTC, Malaysian Army, UNTAC Desk Officer, Office of
the Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the
United Nations.
BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
Georges Abi-Saab, International Crisis and the Role of Law:
The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964 , Oxford
University Press, Oxford and London, 1978.
Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee and Sorpng Peou, Cambodia - The
1989 Paris Peace Conference; Background Analysis and
Documents , Centre for International and Strategic Studies,
Kraus International Publications, Millwood, New York, 1991.
David A. Ablin & Marlowe Hood, ed., The Cambodian Agony , M.E.
Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, New York, 1987.
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis , Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview,
Illinois, 1971.
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics ,
Little & Brown, Boston, 1978.
Roger T. Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare , Ballantine Books,
New York, 1993.
220
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army; The IRA 1916-1979 , Poolbeg
Press, Ltd., Dublin, Ireland, 1990.
Norman Bentwich & Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter
of The United Nations , Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London,
1951.
Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation ,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993.
Sissela Bok, A Strategy For Peace: Human Values and the
Threat of War , Pantheon Books, New York, 1989.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping , United Nations, New
York, 1992.
Frederick Z. Brown, Second Chance: The United States and
Indochina in the 1990s , Council on Foreign Relations Press,
New York, 1989.
Janusz Bugajski, Fourth World Conflicts: Communism and Rural
Societies , Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.
Kevin Cahill (ed.), A Framework For Survival: Health, Human
Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and
Disasters , Council on Foreign Relations Books, Washington
D.C., 1993.
Cambodia: A Country Study , U.S. Government Printing Office,
1990.
Gerard Chaliand (ed.), Gurrella Strategies: An Historical
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan , University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1982.
David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography
of Pol Pot , Westview Press, Boulder, 1992.
. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War
and Revolution since 1945 , Yale University Press, New Haven,
1991.
Stephen J. Cimbala & Sidney R. Waldman, ed. , Controlling and
Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After The Cold War ,
Greenwood Press, New York, 1992.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(eds. ) Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1976.
221
Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force And Statecraft;
Diplomatic Problems of Our Time , Oxford University Press, New
York, 1990.
William J. Durch, The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping: Case
Studies and Comparative Analysis , St. Martin's Press, New
York, 1993.
James Eggert, Invitation to Economics , Mayfield Publishing,
Mountain View, CA, 1991.
John H. Esterline and Mae H. Esterline, "How The Dominoes
Fell" Southeast Asia in Perspective , University Press of
America, Lanham, Maryland, 1990.
Ricard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, The
United Nations and a Just World Order , Westview Press,
Boulder, 1991.
Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The State,
Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations
Theory , Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1989.
Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and
Statecraft for the Next Century , Simon & Schuster, 1990.
Frank Gregory, The Multinational Force - Aid or Obstacle to
Conflict Resolution , Institute For the Study of Conflict,
London, 1984.
Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power ,
Conrell University Press, Ithaca and New York, 1955.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Collier
MacMillan Publishers, London, 1962.
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis , Prentice-Hall Press, Englewood, New Jersey, 1967.
Ole R. Holsti, P. Errence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity
and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative
Studies , John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1973.
Arthur H. House, The U.N, in The Congo: The Political and
Civilian Efforts , University Press Of America, Washington
D.C., 1978.
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies , Yale
University Press, New Haven and London, 1968.
222
.
The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late
Twentieth Century , University of Oklahoma Press, Norman &
London, 1991.
Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End . Columbia University
Press, New York, 1991.
Karl D. Jackson (ed.) Cambodia: 1975-1978 - Rendezvous with
Death , Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
1989.
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International
Relations Theory, and The Third World , Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1990.
Alan James, Interminable Interim: The U.N. Force in Lebanon ,
the Centre for Security and Conflict Study, London, 1988.
Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change , Stanford University
Press, Stanford, 1982.
John Keegan, A History of Warfare , Alfred A. Knopf Publishers,
New York, 1993.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Legitimacy and Force: Volume One,
Political and Moral Dimensions , Transaction Books, New
Brunswick and Oxford, 1988.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval , Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1982.
Joseph M. Kitagawa (ed.), Religious Traditions of Asia ,
MacMillan Publishing Co., New York, 1989.
Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam , The Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1986.
John M. Lee, Robert von Pagnehardt and Timothy W. Stanley, To
Unite Our Streath , University Press of America, New York and
London, 1992.
Ernest Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo
Operation , The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1967.
Michael Leifer, Cambodian Conflict - The Final Phase? , The
centre for Security and Conflict Studies, London, 1989.
223
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority:
An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts , The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, 1970.
Roy Licklider, "How Civil Wars End: Preliminary Results from
a Comparative Project," An International Law of Guerrilla
Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making , St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1984.
Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown & Reequilibration , The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore & London, 1978.
F.T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of
Force , Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1992.
Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian
Intervention In Somalia , Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and
London, 1993.
Lois B. McHough, United Nations Operations in Cambodia , CRS
Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, 25 January 1993.
Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of
Obedience and Revolt , M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 1978.
Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era ,
Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.
Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma? , Institute for the
Study of Conflict, London, 1986.
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter & Laurence
Whitehead (eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspectives , The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore & London, 1986.
Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development: An
Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas , F.E.
Peacock Publishers, Inc., Itasca, Illinois, 1989.
Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the
History of Military Power , Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1992.
Stephen C. Pelletiere, Humanitarian Operations and The Middle
East: The Hostility Factor , Strategic Studies Institute,
Carlisle, PA, May 1993.
224
Christophe Peschoux, The "New" Khmer Rouge: Reconstruction of
the Movement and Reconquest of the Villages (1979-1990) .
Paris, 1992.
Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a
Bargaining Process , Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1983.
James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World ,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1992.
Steven Schlossstein, Asia's New Little Dragons , Contemporary
Books, Chicago, 1991.
Andrew M. Scott, The Fuctioning of the International System ,
MacMillan Co., New York, 1967.
Ariel Sharon and David Chanoff, Warrior, An Autobiography ,
Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1989.
Anthony Stevens, The Roots of War: A Jungian Perspective ,
Paragon House, New York, 1989.
Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the
Falklands/Malvinas War , Brassey's Inc., Washington, D.C.,
1991.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War . Samuel B. Griffith (trans.), Oxford
University Press, Oxford & London, 1963.
Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War , W.W. Norton & Co.,
New York and London, 1987.
Martin Van Creveld, Transforming War , The Free Press, New
York, 1991.
Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society ,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, 1986.
Carl von Horn, Soldering for Pe^ce , David McKay Company, Inc.,
New York, 1967.
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances , Cornell University
Press, Ithaca and London, 1987.
Max Weber, Essays in Sociology . H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(trans.), New York, 1958.
225
Ronald J. Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal
Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland , University
of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford, 1990.
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Agreements On A Comprehensive Political Settlement Of The
Cambodia Conflict . Paris 23 October 1993.
Cambodia: Conservatives Gain Influence in Kampuchean People 's
Revolutionary Pary Politburo , Analysis Report by the Roreign
Broadcast Information Service, January 3, 1991.
Field Manual 100-1, The Army , Department of the Army,
Washington D.C., 1981.
Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in the Congo , U.N. Document S/4482, 07 September
1960.
Guide to Key Players in Cambodia, A Reference Aid, The
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, May
1992.
Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP (Joint Tactics Techniques and
Procedures) for Peacekeeping Operations , November 1991.
The Paris Conference on Cambodia: Implications for U.S.
Policy , Hearing Before the Subcommitte on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, September 14, 1989.
Recent Developments in Cambodia , Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 10,
1990.
Report of The Secretary-General on Cambodia , 16 February 1992,
Security Council Document S/23613.
Report of The Secretary-General on Somalia . 19 December 1992,
Security Council Document S/23613.
Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia , United Nations
Document No. S/24578, 21 September 1992.
226
United Nations Document A/3943 , 9 October 1958.
United Nations Document S/4451 , 21 August 1960.
United Nations Document S/24992 , 19 December 1992.
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Fact
Sheet , United Nations Department of Public Information, May
1992.
United States Policy Toward Cambodia: Prospects for a
Negotiated Settlement , Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 12, 1990.
U.S. Army , German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans
( 1941-1944) , Department of the Army.
JOURNAL ARTICLES
Frederick Z. Brown, "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace,"
Asian Survey , Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/93.
Nayan Chanda, "Civil War In Cambodia?," Foreign Policy , Number
76, Fall 1989.
Dr. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, "Threats to Southeast Asia: A Thai
Perspective," Pacific Regional Security. The 1985 Pacific
Symposium , National Defense University Press, Washington D.C.,
1988.
Ronald J. Cima, "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the Post-
Cambodia Period," Asian Survey , Vol. XXX, No. 1, January 1990.
Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, Indonesia, ASEAN and the Pacific
Basin," Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin, The 1988
Pacific Symposium , National Defense Univerisity Press,
Washington D.C., 1990.
Reinhard Drifte, "Japan's Security Policy and Southeast Asia,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia , Vol. 12, No. 3.
227
Craig Etcheson, "The 'Peace' in Cambodia," Current History ,
Vol. 91, No. 569, December 1992.
Waldo D. Freeman, Randall J. Hess and Manuel Faria, "The
Challenges of Combined Operations," Military Review , November
1992.
Frank Frost, "The Cambodia Conflict: The Path Towards Peace,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia , Vol. 13, No. 2, September 1991.
Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States,"
Foreign Policy , No. 89, Winter 1992-93.
Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former
Yugoslavia," Journal of International Affairs , July 1993.
Steven J. Hood, "Beijing's Cambodia Gamble and The Prospects
For Peace In Indochina: The Khmer Rouge or Sihanouk," Asian
Survey , Vol. XXX, No. 10, October 1990.
Dr. Kanala Khantaprab, "Regional Security: The Stategic
Thinking Of Thai Military Leaders," Cooperative Security in
the Pacific Basin, The 1988 Pacific Symposium , National
Defense Univerisity Press, Washington D.C., 1990.
Ernest W. Lefever, "Reining in the U.N.," Foreign Affairs ,
Summer 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3.
Edward C. Luck, "Making Peace," Foreign Policy , No. 89, Winter
1992-93.
Charles McGregor, "China, Vietnam, And The Cambodian Conflict:
Beijing's End Game Strategy," Asian Survey , Vol. XXX, No. 3,
March 1990.
Ronald K. McMullen and Augustus Richard Norton, "Somalia and
Other Adventures for the 1990s," Current History , April 1993.
Robert B. Oxnam, "Asia/Pacific Challenges," Foreign Affairs .
Vol. 72, No. 1, America and the World 1992-93.
Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in
Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in
Communist Political Systems," The American Political Science
Review , Vol. 76, 1982.
Robert S. Ross, "China And The Cambodian Peace Process: The
Value of Coercive Diplomacy," Asain Survey , Vol. XXXI, No. 12,
December 1991.
228
John Geraaard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void," Foreign
Affairs , November/December 1993, Vol. 72, No. 5.
Gerald Segal, "Confrontation Between China and Japan?: World
Policy Journal , Summer 1993, Vol. X, No. 2.
Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World
Order," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991.
Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Guerrillas and Elections: An
Institutionalist Perspective on the Costs of Conflict and
Competition," International Studies Quarterly , Vol 36,
December 1992.
Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and The International Community,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 69, No. 2, Spring 1990.
Lewis M. Stern, "Cambodia: Diplomacy Falters," Current
History , Vol. 89, No. 545, March 1990.
Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" Foreign
Policy , Summer 1993.
Lau Teik Soon, "Threats To The Southeast Asian Region,"
Pacific Regional Security, The 1985 Pacific Symposium ,
National Defense Univerisity Press, Washington D.C., 1988.
Nate Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," The
Washington Quarterly , Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1991.
Trisha Thomas, "Into the Unknown: Can the United Nations
Bring Peace to Cambodia?," Journal of International Affairs ,
Vol. 44, No. 2, Winter 1991.
Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and
War," Military Review , April 1992.
Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive
Peace," Asian Survey , Vol. XXXI, No. 1, January 1991.
Dr. Sarasin Viraphol, "Pacific Security and Cooperation: A
Thai View," Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin. The
1988 Pacific Symposium , National Defense Univerisity Press,
Washington D.C., 1990.
Sasaki Yoshitaka, "Japan's Undue International Contribution,
Japan Quarterly , July-September 1993.
229
PERIODICAL ARTICLES
Kevin Barrington, "Getting the Secret (Ballot) Out," Phnom Penh
Post , 09-22 April 1993.
."K.R. Slay Bulgarian Hosts of Peace Dinner," Phnom
Penh Post , 09-22 April 1993.
. "Massacre Condemned But...," Phnom Penh Post , 26
March - 08 April 1993.
. "Objections Raised to UNTAC Prosecution," Phnom
Penh Post . 12 - 25 March 1993.
. "Pay Dispute Undermines UNTAC Morale," Phnom Penh
Post . 12-25 March 1993.
. "Tragedy Throws Polls into Question," Phnom Penh
Post , 23 April-06 May 1993.
John Barry, "The Making of a Fiasco," Newsweek , 18 October
1993.
Yosef Bodansky, "Muslim Forces Plan Major Offensives After a
Peace Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Defense & Foreign Affairs
Strategic Policy , 31 July 1993.
John C. Brown, "NGOs Express Concern Over Draft Constitution,"
Phnom Penh Post , 27 August - 09 September 1993.
. "U.N. Comes Through With Budget Aid," Phnom Penh
Post , 30 July - 12 August 1993.
"Cambodia: Paper Hopes," The Economist , 25 September 1993.
Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer, "I Want to Retake Power," Far
Eastern Economic Review , 04 February 1993.
Nayan Chanda, "Sharp Words," Far Eastern Economic Review , 04
February 1993.
George Church, "Anatomy of a Disaster," Time , 18 October 1993.
Eliot A. Cohen, "A Nasty Little War," National Review , 01
November 1993.
Alan Cowell, "Italy, In U.N. Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia
Troops," The New York Times , 16 July 1993.
230
Catharine Delpino, "Khmer Rouge Riches," the Christian Science
Monitor , 26 March 1991.
Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush to 'Move Fast' on Mideast
Peace," The Washington Post , 2 March 1993.
Michael Duffy, J.F.O. McAllister and Bruce van Voorst,
"Anatomy of a Disaster," Time , 18 October 1993.
Tom Dunkel, "In The Fight To Keep Peace," Insight On The News ,
3 January 1993.
Craig Etcheson, "Pol Pot and the Art of War," Phnom Penh Post ,
13 - 26 August 1993.
Michael Elliot, "High Hurdles and Low Moans," Newsweek , 11
October 1993.
Peter Eng, "Highway Robbery Replaces Warfare as Biggest
Security Threat," Phnom Penh Post , 07 August 1992.
"France to Provide Aid for Military," Phnom Penh Post , 16-29
July 1993.
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. and Russia Sign Peacekeeper Training
Pact," The New York Times , 09 September 1993.
J.C. Grey, "Peacekeeping: The Australian Army View," Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter , June-July 1993.
Michael Hayes, "New Unified Government Army Assaults Khmer
Rouge," Phnom Penh Post , 27 August - 09 September 1993.
. "Panariddh Kicks off Campaign," Phnom Penh Post ,
23 April - 06 May 1993.
Sonya Hepinstall, "Cambodian Economy Hurt by Fleeing
Vietnamese," Bangkok Post , 7 May 1993.
Murray Hieber, Nate Thayer, and Nayab Chanda, "French
Dressing, Far Eastern Economic Review , 25 February 1993.
Steven A. Holmes, "Clinton May Let U.S. Troops Serve Under
U.N. Chiefs," the New York Times , 18 August 1993.
Herschel Hurst, "Training for the Task," Asia-Pacific Defence
Reporter , June-July 1993.
231
"Japan Donates $4 Million," Phnom Penh Post . 13-26 August
1993.
"Japan: No Council Bid," Far Eastern Economic Review , 14
October 1993.
Ian Kemp, "Peacekeeping: Between the Battle Lines," Jane '
s
Defense Weekly , 13 March 1993.
.
"'9 to 5' U.N. Criticized," Jane's Defense
Weekly , 13 March 1993.
"Khmer Blues," The Economist , 20 February 1993.
"Khmer Rouge Puzzle: Softer Strategy," The New York Times . 28
May 1993.
"Khmer Rouge 'Upping the Ante'," Phnom Penh Post , 13 - 26
August 1993.
John Kreiger, "Behind the Khmer Rouge Lines: 'We'll Kill
Anyone Who Tries To Stop Us'," U.S. News & World Report , 24
May 1993.
Nicholas D. Kristof , "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making
Some Neighbors Nervous, Filling a Perceived Power Gap in
Southeast Asia," The New York Times , 11 January 1993.
Paul Lewis, "U.N. Sides Say Use of Force Will Endanger Bosnian
Relief," The New York Times , 21 April 1993.
. "U.N. Gives Timetable for Somalia Democracy," The
New York Times , 17 September 1993.
Donatella Lorch, "20 Somalis Die When Peacekeepers Fire at
Crowd," The New York Times , 15 June 1993.
.
"U.N. Moves Troops to Somali City And Vows
Punishment for Attacks," The New York Times , 8 June 1993.
Emily MacFarquhar, "The U.N. 's Other Quagmire," U.S. News &
World Report , 24 May 1993.
"Marine Is Guilty in Shooting of Two Somalis," AP Wire
Service, New York Times , 07 April 1993.
Marguerite Michaels, "Blue-Helmet Blues," Time , 15 November
1993.
232
"Miyazawa Wary of Proposed U.N. Force," Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, East Asia Report , 19 February 1993.
Ker Munthit, "Cambodia Chooses Francophne Path," Phnom Penh
Post , 13-26 August 1993.
. "Thousands Flee Government Offensive," Phnom Penh
Post , 22 October - 04 November 1993.
"A New Model United Nations," The Economist . 26 September
1992.
Katrina Peach, "UNMOs Powerless to Protect Ethnic Vietnamese,"
Phnom Penh Post , 26 March - 08 April 1993.
"Phnom Penh, Eye on West, Tries to Shed Image as Hanoi Puppet,
The New York Times , 08 January 1990.
John Pilger, "The West's Lethal Illusion in Cambodia," New
Statesman & Society , 09 July 1993.
Jonathan Power, "Cambodia Is a Test for the U.N. in Bosnia,"
Los Angeles Times , 14 May 1993.
David E. Sanger, "Seeking Stature, Japan Steps in Cambodia
Bind," The New York Times , 13 May 1993.
Diana Jean Schemo, "Worry in Gunless Somalia Aid Offices," The
New York Times , 01 March 1993.
Philip Shenon, "Cambodia Factions Use Terror Tactics in
Crucial Election," The New York Times , 10 May 1993.
. "Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to Prepare to Fight
Over Secession," The New York Times , 14 June 1993.
. "Defying Rebels, Voters Throng Cambodia Polls,"
The New York Times , 24 May 1993.
.
"Sihanouk Names a Government, The Withdraws in a
Family Feud," The New York Times , 04 June 1993.
"Shock in Cambodia - Nobody Killed," The Economist , 29 May
1993.
"Sihanouk Again Becomes King and Picks Government," The New
York Times , 25 September 1993.
233
"Somalia: The Right To Bear Arms," The Economist , 19 December
1992.
"Step Out Japan," The Economist , 17 July 1993.
Eric Stover and Dan Charles, "The Killing Minefields of
Cambodia," New Scientist , No. 1791, 19 October 1991.
Chuck Sudetic, "U.N. Troops' Role Widens in Bosnia; 2 Towns
Get Aid," 20 November 1992.
Rodney Tasker, "Uninvited Guest," Far Eastern Economic Review ,
26 August 1993.
Nate Thayer, "Budget Blues.
"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 27
February, 1992.
. "The Grand Illusion," Far Eastern Economic Review ,
25 February 1993.
. "Shattered Peace," Far Eastern Economic Review , 11
February 1993.
. "Shot to Pieces," Far Eastern Economic Review , 20
May 1993.
.
"Sihanouk Poised to Take Control," Phnom Penh
Post , 29 January - 11 February 1993.
.
"U.N.: No on Sanctions, Yes on Logging Ban,"
Phnom Penh Post , 20 November - 03 December 1993.
.
"Wretched of the Earth," Far Eastern Economic
Review , 15 April 1993.
"Tweaking the Trunk of the United Nations," The Economist , 17
July 1993.
"Unilateral U.S. Policy On The Balkans Tilts Peace Process,"
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy , London, 28
February 1993.
Douglas Waller, "When the Bad Guy Has No Phone to Tap,"
Newsweek , 18 October 1993.
234
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E566
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000
4. N513, The Pentagon, Room 4E514
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000
5. N31, The Pentagon, Room 4E572
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000
6. Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
Naval Amphibious Base Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155
7. Commander in Chief
Special Operations Command
MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33608-6001
8. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bx)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943









11. Military Advisor to the Permanent Representative
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
799 U.N. Plaza
New York, NY 10017
12. LT Craig M. Schnese
5144 Broadmoor Bluffs
Colorado Springs, CO 80906
13. Frederick H. Fleitz
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of European Analysis
6G21
Washington, D.C. 20505
14. Dr. Bert Patenaude
953 Bryant St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
15. Leon Fuerth, Esq.
Principal Advisor to the Vice President on
National Security Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
17th St., N.W. & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Rm. 298
Washington, D.C. 20501
236


DUDLEY H LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
GAYLORD S

